Davis v. Piedmont Engineers, Architects and Planners, P.A.

• Decision Date: 18 September 1984
• Docket Number: No. 0331,0331
• Citation: 284 S.C. 20,324 S.E.2d 325
• Parties: , 22 Ed. Law Rep. 568 George E. DAVIS, and Andrea T. Davis, as Guardians ad Litem for Bryan Scott Davis, a minor over 14, Appellants, v. PIEDMONT ENGINEERS, ARCHITECTS AND PLANNERS, P.A., and Leslie Jane Harding, Defendants, of whom Leslie Jane Harding is Respondent. . Heard
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 325

324 S.E.2d 325

284 S.C. 20, 22 Ed. Law Rep. 568

George E. DAVIS, and Andrea T. Davis, as Guardians ad Litem for Bryan Scott Davis, a minor over 14, Appellants, v. PIEDMONT ENGINEERS, ARCHITECTS AND PLANNERS, P.A., and Leslie Jane Harding, Defendants of whom Leslie Jane Harding is Respondent.

No. 0331.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Sept. 18, 1984.

Decided Dec. 11, 1984.

Eugene C. Covington, Jr., of Foster, Covington & Patrick, Greenville, for appellants.

Robert C. Wilson, Jr., of Haynesworth, Perry, Bryant, Marion & Johnstone, Greenville, for defendants.

James H. Watson and Gwendolyn G. Embler, of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville, for respondent.

BELL, Judge:

This is a negligence action. Bryan Davis was injured when he fell in a darkened school classroom during a power failure. His parents, as guardians, brought separate actions for medical expenses and for personal injuries alleging, among other things, negligent supervision on the part of Jane Hardin, Bryan's teacher. The two actions were consolidated for trial. The trial judge granted Hardin's motion for summary judgment. Davis appeals. We reverse and remand for trial.

Summary judgment should be granted only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and where it appears the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones Leasing, Inc. v. Gene Phillips & Associates, 318 S.E.2d 31 (S.C.App.1984). In ruling on the motion, the evidence and inferences which can be drawn therefrom should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Coleman v. Shaw, 281 S.C. 107, 314 S.E.2d 154 (S.C.App.1984).

The undisputed facts are as follows. In October 1978 Bryan Davis was a ninth grade student at Riverside High School. On October 17, Jane Hardin, a substitute teacher, was assigned to teach Davis's class. The classroom was located in the interior of the school building and had no windows. Between twenty-five and thirty students were present.

Shortly after class began, Riverside High experienced a power failure. The classroom was plunged into darkness. Hardin told the students to remain in their seats. She then opened one of two doors to the classroom and left the room. On her way out she asked that someone open the second door. Davis left his seat and opened the door. The power outage had affected the hallway as well as the classroom itself, so opening the classroom doors admitted only minimal light. Davis testified that, even after opening the door, he could not see his way back to his desk. On his way back to his seat, he stumbled in the darkness and fell, striking his right eye and injuring it seriously.

In his order the trial judge narrowed the issues to a single question: Was Hardin negligent in requesting someone to open the door? He concluded that the request was reasonable and that, as a matter of law, no inference of negligent conduct could arise therefrom.

Whether an act constitutes actionable negligence may be a question of fact, even though the act itself is not disputed. See Vaughn v. A.E. Green Co., 277 S.C. 392, 287 S.E.2d 493 (1982). In such circumstances, the question of negligence cannot be determined on a motion for summary judgment. Id. In light of the obvious dangers attendant on crossing a darkened classroom, we hold a jury issue is presented regarding the reasonableness of Hardin's request. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment was error.

Hardin places principal reliance for sustaining the judgment on the case of Hammond v. Scott, 268 S.C. 137, 232 S.E.2d 336 (1977)....