Davis v. NYS Office of Children & Family Servs.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2021
• Docket Number: 20-CV-1480 (JMA) (ARL)
• Parties: ROLANDA J. DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. NYS OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

ROLANDA J. DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. NYS OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al., Defendants.

20-CV-1480 (JMA) (ARL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

March 30, 2021

For Online Publication Only

ORDER

AZRACK, United States District Judge:

By Order dated September 24, 2020 (the "Order"), the Court denied the application to proceed in forma pauperis filed by pro se plaintiff Rolanda J. Davis ("plaintiff"). (Order, ECF No. 7.) The Court ordered plaintiff to either remit the $400 filing fee or renew her application to proceed in forma pauperis upon completion of the AO 239 Long Form in forma pauperis application ("Long Form") attached to the Order within twenty-one (21) days. (Id. at 2.) On November 19, 2020, plaintiff filed the Long Form. (ECF No.10.) Albeit untimely, the Court accepts it for filing. Upon review, the Court finds that plaintiff is qualified by her financial position to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee. However, for the reasons that follow, the complaint is sua sponte dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and with leave to file an amended complaint.

I. THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff's brief, handwritten complaint is submitted on the Court's Section 1983 complaint form and names as defendants the Suffolk County Department of Social Services (CPS) ("DSS"), Suffolk County Commissioners John A. Johnson ("Johnson"), Frances Pierre ("Pierre"), and Dennis Nowak ("Nowak"), and the New York State Office of Children and Family Services ("NYSOCFS" and collectively, "defendants"). In its entirety, plaintiff's fact section alleges:¹

During November 10^th, 2003 plaintiff Rolanda J. Davis was confined to 3 different detention centers were excessive force of abuse was used to subdue as well as misusage of medication, and misdiagnosis for a period of two and a half years. While under the care of NYS OCFS, Suffolk County Commissioner, and Suffolk County Department of Social Services.

On September 21^st 2017 unsupported allegations from a local shelter was ordered in a petition by Suffolk County Social Services ordering a removal of a child S.D.² Kinship resource were provided to aid child. Later JCCA admission without parental consent wall administrated. JCCA later informed mother of restraints used on children. On July 26, 2018, plaintiff son was also removed without prior supported notice and evidence to either allegation under case file # 133449.

Compl. ¶ II. In the space on the form that calls for a description of any claimed injuries, plaintiff responded:

During placement in detention center little medical treatment was provided after a full prone body restraint resulting in severe body aches and pains, busted lips and emotional discomfort. Removal of my children S and K result in maladaptive behavior and complications during pregnancy due to high levels of distress. Further emotional distress and mental abject.

Id. ¶ II.A. For relief, plaintiff seeks "[t]he reunification of both of my children. Amnesty from the County of Suffolk and adjust agreement. Assistive compensation awarded of $1.6 million for past and present occurrances involving Commissioner(s) listed and both children state/federal agencies." Id. ¶ III.

II. DISCUSSION

A. In Forma Pauperis Application

Upon review of plaintiff's renewed application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that plaintiff is qualified to commence this case without prepayment of the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1). Therefore, plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

B. Standard of Review

Pursuant to the in forma pauperis statute, a court must dismiss an action if it determines that it "(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must dismiss the action as soon as it makes such a determination. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Pro se submissions are afforded wide interpretational latitude and should be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); see also Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1997). In addition, the court is required to read the plaintiff's pro se complaint liberally and interpret it as raising the strongest arguments it suggests. United States v. Akinrosotu, 637 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has held that pro se complaints need not even plead specific facts; rather the complainant "need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) ("Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice."). However, a pro se plaintiff must still plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausibleon its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). The plausibility standard requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678. While "'detailed factual allegations'" are not required, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a plaintiff to provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" against each defendant named so that they have adequate notice of the claims against them. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (holding that Rule 8 "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation"). The purpose of Rule 8 "is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable." Velasquez v. Suffolk Cty. Police (7th Precinct), No. 19-CV-5368, 2019 WL 6726217, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A pleading that only "tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement" will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations and alterations omitted). Although the Court must afford pro se pleadings a liberal construction, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ogidi-Abegaje v. Nassau Community College, No. 19-CV-5519, 2020 WL 7699643, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y.Dec. 28, 2020). A court may dismiss a complaint that is "so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised." Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

Here, as is readily apparent, plaintiff's complaint falls far short of the required pleading standard. Plaintiff's allegations are wholly conclusory and are devoid of factual content, making it impossible to determine the basis for her claims, the manner in which she was allegedly harmed, and who, if anyone, harmed her. In addition, wholly absent from plaintiff's complaint is any description of what, if anything, each defendant named in complaint allegedly did, or failed to do, and how such action or inaction violated plaintiff's rights. See Mendes Da Costa v. Marcucilli, 675 F. App'x 15, 17 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (affirming dismissal where it was "virtually impossible to link the various defendants to [the plaintiff's] alleged injuries"). Moreover, the complaint fails to sufficiently allege a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. Because conclusory allegations are insufficient to give fair notice of the events of which she complains, see, e.g., Williams v. Ponte, 16-CV-5420, 2019 WL 4696425, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2019) (dismissing claims where allegations were merely conclusory), plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

D. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides that

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements. First, the conduct challenged must have been "committed by a person acting under color of statelaw." Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) ("[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, "the conduct complained of must have deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Id.; see also Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999). The statute of limitations applied to claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 is three years. See Kelly v. New York, 19-CV-2063, 2020 WL 7042764, *12 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5); Wheeler v. Slanovec, 16-CV-9065, 2019 WL 2994193, *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2019) ("[F]ederal courts in New York apply a three-year statute of limitations for personal...