Davis v. Roberts
| Decision Date | 07 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-3075-SAC,12-3075-SAC |
| Parties | MARVIN B. DAVIS, JR., Petitioner, v. RAY ROBERTS and STEVE KOBACH Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
This case comes before the Court on a petition for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 USC § 2254. Petitioner was convicted in state court of aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, domestic violence, and aggravated indecent liberties, and was sentenced to 230 months imprisonment.1 Petitioner makes multiple challenges to his conviction, including trial court errors, ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and insufficient evidence.
Procedural History
The procedural history of this case has been established by the Kansas Court of Appeals (KCOA) in Petitioner's direct appeal, State v. Davis, No. 79,553, 1999 WL 533699 (unreported opinion),and in Petitioner's various K.S.A. 60-1507 appeals: Davis v. State, No. 85,683, 2002 WL 968737 (); Davis v. State, No. 89,354, 2003 WL 22283015 (Kan.App. October 3, 2003) (); Davis v. State, No. 94,330, 2007 WL 1109528 (Kan.App. April 13, 2007) (); Davis v. State, No. 104,281, 2011 WL 3250578 (Kan.App. July 22, 2011) (). The Court understand that case Nos 98,354 and 02C0350 are not relevant to this habeas corpus as they relate to an earlier case, State v.Davis, 90CR2192 and not to State v.Davis, 96CR2192.
The Court adopts the facts stated in the relevant prior opinions and shall not repeat them except as necessary to the analysis of this petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (); Saiz v. Ortiz, 392 F.3d 1166, 1175 (10th Cir. 2004). In short, Petitioner's conviction for aggravated indecent liberties with a child was founded upon his consensual intercourse with a 15-year-oldgirl, and his other convictions were founded upon a domestic altercation between him and his common-law wife.
Motion to Expand Records
The petitioner moves this court for an order expanding the records, citing Rule 7 governing § 2254 cases. Petitioner seeks to include the following "correct records and cases" he contends are "directly relevant and integral to" his motion; Davis v. Kansas, 04,92777 (Kan.Sp.Ct.J_004); Davis v. Clark, No. 99,121 (Kan.App.Unpub. July 25, 2008); Davis v. Clark, No. 05-94,269 (Kan.Sp.Ct. June 10, 2005); State v.Davis, No. 98,674 (Kan.App. August, 27, 2007); Davis v. KCOA et al., No. 105,130 (Kan.Sp.Ct. June 20, 2011).
The cited rule permits a judge to direct the parties to expand the record, yet case law may permit a petitioner, upon good cause shown, to file such a motion. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969). But Petitioner has shown no need to expand the record, as he does not show the significance of any document not included in the record before this court, and the Court can take judicial notice of the filings in related cases. See St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979). This motion shall thus be denied.
The habeas petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). AEDPA "erects a formidable barrier tofederal habeas relief," Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013), and "requires federal courts to give significant deference to state court decisions" on the merits. Lockett v. Trammel, 711 F.3d 1218, 1230 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2012) .
Under AEDPA, where a state prisoner presents a claim in habeas corpus and the merits were addressed in the state courts, a federal court may grant relief only if it determines that the state court proceedings resulted in a decision (1) "that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783-84 (2011).
"Clearly established law is determined by the United States Supreme Court, and refers to the Court's holdings, as opposed to the dicta." Lockett, 711 F.3d at 1231 (quotations omitted). A state court decision is "contrary to" the Supreme Court's clearly established precedent "if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in reme Court cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.685, 694 (2002) (quotations omitted).
A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-08 (2000)). Likewise, a state court unreasonably applies federal law when it either unreasonably extends, or refuses to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent where it should apply. House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1018 (10th Cir. 2008).
In reviewing state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings, a federal court does not sit as a super-state appellate court. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). "The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). In making this assessment, the Court reviews the factual findings of the state court for clear error, reviewing only the record that was before the appellate court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).
A writ of habeas corpus may issue only when the petitioner shows "there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with Court's precedents." Id. at 786 (emphasis added). "Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean thatthe state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. "'If this standard is difficult to meet'—and it is—'that is because it was meant to be.'" Titlow, 134 S. Ct. at 16 (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786). See Frost v. Pryor, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 1647013 (10th Cir. April 25, 2014).
Petitioner has filed 334 pages in addition to his actual petition, in violation of the rules of this court. See D.Kan.Rule 5.1(f) ( ); Cf, Rule 7.1(e) (). From Petitioner's lengthy and disorganized statements, the court finds and resolves the following issues.2
Petitioner claims that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions for aggravated indecent liberties with a child and aggravated kidnapping. Generally, as to the evidence of aggravated indecent liberties, he points to the weakness of the victim's testimony against him, which was the sole evidence of that crime. As to the aggravated kidnapping, Petitioner asserts that records of relevant 911 calls refute the victim'stestimony about the time of events, making it impossible for him to have committed that crime.
Respondent contends that this issue is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in his direct appeal to the state court. The Court agrees. Federal habeas review is available only where the petitioner has given the state courts "one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845-48, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). Petitioner has not done so here.
Even though "[a] habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion [since] there are no state remedies any longer 'available to him," Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), "there is a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas." Id. at 735 n. 1. Accordingly, this claim is procedurally barred from federal habeas review because it was not fairly presented to the Kansas Supreme Court and would now be untimely under Kansas's procedural rules. See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848.
For the Court to reach the merits of this claim, Petitioner must show cause for his default and prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that this Court's failure to consider the claim willresult in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645-46, 2649, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986).
To show cause petitioner must demonstrate that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded [his] efforts to comply" with the state law. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. "Such an external factor might, for example, be proven by a 'showing that the factual or legal basis...
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