Davis v. Mitchell
| Decision Date | 23 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:99-CV-1649.,1:99-CV-1649. |
| Citation | 110 F.Supp.2d 607 |
| Parties | Wiley DAVIS, Jr., Petitioner, v. Betty MITCHELL, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
John P. Parker, Cleveland, OH, Patricia A. Millhoff, Akron, OH, for Wiley Davis, Jr., Petitioners.
Charles L. Wille, Office of the Attorney General, Capital Crimes Section, Columbus, OH, Jon W. Oebker, Office of the Attorney General, Cleveland, OH, Matthew J. Lampke, Office of the Attorney General, Employment Law Section, Columbus, OH, for Betty Mitchell, Warden, Respondents.
In this death penalty case, Petitioner Wiley Davis, Jr., petitions for a writ of habeas corpus [Doc. 26]. In support of his petition, Davis says constitutional error attended his conviction and resulting death sentence.
Respondent Warden Betty Mitchell says Petitioner Davis is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. First, Respondent Mitchell maintains that Petitioner Davis has procedurally defaulted many of his claims for relief. With regard to the remaining claims, Respondent Mitchell argues that Petitioner Davis either fails to show any constitutional violation or raises claims not cognizable on habeas review.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Petitioner Davis has failed to establish his right to a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, the Court denies Davis's petition.
In evaluating the petition, the Court first describes the facts relating to Petitioner Davis's crime of conviction. Second, the Court reviews Davis's direct appeals and attempts to receive post-conviction relief. Third, the Court decides whether Davis has exhausted his state remedies and has procedurally defaulted any of his grounds for relief. Fourth, the Court considers Davis's request for an evidentiary hearing. Fifth, the Court sets forth the standard of review applicable to Davis's petition. Finally, the Court substantively reviews Davis's grounds for relief.
Currently, Petitioner Wiley Davis awaits execution for the murder of Amy Perkins. A jury found that Davis murdered Perkins on November 26, 1991, shortly after kidnapping her from a downtown Cleveland parking lot.
On that date, Davis was observed at the kidnapping scene at 8:15 a.m. At a downtown Cleveland parking lot, parking lot patron Mattie Baker observed Davis pacing back and forth in the parking lot as she parked her car. By the time Baker exited her car, Davis was no longer in sight.
Having forgotten her parking space number, Baker soon returned to her vehicle. As she returned, Baker saw Davis sitting in the driver's seat of the car parked next to her vehicle. Baker described the car as a small gray Toyota with Texas license plates. Amy Perkins owned the vehicle. Baker testified that a white female sat in the passenger's seat of the car. The female had a "terrified look" on her face, prompting Baker to seek help. However, the car left the parking lot before Baker was able to find any assistance.
Within an hour of Baker's encounter with Davis, Gwendolyn Brice saw Amy Perkins's car sitting at a stop sign near Brice's home. She saw a woman in the car motion as if to push something away just before a "pop" sound emanated from the vehicle. Brice then saw the passenger side window shatter and the woman's head drop.
Shortly thereafter, Marjorie Johnson arrived at Brice's house and parked behind Perkins's car. Johnson saw a black male in the driver's seat and a white female in the passenger's seat. The female's head was hanging out of the window. Upon seeing Johnson, the driver pulled away at a high rate of speed.
Nancy Brown next spotted Perkins's vehicle as she waited with her son and his friends for their school bus to arrive. Brown saw the car cross the intersection near the bus stop while the driver struggled to close the passenger's door.
After the car passed, the children told Brown they saw someone lying in some nearby bushes. Brown ran to the bushes, where she discovered a nude white female struggling to speak. After calling 911 from a house in the area, Brown covered the woman with a borrowed blanket.
The ambulance arrived and took the woman to the hospital, where she eventually died. David Perkins later identified the woman as his wife, Amy Perkins.
Soon after the shooting, the police located Amy Perkins's gray Toyota in the parking lot of a deli. The car contained shattered glass and fresh blood. Approximately five to ten feet from the driver's side of the car, the police recovered a Federal .32 caliber shell casing. Inside the car, the police found Amy Perkins's clothing, checkbook, and some personal items. They appeared to have been rifled through.
Later that morning, Petitioner Davis appeared at his sister's house. Davis's sister lived approximately three hundred yards from the Toyota's final location. After coming into his sister's house, Davis told his sister and her boyfriend that he had accidentally shot someone during an altercation. He then asked his sister's boyfriend, Alfonso Herring, Jr., to give him a change of clothes and to hide his gun. Herring agreed. After changing out of his blood-stained sweatsuit, Davis left his sister's home at 9:40 a.m.
A few hours later, Cleveland police officers arrested Davis at his girlfriend's house. A search of the house uncovered a box of Federal brand .32 caliber ammunition and a blood-stained right shoe. Herring later gave to the police Davis's gun and the clothes Davis had worn on the morning of Amy Perkins's murder.
Firearm testing showed that the gun Davis gave to Herring had fired the casing found in the deli parking lot. And the Cuyahoga County Coroner's Officer identified the blood stains on Davis's shoe and sweatsuit as Type O — the same type as Amy Perkins.
Regarding the state's later claim that Amy Perkins was murdered during the course of a robbery, the police did not recover any jewelry from the car or Perkins's body. However, David Perkins testified that his wife always wore a custom-made engagement wedding ring and a Rolex watch. He said these items had been missing since Amy's death.
On December 5, 1991, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Davis on a six-count indictment. The first two counts charged aggravated murder under Ohio Revised Code § 2903.01(A) and (B). Each count carried three felony-murder capital specifications — kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and rape or attempted rape. The remaining counts charged kidnapping1, rape2, aggravated robbery3, and having a weapon while under a disability.4
Davis was tried before the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. The jury convicted Davis on all counts and all specifications thereto. Following the jury's recommendation, the trial court sentenced Davis to death. The court also ordered Davis to spend the twenty-sixth day of each month in solitary confinement until his execution.
Following his conviction, Petitioner Davis appealed to the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals. In 1995, the appellate court affirmed Davis's conviction, and set aside only that portion of Davis's sentence calling for his placement in solitary confinement on the anniversary of Amy Perkins's death.
After the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, Petitioner Davis sought review with the Ohio Supreme Court. In 1996, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed both Davis's conviction and sentence.
Davis next filed a state-court petition for post-conviction relief. After the state trial court denied the petition, Davis sought review with the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals. In 1998, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Davis then filed an appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction.
On January 7, 2000, Davis filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court now considers his petition.
A habeas corpus petitioner must exhaust his available state remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To determine whether the exhaustion requirement is met, the Court examines whether the petitioner "has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).
As explained in Part II, Petitioner Davis has pursued all opportunities for relief at the state level, both on direct appeal and in post-conviction proceedings. Petitioner Davis has thus exhausted available state court remedies.
Federal courts "will not review questions of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests upon a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Applied to the habeas context, this doctrine stops federal court review of claims that a state court has declined to address because of the petitioner's noncompliance with a state procedural requirement. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). "In these cases, the state judgment rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has established a four-step analysis to determine whether a claim has been procedurally defaulted. See Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135 (6th Cir.1986). Under this test, the Court must determine (1) whether the petitioner failed to comply with an applicable state procedural rule; (2) whether the state courts actually enforced the state procedural sanction; (3) whether the state procedural bar is an "adequate and independent" state ground on which the state can foreclose federal review; and, if the previous elements are met, (4) wh...
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