Davis v. People of Territory of Utah
Decision Date | 08 January 1894 |
Docket Number | No. 961,961 |
Parties | DAVIS v. PEOPLE OF TERRITORY OF UTAH |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Warren N. Dusenberry, for plaintiff in error.
Sol. Gen. Maxwell, for defendants in error.
The plaintiff in error, Enoch Davis, was indicted in the first judicial district court of the territory of Utah for murder, alleged to have been committed as follows:
'The said Enoch Davis, on the 6th day of June, A. D. 1892, at the county of Utah, in said territory of Utah, in and upon one Louisa Davis, there being, willfully, feloniously, and of his deliberately premeditated malice aforethought did make an assault with a certain revolver, by him, the said Enoch Davis, then and there had and held, with which said revolver he, the said Enoch Davis, her, the said Louisa Davis, upon the head did then and there willfully, feloniously, and of his deliberately premeditated malice aforethought beat, bruise, and wound, thereby then and there inflicting upon the head of her, the said Louisa Davis, one mortal wound, of which the said Louisa Davis then and there instantly died; and so the grand jurors aforesaid so say that, in manner aforesaid, he, the said Enoch Davis, her, the said Louisa Davis, then and there did kill and murder, contrary to the form of the statutes of said territory in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the people aforesaid.'
The defendant demurred to the indictment on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense. The demurrer was overruled, and he excepted. The defendant then pleaded not guilty. After trial, the jury returned the following verdict:
There was a motion for a new trial, upon various grounds, and defendant also moved in arrest of judgment upon the following grounds: First, the indictment does not charge murder in the first degree; second, the verdict against the defendant, of murder in the first degree, was in excess of the offense charged in the indictment.
Under date of November 3, 1892, appears the following order of the court:
An appeal was taken to the supreme court of the territory, and the judgment was affirmed. 32 Pac. 670.
'Murder' is declared by the statutes of Utah to be 'the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.' This is substantially 'murder,' as defined at common law. 4 Bl. Comm. 195; 3 Co. Inst. 47. And such malice may be expressed or implied; expressed, when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature; implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned or malignant heart. 2 Comp. Laws Utah, p. 578, §§ 4452, 4453.
It is also provided that 'every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of wilful, deliberate malice and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, burglary, or robbery, or perpetrated from a premeditated design, unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any other human being, other than him who is killed; or perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, and evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, is murder in the first degree; and any other homicide, committed under such circumstances as would have constituted murder at common law, is murder in the second degree.' Further, that 'every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or, upon the recommendation of the jury, may be imprisoned, at hard labor in the penitentiary for life, at the discretion of the court, and every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall be imprisoned, at hard labor, in the penitentiary for a term not less than five or more than fifteen years.' 2 Comp. Laws Utah, p. 579, §§ 4454, 4455.
In respect to the forms of pleadings in criminal actions, and the rules by which their sufficiency is to be determined, it is provided that the indictment must contain a clear and concise statement of the acts or omissions constituting the offense, with such particulars as to time, place, person, and property, as will enable the defendant to understand distinctly the character of the offense charged, and to answer the indictment, and must be direct and certain, as regards the party and the offense charged, and the particular circumstances of the offense. The words used in the indictment are to be construed according to their usual acceptance in common language, except such words and phrases as are defined by law, and they are to be construed according to their legal meaning. Words in the statute defining a public offense need not be strictly pursued in the indictment, but other words, conveying the same meaning, may be used. 2 Comp. Laws Utah, pp. 687, 688, §§ 4928-4931, 4936, 4937.
In respect to the description of the offense, an indictment is sufficient, under the laws of Utah, if the act or omission charged as the offense is clearly and distinctly set forth, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable the court to understand what is intended, and to pronounce judgment, upon conviction, according to the right of the case. 2 Comp. Laws Utah, § 4938.
The first assignment of error relates to the overruling of the demurrer to the indictment. The point here made is that, as 'murder' is defined by the statute to be the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, it was necessary to charge, in words, that the killing was 'unlawful.' This position cannot be sustained, for the facts alleged present, in clear and distinct language, a case of unlawful killing. It is not necessary, as we have seen, to use the very words of the statute defining the offense. It is sufficient if those used convey the same meaning. The indictment sets forth the case of an assault and battery committed by the defendant willfully, feloniously, and with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, and resulting in instant death, whereby the defendant did kill and murder, contrary to the statute, etc. Such facts plainly import an unlawful killing.
Other assignments of error present the objection that the indictment is so framed that it will not support a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. This objection is based, in part, upon the theory that murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree are made distinct, separate offenses. But this is an erroneous interpretation of the statute. The crime defined is that of murder. The statute divides that crime into two classes, in order that the punishment may be adjusted with reference to the presence or absence of circumstances of aggravation; and, therefore, 'whenever a crime is distinguished into degrees,' it is left to the jury, if they convict the defendant, 'to find the degree of the crime of which he is guilty.' 2 Comp. Laws Utah, p. 715, § 5076. If the defendant pleads guilty 'of a crime distinguished or divided into degrees, the court must, before passing sentence, determine the degree.' Id. p. 721, § 5101. An in- dictment which clearly and distinctly alleges facts showing a murder by the unlawful killing of a human being with malice...
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