Davis v. Margolis

• Decision Date: 28 February 1928
• Citation: 107 Conn. 417,140 A. 823
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: DAVIS v. MARGOLIS.

140 A. 823

107 Conn. 417

DAVIS v. MARGOLIS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 28, 1928

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Edwin C. Dickenson Judge.

Action by Joseph J. Davis, administrator, against Paul Margolis, to recover damages for the alleged negligence of defendant tried to the court. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Error, judgment reversed, and cause remanded, with directions.

Joseph J. Davis and Herman J. Weisman, both of Waterbury, for appellant.

Richardson Bronson, of Waterbury, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, BANKS, and ELLS JJ.

WHEELER, C.J.

This action is brought to recover damages for the instantaneous death of the plaintiff's intestate, which occurred in a collision at a grade crossing of a steam railroad train with the automobile of defendant, in which plaintiff's decedent was a passenger. The case was tried to the court. The grounds of the appeal, though three in number, in fact are one, and all are based upon the conclusion of the court upon the facts found that:

" The defendant's driver was proceeding as would the ordinarily prudent man under like circumstances at the time of the collision, and the defendant is not liable for damages to the plaintiff's intestate."

The defendant supports the judgment in his favor upon the ground that the conclusion drawn by the trier from the facts found as to whether or not there was negligence was for him, and unreviewable by this court. Our question is whether the conclusion thus reached is one of fact for the trier, or one of law and reviewable by us. We will first give a summary of the essential facts found, then ascertain the rule of law by which we determine whether a conclusion drawn from the facts found is one of fact or of law, and finally apply the rule to the facts found.

The defendant, on October 15, 1923, was en route from his home in Waterbury to Providonce in his own automobile, operated by his son Samuel at his request and as his agent. There were three passengers in the automobile, one of whom was plaintiff's intestate, the wife of the owner of the car. The tracks of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company cross the state road between Hartford and Willimantic at an acute angle at a crossing known as Columbia Crossing. As the automobile approached this crossing, traveling in an easterly direction, it was being operated at a moderate speed, and the driver, when the car had arrived at a short distance from the crossing, reduced its speed to nearly a stop. There was a curve in the railroad's right of way about 600 feet northeasterly from the crossing. Persons traveling easterly on this highway had a clear view, except for a few trees just beyond the curve, of an engine and train, approaching easterly, for a distance of about 400 feet from the crossing. In order to warn passengers traveling on the highway of the approach of a train, there was stationed, adjacent to this crossing, a signal light, which was operated by flashing red whenever a train was approaching the crossing, and continued to so operate until the train had passed over the crossing. This flash-light was visible to those traveling easterly on the highway for a distance of 400 to 500 feet from the crossing. When the train in question was at a distance of about one-quarter of a mile from the crossing several long, loud blasts were blown from its engine whistle, and shorter blasts continued until the collision. All of the windows of the automobile were closed, except the one by the side of the driver. No occupant of the automobile heard a whistle or the sound of the approaching train, nor did they see it. The signal light was flashing red, and had been so flashing for some time before the automobile reached the crossing. The driver saw the red light, but thought it was the reflection of the sun on the signal light. As the driver brought the car nearly to a stop, just before driving across the tracks, either his father, the defendant, or one Silver, upon the rear seat, asked the driver what he was waiting for, and said that there was nothing coming. The driver, as he approached the crossing, looked to the right and left, and did not observe an approaching train. Upon hearing the question of his father or Silver, he proceeded to cross the tracks, and had almost cleared them when the automobile was struck by the train, and the plaintiff's fintestate was instantly killed; she herself was at all times in the exercise of due care.

The conclusion of the trial court that the driver proceeded as an ordinarily prudent man under like circumstances would have proceeded was obtained by determining what would have been the standard of conduct of the ordinarily prudent man under like circumstances, and then by applying that standard to the facts found, in measuring the driver's conduct by that standard. A conclusion of this character is often called one of fact, strictly speaking it is one of law and fact, involving, first, the ascertainment of the standard and then its application to the case in hand. The conclusion or inference will not be reviewable, " where the facts have been properly found, unless the court can see from the record that in drawing such inference the trier imposed some duty upon the parties which the law did not impose, or absolved them from some duty which the law required of them under the circumstances, or in some other respect violated some rule or principle of law." Farrell v. Waterbury Horse R. R. Co., 60 Conn. 239, 257, 21 A. 675, 680; Dundon et al. v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 67 Conn. 266, 269, 34 A. 1041. If reasoning men of impartiality might reasonably differ in the conclusion or inference reached, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trier. The inference or conclusions of fact drawn by the trier from the evidence will not be reviewed by us, except through the method of correction of the finding. But, when the facts have been found by the court, " nothing remained," said Judge Loomis, " but for the court in the exercise of its legal judgment to draw its inference from the facts," and " in such a case the conclusion of the court can always be reviewed by the appellate court. An erroneous conclusion is an error of law and not an error in an inference of fact." Hayden v. Allyn, 55 Conn. 280, 289, 11 A. 31, 34; Tyler v. Waddingham, 58 Conn. 375, 386, 20 A. 335, 8 L.R.A. 657; Neff v. Neff, 96 Conn. 273, 275, 114 A. 126.

In Winsted Hosiery Co. v. New Britain Knitting Co., 69 Conn. 565, 575, 38 A. 310, 311, we held:

" The judgment or ultimate conclusion of a court upon the special facts in issue, as ascertained from the evidence and settled by the trier, is a conclusion of law, and as such reviewable by this court; and this is true whether such facts are settled by a special verdict of a jury or a special finding of a judge."

Judge Hamersley points out that the phrasing of the statute of 1821, preserved unchanged in succeeding revisions, seems to authorize in a trial to the court that the judge " settle the facts...