Davis v. Joseph J. Magnolia, Inc.

Decision Date28 September 2012
Docket NumberCiv. Action No. 08–290 (EGS).
Citation893 F.Supp.2d 165
PartiesBlyden A. DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH J. MAGNOLIA, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

T. Cary Devorsetz, Alderman, Devorsetz & Hora, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Andrew Steven Cabana, Michael N. Petkovich, Jackson Lewis LLP, Reston, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

EMMET G. SULLIVAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Blyden A. Davis filed discrimination and retaliation claims against defendantJoseph J. Magnolia, Inc., his former employer, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code § 2–1401.01 et seq. On September 30, 2011, 815 F.Supp.2d 270 (D.D.C.2011), the Court granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing all of plaintiff's claims except for one claim of Title VII discrimination. Plaintiff and defendant have each moved for reconsideration of Court's ruling. Defendant challenges the Court's denial of summary judgment on the remaining claim in this case for discrimination in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff challenges the Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his retaliation claim. Upon consideration of the motions, the responses and replies thereto, the applicable law, the entire record, and for the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby DENIES defendant's motion for reconsideration and DENIES plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case has been set forth in the Court's prior opinions and will not be repeated here unless relevant to the pending motions.

Plaintiff, who is African–American, was hired by defendant in April 2005 as a heavy equipment operator working at construction job sites. Soon after being hired, plaintiff received two or three oral warnings in May 2005 concerning his inability to operate heavy equipment, followed by a written warning issued on June 2, 2005. The warning stated that plaintiff was unable to operate heavy equipment as required by the job, and plaintiff was transferred to a new crew, supervised by Foreman Jeff Forsythe.

Plaintiff alleges that while working with the new crew, in July 2005, a fellow employee informed him that Forsythe had referred to plaintiff as a “nigger.” Plaintiff made an internal complaint regarding Forsythe's allegedly discriminatory conduct on October 17, 2005. Following an investigation, Forsythe received a written warning for violation of company procedures and unsatisfactory behavior towards employees or customers.

On November 2, 2005, while still working on Forsythe's crew, plaintiff received another written warning. This warning stated that plaintiff had been insubordinate and violated company policies by failing to take a required training class. The warning specified that it was the “final warning before discharge.”

In its September 30, 2011 Opinion, the Court found that with respect to all but one of the allegedly discriminatory actions, defendant had produced legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the action, and summary judgment was appropriate for defendant. With respect to one of the allegedly discriminatory actions, however, the Court found that plaintiff had produced “sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer intentional discrimination.” Sept. 30, 2011, 815 F.Supp.2d at 277. Specifically, the Court found that with respect to the November 2005 written warning, plaintiff had identified “sufficient, albeit circumstantial, evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Forsythe's decision to issue plaintiff a written reprimand was the result of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 277.

The Court also granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of retaliation. Although the Court found that plaintiff had established a prima facie case of retaliation, the Court found that defendant had produced legitimate,non-discriminatory reasons for the November 2005 and January 2006 written warnings and plaintiff's termination in May 2006. Sept. 30, 2011, 815 F.Supp.2d at 282–83. The Court rejected plaintiff's arguments regarding the temporal proximity of plaintiff's complaints in October 2005 and January 2006 and the written warnings. Sept. 30, 2011, 815 F.Supp.2d at 283 (citing Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 313 (D.C.Cir.2011) ([P]ositive evidence beyond mere proximity is required to defeat the presumption that the proffered explanations are genuine.”)).

Defendant, in its motion for reconsideration, asks the Court to grant summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's sole remaining claim in the case: that plaintiff's supervisor discriminated against him by issuing a written warning allegedly as a result of plaintiff's failure to re-take a training course. In support of its motion, defendant asks the Court to consider “supplemental” facts that it did not submit in support of its initial motion. Defendant also argues that a single, written warning cannot, as a matter of law, qualify as an “adverse employment action” under Title VII.

