Davis v. Odeco, Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-9529,92-9529
• Citation: 18 F.3d 1237
• Parties: , 40 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 821 Beverly P. DAVIS, wife of/and Willie Earl Davis, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ODECO, INC., Defendant, Murphy Exploration & Production Company, originally sued as Odeco, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1237

18 F.3d 1237

1995 A.M.C. 608, 40 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 821

Beverly P. DAVIS, wife of/and Willie Earl Davis, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ODECO, INC., Defendant Murphy Exploration & Production Company, originally sued as Odeco, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 92-9529.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 4, 1994.

Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied May 3, 1994.

Wilton E. Bland, III, Maurice C. Hebert, Jr., Alan G. Brackett, Hebert, Mouledoux & Bland, New Orleans, LA, for defendant-appellant.

David A. Bowling, Wilson & Bowling, New Orleans, LA, Wm. D. Boerner, Boerner & Breeland, Brookhaven, MS, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before VAN GRAAFEILAND ^*, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellee Willie Earl Davis (Davis) and his wife sued Defendant-Appellant Murphy Exploration & Production Company (Murphy Co.), ¹ alleging that Murphy Co. contravened the Jones Act and general maritime law by exposing him to hydrocarbons while he worked aboard its vessels. Davis contends that this exposure caused him to contract Goodpasture's Syndrome (GPS), a rare disease with renal, pulmonary, and autoimmune symptoms. Davis won a $675,600.00 jury verdict, and the district court entered a judgment for Davis in that amount. Murphy Co. timely appealed, positing that the district court committed 19 reversible errors in the course of the trial.

I FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Davis worked for Murphy Co. for approximately ten years as a roustabout, a floorhand On February 23, 1990, however, just before boarding the Ocean America, Davis again felt sick. Five days later he collapsed and was promptly evacuated by Murphy Co. to West Jefferson Medical Center where he was admitted in critical condition. For a time medical specialists were unable to diagnose Davis' condition, although they were able to rule out a number of diseases, including Legionnaire's disease and AIDS. Ultimately, Davis was diagnosed as having GPS, an uncommon condition comprising three disease components: kidney disease, lung disease, and autoimmune disease. ² During his illness, Davis received $174,259.68 in medical and disability payments from the Group Insurance Plan (the Plan), which was established (and largely funded) by Murphy Co. to compensate employees for nonwork-related accidents and illnesses. ³ Davis ultimately filed a complaint in district court, contending that his exposure to hydrocarbons while working for Murphy Co. caused him to develop GPS. ⁴ Although medical evidence exists that links development of GPS with exposure to hydrocarbons, a causal relationship between such exposure and development of GPS has not been firmly established. ⁵ Davis nevertheless asserted that Murphy Co. was negligent in failing to (1) provide him with a respirator, (2) train him to use a respirator, and (3) require him to use a respirator, all the while forcing him to work with compounds rich in hydrocarbons. He also averred that Murphy Co. was negligent per se in violating Coast Guard Regulations that required Murphy Co. to (1) have a written policy regarding use of respirators, (2) fit-test employees annually to ensure that their respirators fit properly, and (3) perform air monitoring for hazardous substances and medical monitoring of employees for signs of exposure to such substances. Finally, Davis alleged that several of Murphy Co.'s vessels aboard which he served were "unseaworthy," essentially for the same reasons that Murphy Co. was allegedly negligent.

and a shaker hand--all positions involving unskilled labor. During that time, he worked aboard thirteen different Murphy Co. vessels. In November 1989, while aboard the Ocean Titan, Davis coughed up blood. Although contemporaneous records of Davis' medical treatment reveal that he had abnormally high concentrations of protein and blood in his urine, he was not advised that he had any serious health problems, and he went back to work.

After the district court ruled on a barrage of pre-trial motions, the case went to trial, with Davis winning a verdict. The jury concluded that Murphy Co. had been both negligent and negligent per se, and that several of the Murphy Co.'s vessels had been unseaworthy. The jury awarded Davis a total of $675,600.00 in damages and maintenance, as follows: $300,000 for past pain and suffering, $100,000 for future pain and suffering, $30,000 in past lost wages, $43,000 in future lost wages, $142,000 for past medical expenses,

$48,000 for future medical expenses, and $12,600 for maintenance. The court duly entered judgment for $675,600.00, and Murphy Co. timely appealed, contending that the district court committed nearly a score of reversible errors in the course of the trial.

