Davis v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty.

Decision Date22 March 2022
Docket Number3:17-CV-00773
PartiesSARA SHEA “SALLY” DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, [1] Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARVIN E. ASPEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In April 2020, we granted summary judgment to Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County Tennessee on Plaintiff Sara Shea “Sally” Davis's claims against it. Davis v. Metro Parks &amp Recreation Dep't (Davis I), No 3:17-CV-00773, 2020 WL 1915247, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 20 2020). The Sixth Circuit affirmed our decision in large part, but it reversed our decision to grant summary judgment on Plaintiff's retaliatory harassment claim and remanded the case. Davis v. Metro Parks & Recreation Dep't (Davis II), 854 Fed.Appx. 707, 719 (6th Cir. 2021). Defendant now renews its motion for summary judgment on this claim. (Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 86).)[2] For the following reasons, we deny Defendant's motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

We take the relevant factual background largely from our previous opinion in Davis I and the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Davis II. To avoid cluttering the factual background with quotation marks and brackets, we have generally refrained from using such notations when relying upon these opinions for background facts. Where necessary, we have also set forth additional undisputed facts based on the record, including the parties' Local Rule 56.01 submissions on remand and the materials cited therein. (See Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Its Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Def.'s SOF) (Dkt. No. 88); Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Facts (“Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s SOF”) (Dkt. No. 96-1);[3] Plaintiff's Statement of Additonal [sic] Facts (“Pl.'s SOAF”) (Dkt. No. 96-2);[4] Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Facts (“Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s SOAF”) (Dkt. No. 102).)

From October 1978 to July 2017, Plaintiff was an employee at one of Defendant's departments, the Metro Parks and Recreation Department (the Parks Department). (Dkt. No. 18 ¶ 7); Davis II, 854 Fed.Appx. at 707. During her tenure at the Parks Department, Plaintiff worked in the Community Recreation Division and the Revenue Producing Division. Davis II, 854 Fed.Appx. at 707. Plaintiff had no disputes at her workplace until 2011, when the Parks Department hired Tommy Lynch to be its director. Id. at 707-08. According to Plaintiff, Lynch created a “good ole' boys atmosphere, ” which he formalized in 2013 by merging the application process for two Assistant Director positions in Special Services and Community Programs. Id. at 708 (citation omitted).

Plaintiff applied for the position of Assistant Director for Special Services, which was one level above her then-position as Superintendent of Golf. Id. After panel interviews for both assistant director positions (Special Services and Community Programs), the hiring committee ranked Plaintiff as number “1” in the process. Id. But long-time male employee John Holmes received the Special Services position, while Plaintiff received the Community Programs position. Id. In Plaintiff's view, her experience in the Revenue division made her the most qualified candidate for the Special Services position. Id. Believing that she had been a victim of gender discrimination, Plaintiff filed a complaint about the promotional process with Defendant's HR department on June 27, 2013. Id.; Davis I, 2020 WL 1915247, at *1; (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s SOF ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff asserts that she began experiencing retaliation the following day, when Lynch's assistant refused to allow Plaintiff to access her own personnel file, to which Plaintiff previously had easy access. Davis II, 854 Fed.Appx. at 708. Immediately thereafter, Lynch threatened Plaintiff's job, informing her that she might not last in the department for the remaining year and four months until her eligible retirement date. Id. Soon after that, Lynch's “open door” policy to speak with him, which he granted to everyone in the Parks Department, no longer applied to Plaintiff. Id. Around the same time, Lynch made sure someone else always sat in on his biweekly meetings with Plaintiff. Id. Lynch also spoke with Plaintiff's peers about her complaint and questioned Plaintiff's “loyalty” for accusing him of gender discrimination. Id.; (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 19.)

In July 2013, Lynch informed Plaintiff that her gender discrimination complaint had been turned over to HR to be investigated. (Dkt. No. 47-1 at 8.) A month later, Plaintiff met with two HR employees to discuss how to stop the retaliation and harassment Lynch was directing at her. (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s SOAF ¶¶ 25, 26.) At the meeting, Plaintiff explained that she was working in a hostile environment; in response, the HR employees said that they would stop the retaliation and harassment against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 27.)