Plaintiff, in his motion for reconsideration, argues that the Court should reverse its grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's claims of retaliation under Title VII. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the Court overlooked evidence in the record that defendant's reasons for disciplining plaintiff were without basis, pretextual, or involve disputed material facts.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEWA. Motion for Reconsideration

Under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court may revise its own interlocutory orders “at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has provided that relief under 54(b) is available “as justice requires.” Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc. v. Guest Servs., Inc, 630 F.3d 217, 227 (D.C.Cir.2011). However, a motion for reconsideration is discretionary and should not be granted unless the movant presents either newly discovered evidence or errors of law or fact that need correction. Nat'l Trust for Hist. Pres. v. Dep't of State, 834 F.Supp. 453, 455 (D.D.C.1993). Motions for reconsideration cannot be used as “an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled, nor as a vehicle for presenting theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier.” S.E.C. v. Bilzerian, 729 F.Supp.2d 9, 14 (D.D.C.2010) (internal citations omitted); accord Gaither v. District of Columbia, 771 F.Supp.2d 5, 10 (D.D.C.2011) (denying motion for reconsideration of summary judgment ruling where party sought to reargue theories and to supplement its inadequate summary judgment briefing).

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Though the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party in deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, [t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant]'s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].”Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In the District of Columbia, Local Civil Rule 7(h) requires that a motion for summary judgment “shall be accompanied by a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue, which shall include references to the parts of the record relied on to support the statement.” Local Civ. R. 7(h). This rule “places the burden on the parties and their counsel, who are most familiar with the litigation and the record, to crystallize for the district court the material facts and relevant portions of the record.” Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, 101 F.3d 145, 151 (D.C.Cir.1996) (citing Twist v. Meese, 854 F.2d 1421, 1425 (D.C.Cir.1988)). Courts in this Circuit have required strict adherence to this rule. See, e.g., id. (affirming district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to supplement its statement of material fact with additional facts).

III. DISCUSSIONA. Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration

As an initial matter, defendant's motion for reconsideration fails to set forth the applicable standard of review for a motion for reconsideration and does not make clear on what basis defendant seeks to have the Court reconsider its prior opinion. On reply, defendant clarifies that it is seeking reconsideration because “the undisputed facts establish [that] Forsythe did not even know about, let alone request, prepare, or issue the November 2005 written reprimand.” Def.'s Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Recons. (“Def.'s Reply”), ECF No. 59, at 6. Defendant argues that the Court's September 30, 2011 Opinion is based on the erroneous conclusion that “Forsythe's decision to issue plaintiff a written reprimand was the result of intentional discrimination.” Id.

The Court reached no such conclusion. The language quoted by defendant states in full that [p]laintiff has therefore identified sufficient, albeit circumstantial, evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Forsythe's decision to issue plaintiff a written reprimand was the result of intentional discrimination.” Sept. 30, 2011, 815 F.Supp.2d at 277. This was the Court's conclusion that summary judgment was inappropriate and that the issue of whether plaintiff had been discriminated against should be left to the trier of fact.

In support of its motion, defendant submits a “Supplemental Statement of Material Undisputed Facts” listing additional facts and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • Faison v. Dist. of Columbia
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • September 28, 2012
    ... ... ) Deborah Deal, lead tech in the customer services unit; (2) Earlean Davis, an employee in the customer services unit; and (3) Ms. Johnson, lead tech ... Supervisor: Michael Hailey, chief administrative officer (age 48); Joseph Allen, supervisory information technology specialist (age 38); Richard ... Id.; cf. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) (recovery limited ... ...
  • Lovely-Coley v. Dist. of Columbia
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • June 9, 2017
    ...its [m]otion," id. at 7. As previously noted, "relief under Rule 54(b) is available ‘as justice requires.’ " Davis v. Joseph J. Magnolia, Inc., 893 F.Supp.2d 165, 168 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc., 630 F.3d at 227 ). In deciding whether "justice requires" reversa......
  • In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • May 12, 2021
    ...a party may not rely on facts that could have been alleged in the underlying motion but were not." Davis v. Joseph J. Magnolia, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 165, 169 (D.D.C. 2012). Thus, "[e]ven if evidence is 'newly raised,' it is not considered 'new' evidence if it was 'previously available'" to......
  • Said v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • July 18, 2019
    ...2d 70, 75 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Singh v. George Wash. Univ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) ); see Davis v. Joseph J. Magnolia, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 165, 168 (D.D.C. 2012) ("[A] motion for reconsideration is discretionary and should not be granted unless the movant presents either ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT