Davis v. Moran

• Decision Date: 06 April 1987
• Docket Number: No. 16161,16161
• Citation: 735 P.2d 1014,112 Idaho 703
• Parties: William R. DAVIS and Julia D. Davis, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Mark F. MORAN, M.D.; Bannock Regional Medical Center; Intermountain Cancer Clinic; and John Does I Through X, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1014

735 P.2d 1014

112 Idaho 703

William R. DAVIS and Julia D. Davis, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Mark F. MORAN, M.D.; Bannock Regional Medical Center; Intermountain Cancer Clinic; and John Does I Through X, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 16161.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

April 6, 1987.

Christen L. Schmutz, and Lowell N. Hawkes (argued), of Hawkes, Esplin & Burnham, Pocatello, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Richard C. Fields, and Kristi Emig-Mark (argued), of Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton, Boise, for defendant-respondent Moran.

Gary T. Dance (argued), of Merrill & Merrill, Pocatello, for defendant-respondent Bannock Regional Medical Center.

DONALDSON, Chief Justice.

In February of 1982, plaintiff-appellant, Julia Davis, had a modified radical mastectomy of her left breast. She then underwent cancer radiation therapy at defendant-respondent, Intermountain Cancer Clinic (ICC), located at defendant-respondent, Bannock Regional Medical Center (BRMC), in Pocatello. This radiation therapy occurred between February 23, 1982 and April 7, 1982, and was given under the supervision of defendant-respondent, Dr. Mark F. Moran. During that treatment, Davis alleges that her spinal cord was either exposed to an excessive dose of radiation or otherwise irradiated from an overlap of the dual-beam radiation field. However, nothing evidenced the excessive spinal cord irradiation, and following the therapy Davis was able to perform normal daily activities. She had no pain or loss of function in her legs or lower back at that time.

In early 1983, Davis began to experience spasms in her left leg and pain in her feet. In April of 1983, she was hospitalized and underwent tests at BRMC. However, none of her doctors were able to determine the source or cause of her symptoms. In May of 1983, Davis spent an additional eight days being tested at the University of Utah Medical Center to determine the cause of her problems. At that time, the doctors feared that the cancer had spread to her spinal cord. In June of 1983, Davis received a letter from Dr. Richard Baringer, one of the doctors connected with Davis's testing at the University of Utah. He explained that he had a suspicion that Davis's difficulties were related to her prior radiation treatment, and that he had asked his staff to seek further information on this possibility with a focus upon the doses of radiation and the exact way in which they were administered. That inquiry initiated by Dr. Baringer eventually lead to the discovery of the overlapping radiation fields.

Dr. Frederic Gibbs, who also looked into Davis's prior radiation treatment to determine the cause of her spinal damage, explained that although excessive spinal cord irradiation may have occurred in 1982, it would have been impossible to detect at that time. Davis learned of Dr. Gibbs' findings when she met with the Utah doctors on August 25, 1983. Dr. Gibbs explained that the exact mechanism of injury is not understood. Detectable damage only follows after a period of time, related to genetics, when the body reaches the critical point where the blood supply becomes inadequate. This is often after several years. He stated that, "[t]he damage by the radiation is not clinically detectable by any means until the functional defect occurs."

A claim was filed on July 27, 1984. A prelitigation screening panel hearing was held, and its decision filed four months later. Suit was then filed on December 27, 1984. Defendants then moved for summary judgment on two bases: (1) that the Davises' action was barred by the statute of limitations, I.C. § 5-219(4); and (2) that the Davises' failure to timely file a Notice of Tort Claim barred their action as against BRMC and ICC. The district court granted summary judgment based on the running of the statute of limitations from which the Davises now appeal.