In October 2013, Lynch evaluated Plaintiff's work performance. Davis I, 2020 WL 1915247, at *2. The scores Plaintiff received were the lowest possible on the evaluation form. Davis II, 854 Fed.Appx. at 708. They also were the lowest scores Plaintiff had ever received in her career. Id. Plaintiff believed the evaluation was illegitimate and returned it to Lynch. Id. Lynch then amended the evaluation to include higher scores, with the revised score being a 3.31 out of 4. Id.; Davis I, 2020 WL 1915247, at *2. Lynch evaluated Plaintiff again at the end of 2013. (Dkt. No. 40-6 at 4-5.) Plaintiff's average score in this evaluation was 3.35 out of 4. (Id. at 5; Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s SOF ¶ 7.)

In June 2014, Lynch issued a written reprimand via email to Plaintiff for missing a work meeting. Davis II, 854 Fed.Appx. at 708-09. Approximately six months later, Lynch issued another written reprimand via email to Plaintiff, this time for missing a work deadline. Id. at 709. Following this second reprimand, Plaintiff spoke with Lynch about the email, and she claims that he spoke to her like a child and dismissed her with a wave of his hand. Id. For his part, Lynch admitted to “being irate” and raising his voice at Plaintiff and other employees at times. Id. Plaintiff further contends that Lynch did not reprimand other assistant directors for similar conduct, but Lynch claims that he verbally reprimanded other employees for being unprepared at meetings. Id. In addition, Lynch testified that he had issued written reprimands to other employees for unrelated issues. Id.

In July 2015, Lynch completed another work evaluation for Plaintiff. Id. He gave Plaintiff's performance a 2.88 rating on a scale where two was considered acceptable and three was considered commendable. Id. In his rationale for the score, Lynch wrote:

Sally has done a credible job in Recreation but her relationship with peers in the department and her supervisor continues to deteriorate. She has been reprimanded within the past year: and yet seems to think she is entitled to not respond to her supervisor in certain situations.

Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiff, however, disputes that her relationships with peers had deteriorated. Id. at 710. A few days after Lynch's evaluation, Plaintiff requested another meeting with HR to discuss her complaints regarding Lynch. (Dkt. No. 40-9 at 6-7; Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 37.)

In February 2016, Lynch appointed Monique Odom as Deputy Director of the Parks Department. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s SOF ¶ 11; Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 40.) As the Deputy Director, Odom held an equivalent rank and a functionally similar position in the department as the assistant directors, including Plaintiff. Davis II, 854 Fed.Appx. at 710, 715; (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 41.)

In April 2016, Lynch informed Plaintiff that she would now be reporting to Odom, who would then report to Lynch. Davis II, 854 Fed.Appx. at 710; (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 43.) Around the same time, Lynch stopped speaking to Plaintiff except at group meetings, and Plaintiff began having bi-weekly meetings with Odom instead of Lynch. Davis II, 854 Fed.Appx. at 710; (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 48.) Plaintiff was the first assistant director supervised by Odom, but Odom eventually supervised all the assistant directors within the Parks Department. Davis II, 854 Fed.Appx. at 715. Plaintiff expressed to Odom many times her concern about the pattern of retaliation, harassment, and hostile work environment she felt she was being forced to endure, including the fact that she had to report to Odom. (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 52.)

In September 2016, Lynch issued a written reprimand to Plaintiff for ignoring his instructions. Davis II, 854 Fed.Appx. at 710, 716. In early January 2017, Lynch transferred Plaintiff's assistant of 14 years, Robert Benson, to another division without consulting or notifying Plaintiff beforehand. Id. at 710; (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 55.) Neither Plaintiff nor Benson was provided with an explanation for the move, but Odom said she supported the move and had planned to move Benson once Lynch retired and she became director of the department. Davis II, 854 Fed.Appx. at 710-11. Later that month, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), arguing that she had been subjected to harassment and intimidation after filing a sex discrimination complaint with HR. Id. at 711. A little more than five months later, on July 2, 2017, Plaintiff voluntarily retired. Id.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit in April 2017, alleging retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights...

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