Davis v. Perrino, 1351.
| Citation | 197 A. 393 |
| Decision Date | 25 February 1938 |
| Docket Number | No. 1351.,1351. |
| Parties | DAVIS et al. v. PERRINO et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; G. Frederick Frost, Judge.
Proceeding in equity by James Earl Davis and others against Michael A. Perrino and others, seeking to set aside a foreclosure sale, wherein a temporary receiver was appointed on petition of one of the complainants. From a decree allowing the report of the temporary receiver and awarding him fees to be paid one-half by complainants and one-half by the respondents, the respondents appeal.
Appeal denied and dismissed, and cause remanded for further proceedings.
J. Raymond Dubee and Aram A. Arabian, both of Providence, for receiver. Frank H. Wildes, of Providence, for respondents.
This is a proceeding in equity in which a decree was entered in the superior court allowing the report of a temporary receiver appointed by that court, and awarding him $125 for his fees and disbursements as such receiver, which sum by such decree was ordered to be paid, one-half by the complainants and one-half by the respondents. From the entry of this decree the respondents duly appealed to this court.
The facts, as they appear from the papers in the case, are as follows: The bill of complaint, which sought to set aside a foreclosure sale, which had been held under a chattel mortgage, of the contents of a store formerly operated by the complainants, was filed July 11, 1936, and a subpoena containing notice of the granting of a restraining order by the superior court to prevent the further sale, transfer, or incumbering of any of the contents of such store, was issued to the respondents named in the bill, and was made returnable July 15, 1936; one of the respondents having been the purchaser at such foreclosure sale. On July 14, one of the complainants presented a petition, under oath, to a justice of the superior court, containing, among other things, allegations that the above-mentioned subpoena had been served on the respondents at 12 o'clock noon on July 13, 1936, but that instead of closing said store, the respondents had continued to operate it and to sell goods therefrom, in violation of the restraining order issued by the superior court. The above complainant therefore prayed that a temporary receiver be appointed to take possession of the store and its contents, and that a citation be issued to the respondents ordering them to show cause why they should not be adjudged in contempt. The justice to whom this petition was presented entered a decree appointing a temporary receiver, ordering the premises closed, and providing for notice in the matter of contempt to be given the respondents for a hearing on July 17, 1936.
Later, after several days' hearing upon the bill of complaint on the question of issuing a temporary injunction and making the temporary receiver permanent, a decree was entered July 28, 1936, by the superior court, dissolving the restraining order and discharging the temporary receiver. Thereafter, the latter filed his report and account. On November 17, 1936, this report came before the superior court for allowance and for fixing the fees and disbursements of the temporary receiver, and following the hearing on that day, the decree, which is now before us on appeal, was entered on December 14. 1936.
The respondents' reasons of appeal set out in substance that the allowance by the superior court of the temporary receiver's report was erroneous, that the charges allowed were excessive, and that the apportioning of the charges between the complainants and respondents was contrary to law and justice. The respondents chiefly object to paying one-half of the fees and disbursements awarded the temporary receiver, as provided in the decree appealed from. They contend that, under the circumstances of this case, the appointment of the temporary receiver was unnecessarily and improperly made by the superior court. They allege that the sworn petition, under which the temporary receiver was appointed,...
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State v. Piedmont Funding Corp.
...assessment" clearly negates any argument of irreparable injury. The plaintiff further argues that our decisions in Davis v. Perrino, 60 R.I. 145, 197 A. 393 (1938) and Berberian Co. v. Berberian, 56 R.I. 473, 187 A. 855 (1936) are dispositive of the instant case. We find both of these cases......
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Plouffe v. Taft-peirce Mfg. Co., 1786.
...parties. Purcell v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 56 R.I. 93, 183 A. 884; Corbett v. Penhall, 58 R.I. 185, 192 A. 171; Davis v. Perrino, 60 R.I. 145, 197 A. 393; Austin v. Newport Trust Co., 65 R.I. 87, 13 A.2d 682. The statute upon which these decisions are based, now G.L.1938, chap. ......
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Coen v. Corr
...appeal to the end that possible injurious consequences may be prevented. She cites McAuslan v. McAuslan, supra, and Davis v. Perrino, 60 R.I. 145, 197 A. 393. The McAuslan case is of no assistance to respondent. That case acknowledges with much particularity that there are exceptions to and......
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