Davis v. Locke

Decision Date26 July 1991
Docket NumberNos. 90-5008,90-5556,s. 90-5008
PartiesKenny DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lt. James LOCKE and Lt. Gemelli, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

George L. Waas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants-appellants.

William R. Amlong, Amlong & Amlong, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before HATCHETT and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

This case involves a prison inmate who alleged that his civil rights were violated by two prison guards upon apprehension after an attempted escape. Appellee Kenny Davis claimed that appellants James Locke and Norman Gemelli violated his constitutional rights when they dropped him, headfirst, from the back of a pickup truck while his hands were shackled behind his back. After a jury trial, Davis was awarded punitive damages and attorneys' fees against Locke and Gemelli. On appeal, Locke and Gemelli challenge the jury's verdict and the award of attorneys' fees. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

Davis was incarcerated at Hendry Correctional Institution (HCI). On September 19, 1984, Davis attempted to escape from HCI and was recaptured by Locke and Gemelli in an orange grove near the prison. For the trip back to HCI, Davis was confined in a dog cage on the back of the guards' truck with his hands shackled behind his back. Davis testified that Locke and Gemelli taunted him with racial slurs and threatened to "teach [him] a lesson" when they returned to HCI. 1

At the prison, the guards allegedly grabbed Davis by his ankles and pulled him from the dog cage. Because his hands were shacked behind his back, Davis claimed that he landed on his head. The guards then pulled Davis to his feet and took him to the prison medical facility for treatment before returning him to confinement.

Davis filed a pro se complaint in the district court on November 20, 1984. With the assistance of court-appointed counsel Davis filed an amended complaint on March 14, 1986. The amended complaint sought civil damages against Locke, Gemelli and prison superintendent Charles P. Worthington under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1983, 1985(3) and 1986. Davis contended that the defendants violated his constitutional rights to be free from, among other things, cruel and unusual punishment, the use of excessive force, and racial discrimination. Davis also sought to recover his attorneys' fees.

At trial, Davis offered expert psychiatric testimony that he suffered severe psychological injuries as a result of this incident. The jury did not hear any evidence that Davis suffered physical injuries attributable to his fall. The verdict form presented a series of questions pertaining to each defendant. The jury was asked to decide whether each defendant violated Davis's constitutional rights by: (1) placing him in the dog cage; (2) taunting him with racial slurs; (3) causing him to fall from the back of the truck; (4) punching him in the face at the prison medical facility; and (5) placing him in solitary confinement.

The jury verdict acquitted Worthington on all counts, but found that Locke and Gemelli violated Davis's constitutional rights by causing him to fall from the back of the truck. The jury awarded no compensatory damages, but permitted Davis to recover $1,750 in punitive damages from both Locke and Gemelli. The district court denied Locke and Gemelli's motion for JNOV. Davis then moved for a new trial as to the final judgment in favor of Worthington.

While Davis's motion was pending, Locke and Gemelli appealed the denial of their motion for JNOV. That appeal was dismissed by this court on jurisdictional grounds on January 25, 1990, because Davis's motion for new trial had not yet been decided when the appeal was filed. Davis's motion for new trial was denied on November 29, 1989, at which time the district court also granted Davis's motion to tax costs. Locke and Gemelli filed an amended notice of appeal, regarding the final judgment and the decision to tax costs, on December 26, 1989.

Davis's motion for attorneys' fees was heard by a United States magistrate on March 9, 1990, and the magistrate issued his report and recommendation on April 13, 1990. The district court awarded Davis $62,643.20 in attorneys' fees in a final judgment on July 18, 1990. Locke and Gemelli filed a second amended notice of appeal, which added the award of attorneys' fees to the other issues that had been appealed previously.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Locke and Gemelli's Notices of Appeal

Davis argues that this court has no jurisdiction over Locke and Gemelli's appeal because their notices of appeal were filed untimely. The defendants filed their original Notice of Appeal on September 25, 1989, while Davis awaited a ruling on his pending motion for new trial. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4) provides that a notice of appeal is invalid if filed during the pendency of a timely motion for new trial, so the September 21, 1989 notice of appeal was premature and ineffective.

After the district court denied Davis's motion for new trial, Locke and Gemelli filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on December 26, 1989. A Second Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on June 28, 1990. Davis contends that the amendments are inconsequential because "a notice of appeal that is void at the outset cannot by amendment become anything other than void." Trinidad Corp. v. Maru, 781 F.2d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir.1986). In this circuit, however, notices of appeal are to be liberally construed. Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Industries, Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1528 (11th Cir.1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 169, 109 S.Ct. 987, 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989). Moreover, in Trinidad the Ninth Circuit chastised the appellants but disregarded their designation of a "second amended notice of appeal" and treated the pleading as the new notice required by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 781 F.2d at 1362.

Davis has presented no evidence that he might be prejudiced by our acceptance of this appeal, and Locke and Gemelli's amended notices of appeal specified all orders of the district court from which relief was sought. Compare Osterneck, 825 F.2d at 1528-29 (notice of appeal will not be expanded to include judgments and orders not specified unless intent to appeal is apparent from the face of the notice). This court subsequently notified Locke and Gemelli that their appeal had been properly filed and docketed. Accordingly, we will construe the "amended" notices of appeal without reference to the original, invalid notice of appeal and proceed to the merits of this case.

B. Davis's Claim Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983

Locke and Gemelli appeal the district court's denial of their motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") on this claim. On review, we must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 (11th Cir.1990). Reversal is proper only if the facts and inferences point so strongly in favor of the movant that reasonable jurors could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Id.

Davis contends that Locke and Gemelli violated his eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his fourteenth amendment right to due process of law when they pulled him from the dog cage and caused him to fall to the ground. Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for the deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities protected by the constitution or the laws of the United States.

The eighth amendment "prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, or the infliction of pain totally without penological justification." Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 321 (11th Cir.1987). In the context of prison discipline, we must consider

the distinction between, on the one hand, "punishment" in the strict sense and, on the other, immediately necessary coercive measures undertaken to obtain compliance with a reasonable prison rule or regulation. Punishment in the strict sense involves a penalty which is deliberately administered after reflection and evaluation in response to conduct occurring in the past.... Punishment in this sense is not designed to bring an ongoing violation to a halt.

Id. at 322 (footnote omitted). However, "an isolated assault by an individual guard on an inmate is not, within the meaning of the eighth amendment, punishment." George v. Evans, 633 F.2d 413, 415 (5th Cir.1980).

Even if a physical assault does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, "the use of undue force by a prison guard is actionable as a deprivation of fourteenth amendment due process rights." Id., 633 F.2d at 416. Moreover, the fourteenth amendment is violated "where prison officers continue to employ force or other coercive measures after the necessity for such coercive action has ceased." Ort, 813 F.2d at 327.

The Supreme Court has explained that this issue turns on "whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973)). At the time of the incident in question, Davis had been recaptured after his escape from prison. He was confined in a dog cage with his hands shackled behind his back. Under these circumstances, the "ongoing violation" of escape had been terminated, and a jury could reasonably conclude that Davis posed no continuing threat to Locke or Gemelli.

The record evidence supports a jury determination that Locke and Gemelli intended to punish Davis for his attempted escape and did so through the use of excessive force, in violation of the ...

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