II ANALYSIS

After carefully considering the facts and legal arguments advanced by counsel in their briefs to this court and in their oral arguments to this panel, and after reviewing the record from the district court, we conclude that the majority of the 19 claims of error advanced by Murphy Co. on appeal--while not frivolous--lack sufficient factual and legal substance to justify reversing the district court and are not here entitled to elaborate treatment. Several issues, however, do merit more extensive discussion, and we proceed to consider these.

A. Fault or Breach of Standard of Care

Davis essentially asserted two causes of action in this case: negligence under the Jones Act, and the unseaworthiness of Murphy Co.'s vessels under general maritime law. To establish negligence under the Jones Act, Davis also averred that Murphy Co. violated applicable Coast Guard regulations, and thus was negligent per se. ⁶ The jury found that Murphy Co. was negligent and negligent per se "in the manner claimed by the plaintiff." The jury also found certain of Murphy Co.'s vessels to have been unseaworthy. On appeal, Murphy Co. argues, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict.

We may overturn the jury's determination that some of Murphy Co.'s vessels were unseaworthy only if the facts and inferences favor Murphy Co. so strongly that a reasonable jury could not have reached a verdict for Davis. ⁷ In contrast, as Davis' negligence claims were brought under the Jones Act, the jury's verdict that Murphy Co. was negligent and negligent per se must stand unless "there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the verdict." ⁸ Consequently, we must not disturb the verdict unless Davis failed to advance even a marginal claim for relief. ⁹ We have appropriately labeled this burden as "featherweight." ¹⁰

As the jury did not apportion damages among applicable legal theories, we must affirm the jury's award--and the judgment of the district court--if the verdict is supportable under any legal theory advanced by Davis. Because the "complete absence of supporting probative facts" standard is appreciably more deferential to jury verdicts than the reasonable jury standard, we need only consider whether Davis adduced sufficient evidence to meet the "featherweight" burden under the Jones Act. ¹¹ We conclude that he did.

Although Murphy Co. vigorously contested Davis' allegations that it was negligent for failing to provide him with a respirator, to train him to use a respirator, and to require him to use a respirator at all relevant times, we cannot say that our review of the record reveals the complete absence of probative facts that is required to overturn a verdict Moreover, Murphy Co. did not adequately respond to Davis' contention that it was negligent per se. Davis argued that Murphy Co. was negligent per se under the Jones Act because it violated applicable Coast Guard Regulations (hereinafter "ANSI standards") ¹³--effective January 12, 1987--that established a standard of care requiring Murphy Co. to (1) have a written policy regarding use of respirators, (2) fit-test employees annually to ensure that their respirators fit properly, and (3) perform air monitoring for hazardous substances and medical monitoring of employees for signs of exposure to such substances. ¹⁴ In response to these arguments, Murphy Co. asserts that its policies regarding use of respirators were stricter than those imposed by the ANSI standards because Murphy Co. required (presumably through an unwritten policy) that "respirators be used at all times." ¹⁵

                under the Jones Act. 12  At trial, Murphy Co. did introduce convincing evidence that respirators were available for Davis' use, that Davis knew how to use a respirator, and that Murphy Co. had a policy requiring its employees to use respirators at appropriate times.  Nonetheless, there was not a complete absence of probative fact supporting Davis' allegations, and we are therefore constrained to uphold the jury's verdict
                

This response is, however, something of a non sequitur. The ANSI regulations did not require Murphy Co. to enact respirator use policies of a given arbitrary stringency. Rather, they required Murphy Co. to establish a written policy concerning use of respirators. Murphy Co.'s response is thus feckless. Additionally, Murphy Co. did not even allege that it complied with the ANSI standards requiring fit-testing and air monitoring. Indeed, Murphy Co. conceded that it may not have "follow[ed] the ANSI standards to the letter." Murphy Co. thus appears unable convincingly to gainsay the jury's finding that Murphy Co. violated applicable Coast Guard Regulations and was thus negligent per se. As there was not a complete absence of probative facts to support the jury's determination that Murphy Co. was negligent and negligent per se under the Jones Act, we will not upset the jury's finding that Murphy Co. breached the applicable standard of care.

B. Causality

Murphy Co. also asserts that "the jury lacked sufficient evidence to find medical causation." We agree that the evidence supporting the hypothesis that...