Davis v. Milwaukee County, 00-C-0786.

Decision Date30 September 2002
Docket NumberNo. 00-C-0786.,00-C-0786.
Citation225 F.Supp.2d 967
PartiesAllen Tony DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. MILWAUKEE COUNTY and Robert B. Kliesmet, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

Allen Tony Davis, pro se.

Mary Ellen Poulos, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

ADELMAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Allen Tony Davis, a Wisconsin state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Supermax Correctional Institution, brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that when he was a pre-trial detainee at the Milwaukee County Jail ("the jail") defendants Milwaukee County and its former sheriff, Robert Kliesmet, violated his constitutional right of access to the courts. Defendants now move for summary judgment.

I. FACTS

Plaintiff was detained at the jail between October 27, 1995 and November 26, 1996 having been charged with four counts of sexual assault of a child. During that time detainees at the jail had no access to legal materials of any kind.1 Plaintiff asserts that the absence of legal materials hindered his efforts to defend himself in the sexual assault case and to pursue five civil cases in which he was the plaintiff.

The cases which form the basis for plaintiff's denial of access to the courts claim are as follows: (1) Milwaukee County Circuit Court Case No. F-941186, the criminal case on which he was detained and later convicted; (2) Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 95-3555, an appeal of a § 1983 case brought by plaintiff against state corrections officials in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which was dismissed by the court of appeals on December 19, 1995; (3) Wisconsin Court of Appeals Case No. 96-2468-W, in which plaintiff, while detained at the jail, unsuccessfully petitioned for a supervisory writ directing the jail to give him visitation rights; (4) Wisconsin Court of Appeals Case No. 96-2604-W, which also involved an unsuccessful petition by plaintiff for a supervisory writ regarding visitation rights at the jail; (5) Western District of Wisconsin Case No. 99-C-445, a § 1983 case brought by plaintiff in 1999 in which he alleged that he had been subjected to unlawful corporal punishment at the jail, and which was dismissed by the court sua sponte for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (6) Western District of Wisconsin Case No. 99-C-447, also a § 1983 case brought in 1999, in which plaintiff challenged a number of conditions of his confinement at the jail, and which was also dismissed sua sponte for failure to exhaust.2

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is required "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Material" facts are those facts that might affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute over such facts is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.

The movant bears the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the court concludes there is no genuine issue of material fact but that the law compels a judgment in favor of the non-movant, it may grant summary judgment in favor of the nonmovant, even in the absence of a cross-motion for summary judgment, so long as the movant has been provided with an adequate opportunity to present its evidence and arguments. See 10A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (1998); see also Kassbaum v. Steppenwolf Productions, Inc., 236 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir.2000), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 41, 151 L.Ed.2d 13 (2001) ("It is generally recognized that a court has the power sua sponte to grant summary judgment to a non-movant when there has been a motion but no cross-motion."); Goldstein v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 86 F.3d 749, 750-51 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that grant of summary judgment to non-movant was proper where movant knew summary judgment was being considered, district court agreed there were no material factual disputes, but found that facts compelled judgment in favor of non-movant as a matter of law); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Village of Orland Park, 139 F.Supp.2d 950, 957 (N.D.Ill.2001) ("This judicial power furthers the policy goals of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, in that it enables a court to promptly dispose of a case in which there are no genuine issues of material fact.").

III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard for Establishing Liability on Claim of Denial of Access to the Courts

It is well established that prisoners and pre-trial detainees have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Casteel v. Pieschek, 3 F.3d 1050, 1053 (7th Cir. 1993). This right "requires prison authorities to assist inmates in preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491.

To establish a denial of his constitutional right an inmate must show that the jail had deficient legal facilities and that he was hindered in his efforts to pursue a particular legal claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996); see also Alston v. DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that inmate must establish (1) the failure of prison officials to assist in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers and (2) some quantum of detriment caused by the challenged conduct). Thus, even if the inmate can establish an "absolute deprivation of access to all legal materials," Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 n. 4, 116 S.Ct. 2174, his claim will fail absent identification of some injury linked to the deprivation.

He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known. Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable even to file a complaint.

Id. at 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174.

Moreover, the injury requirement is not satisfied by all types of frustrated legal claims.

Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.

Id. at 355, 116 S.Ct. 2174.

However, to establish injury an inmate need not show that if he had been provided with adequate legal facilities he would have prevailed in a lawsuit. Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir.1998); see also Hoard v. Reddy, 175 F.3d 531, 533 (7th Cir.1999). Rather, he need only show that he was prevented "from litigating a non-frivolous case." Walters, 163 F.3d at 434.

The Seventh Circuit has not discussed in any detail the standard for determining non-frivolousness and at what stage in the underlying case it should be applied.3 But Walters suggests that the determination should be made based on the pleadings in the frustrated case(s), applying a standard similar to that found in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Id. at 436 (analyzing the complaints in several of the underlying cases to determine whether "these suits were colorable rather than frivolous"). The application of such a standard eliminates the need for an extensive analysis of the merits of the underlying case, see id. at 434 (stating that trials within trials should be avoided when possible), and makes it less likely that a court will consider a merits-based determination in an underlying case in which prison officials hindered a plaintiff's legal efforts.4

Under § 1915A, the court must screen a prisoner's complaint against a governmental entity or officer to determine whether it is is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court must take all well-pleaded allegations as true and, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, dismiss only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir.2000).

This standard includes both a legal and a factual component. Gladney v. Pendleton, 302 F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir.2002); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). The legal component requires the court to determine whether, even if all of the allegations are true, there is some legal basis for the claim. If not, the case must be dismissed. See Walters, 163 F.3d at 436 (holding that underlying claim that prisoner wanted to see a doctor for a kidney problem was frivolous because, without more, such an allegation does not implicate the Eighth Amendment).

The factual component allows a suit to be dismissed if the facts are so delusional as to be inherently unbelievable. Id. "[N]o evidentiary hearing is required in a prisoner's case...

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