I

The first issue that we must address under the facts of this case is which statute of limitations applies. The statute relied upon by the district court was I.C. § 5-219(4) which governs actions for damages for malpractice. ¹ Other statutes, I.C §§ 5-242 through -244, more specifically govern limitations on actions based on injuries caused by ionizing radiation. The applicable time period is contained in I.C. § 5-243 which reads:

"5-243. Limitation of action for ionizing radiation injuries.--No action or proceeding may be brought to recover for an ionizing radiation injury more than three (3) years after the person suffering such injury had knowledge or ought reasonably to have had knowledge of having suffered the injury and of the cause thereof, but in no event more than thirty (30) years from the date of the last occurrence to which the injury is attributed."

However, I.C. § 5-242 reads:

"5-242. Ionizing radiation injuries--Purpose of act.--For purposes of this act, 'ionizing radiation' means any particulate or electromagnetic radiation capable of producing ions directly or indirectly in its passage through matter; provided, however, that the provisions hereof and of sections 5-243 and 5-244, Idaho Code, shall not be deemed to apply to any action or proceeding to recover damages for professional malpractice, as defined in section 5-219, Idaho Code." (Emphasis added.)

The language of the provision excepting professional malpractice actions was added to this section by amendment in 1976, following, and very likely in reaction to, our holding in the case of Arnold v. Woolley, 95 Idaho 604, 514 P.2d 599 (1973). In that case, we had interpreted I.C. §§ 5-242 through -244 to apply to a malpractice action against a doctor whose alleged negligent use of radiation therapy had caused injury to the plaintiff.

Appellants argue that the legislature's exclusion of professional malpractice actions from the broader statute of limitations contained in I.C. § 5-242 created two classes of persons who seek redress for injuries caused by ionizing radiation: plaintiffs who are so injured as a result of professional malpractice, and plaintiffs who are so injured in any other context. Because there is no rational basis for the legislature's disparate treatment of these two classes of persons, appellants contend, the 1976 amendment to I.C. § 5-242 is in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. We disagree.

The first step in an equal protection analysis is to identify whether the classification which is being challenged is inherently suspect, and the second step is to determine the standard under which the classification will be judicially reviewed. Tarbox v. Idaho Tax Commission, 107 Idaho 957, 695 P.2d 342 (1984). It is clear that there is neither an inherently suspect classification involved, nor a fundamental constitutional right, and thus, our analysis of the appellants' equal protection claim is governed by the lower level of review characterized as the rational basis test. For, as the United States Supreme Court has said,

"Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presumed constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude. Legislatures may implement their program step by step, in such economic areas, adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to future regulations...." City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516-17, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); see also, Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Company, 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911). ²

It is important to note that the Idaho Legislature enacted I.C. §§ 5-242 through -244 in 1967 following the construction of the rather extensive nuclear energy research facilities in the desert between Arco and Idaho Falls. Although we were fully justified in applying the plain language of I.C. § 5-243 to medical malpractice cases in Arnold, the legislature was no doubt surprised by our holding and responded by amending the statute to exclude malpractice claims. Often, it is not until the legislature amends a statute several times before the legislature's original intent in passing the statute becomes apparent. The 1976 amendment to I.C. § 5-242, which covers §§ 5-243 and -244 as well, made the legislature's initial intent quite clear, particularly as the amendment was adopted with an emergency clause and a provision that purported to apply it retroactively to all accrued claims. 1976 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 184, p. 670.

A rational basis does exist for the distinction between plaintiffs exposed to radiation in the professional malpractice context and those exposed to radiation in other types of situations, such as at a nuclear facility or where radioactive materials are manufactured. In the latter situations, it is possible that a person may be exposed to radiation without his knowledge or consent. That lack of knowledge may prevent him from being able to link possible physical injuries to the radiation for a long period of time. In the professional malpractice context, however, a patient or a patient's family must voluntarily consent to be treated with radiation therapy at a hospital or other health facility. In fact, as in this case, patients are usually required to sign a consent form evidencing their understanding of the risks. A person who specifically knows about the radiation can closely monitor himself for subsequent effects. Thus, it is reasonable to establish a shorter period of limitation for the claims of these persons; and the legislature's different treatment of these two groups with respect to...