Davis v. S. Nassau Cmtys. Hosp.

Decision Date16 December 2015
Docket NumberNo. 163,163
PartiesEdwin DAVIS et al., Appellants, v. SOUTH NASSAU COMMUNITIES HOSPITAL et al., Respondents.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

26 N.Y.3d 563
46 N.E.3d 614
26 N.Y.S.3d 231
2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 09229

Edwin DAVIS et al., Appellants
v.
SOUTH NASSAU COMMUNITIES HOSPITAL et al., Respondents.

No. 163

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 16, 2015.


Dell & Dean, PLLC, Garden City (Joseph G. Dell, Christopher R. Dean and Jay J. Massaro of counsel), for appellants.

James W. Tuffin, Islandia and Santangelo, Benvenuto & Slattery, Roslyn, for Regina E. Hammock, D.O., and others, respondents.

Bartlett, McDonough & Monaghan, LLP, Mineola (Robert G. Vizza of counsel), for South Nassau Communities Hospital, respondent.

Kern Augustine Conroy & Schoppmann, P.C., Westbury (Donald R. Moy of counsel), for The Medical Society of the State of New York and another, amici curiae.

Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Albany (James A. Shannon of counsel), for Healthcare Association of New York State, Inc., amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FAHEY, J.

46 N.E.3d 616

This action arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred after nonparty Lorraine A. Walsh was treated at defendant South Nassau Communities Hospital by defendants Regina E. Hammock, DO and Christine DeLuca, RPA–C, that is, medical professionals employed by defendant Island Medical Physicians, P.C. (collectively, Island Medical defendants). As a part of that treatment, defendants intravenously administered to Walsh an opioid narcotic pain-killer and a benzodiazepine drug without warning her that such medication either impaired or could impair her ability to safely operate an automobile. Shortly thereafter, Walsh drove herself from the Hospital and, while allegedly impaired by the medication administered to her at that facility, she was involved in an accident. The automobile she operated crossed a double yellow line and struck a bus driven by Edwin Davis (plaintiff).

Here we are confronted with the question whether third-party liability can attach when a hospital administered drugs to a patient and then released her, in an impaired state, without any warning that the drugs affected or could have affected her ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. Stated differently, the main question is whether defendants owed a duty to plaintiff and his wife, Dianna,1 to warn Walsh that the medication defendants gave to Walsh either impaired or could have impaired her ability to safely operate a motor vehicle following her departure from the Hospital.

We are mindful that in addressing the modification of a legal duty, its reach must be limited by what is foreseeable.

Any

46 N.E.3d 617

expansion of duty is a power to be exercised cautiously, but it is a power that must be used if the changing needs of society are to be met. It was succinctly stated by Judge Cardozo that “[t]he principle that the danger must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to the principle do change. They are whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them to be” (MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391, 111 N.E. 1050 [1916] ). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that where a medical provider has administered to a patient medication that impairs or could impair the patient's ability to safely operate an automobile, the medical provider has a duty to third parties to warn the patient of that danger.

I.

On March 4, 2009, Walsh sought treatment at the Hospital's emergency room. According to plaintiffs, Walsh's medical records indicate that she drove herself to the Hospital, where she was intravenously administered Dilaudid, an opioid narcotic pain-killer, and Ativan, a benzodiazepine drug, at 11:00 a.m.

The record reflects that “[c]ommon side effects [of Ativan ] include sedation, dizziness, weakness, unsteadiness, and disorientation.” Plaintiffs' expert averred that such drug has a “sedative/hypnotic” effect. Plaintiffs' expert also explained that “Dilaudid has two to eight times the painkilling effect of morphine,” that the half-life of intravenously-administered Dilaudid is two to four hours, and that the Dilaudid package label and package insert contain various cautionary instructions pertinent to this matter. For example, plaintiffs' expert noted that “the package label for Dilaudid states that it ‘may impair mental and/or physical ability needed to perform potentially hazardous activities such as driving a car or operating machinery.’ ” The same expert further noted that the section of the package insert for Dilaudid “titled Use In Ambulatory Patients ... states that the drug ‘may impair mental and/or physical ability required for the performance of potentially hazardous tasks (e.g., driving, operating machinery). Patients should be cautioned accordingly.’ ” In the words of that expert, the “insert also states that the most common adverse effects of [Dilaudid] are ‘more prominent in[, inter alia,] ambulatory patients.’ ”

Walsh was discharged from the Hospital at 12:30 p.m. on the date in question. She drove herself away from that facility. Nineteen minutes after that discharge, Walsh was involved in

a motor vehicle accident in which the vehicle she was driving crossed a double yellow line and struck a bus operated by plaintiff. According to plaintiffs, the accident occurred while Walsh was in “a state of disorientation” and “under the influence of the aforementioned drugs.”

Plaintiffs subsequently commenced this action against the Island Medical defendants and the Hospital. The complaint alleges, in relevant part, that Walsh sought the professional care of defendants on the date in question; that defendants rendered medical care to Walsh at that time; that, in the course of rendering such care to Walsh, defendants administered to Walsh the medication at issue; that defendants did not warn Walsh of the effects of such medication; and that the accident occurred while Walsh was affected by such medication. Based on those allegations, plaintiffs seek damages for injuries they sustained as the result of defendants' alleged medical malpractice in treating Walsh.

After issue was joined, the Island Medical defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211[a][7] ), essentially contending that they did not owe plaintiffs a

46 N.E.3d 618

duty of care inasmuch as plaintiffs were third parties to the treatment rendered to Walsh. The Hospital cross-moved for the same relief, while plaintiffs cross-moved for an order both granting leave to serve an amended complaint asserting a cause of action for negligence and consolidating this action with two other actions arising from the subject accident. Supreme Court granted the motion of the Island Medical defendants and the cross motion of the Hospital seeking dismissal of the complaint while concomitantly denying plaintiffs' cross motion (2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 31969[U], 2012 WL 3070843 [Sup.Ct., Nassau County 2012] ). On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that because “only Walsh ... had a physician-patient relationship with the defendants [,] ... the allegations did not support a duty of care owed by the defendants to the injured plaintiff” (119 A.D.3d 512, 514, 989 N.Y.S.2d 500 [2d Dept.2014] ). We granted plaintiffs leave to appeal (24 N.Y.3d 905, 2014 WL 4693253 [2014] ).

II.

Under these facts, defendants owed to plaintiffs a duty to warn Walsh that the medication administered to her either impaired or could have impaired her ability to safely operate an automobile. We begin our discussion of that issue with reference to the principles of law that inform our review.

In the context of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, we “determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87–88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 [1994] ). “[T]he criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has stated one” (id. at 88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). We “may freely consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint” (id. ).

Similarly germane is our jurisprudence with respect to the recognition of a duty of care. “The threshold question in any negligence action is ... [whether the] defendant owe[s] a legally recognized duty of care to [the] plaintiff” (Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 232, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 750 N.E.2d 1055 [2001] ). “The question of whether a member or group of society owes a duty of care to reasonably avoid injury to another is [one] of law for the courts” (Purdy v. Public Adm'r of County of Westchester, 72 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 530 N.Y.S.2d 513, 526 N.E.2d 4 [1988], rearg. denied 72 N.Y.2d 953, 533 N.Y.S.2d 60, 529 N.E.2d 428 [1988] ). “Courts resolve legal duty questions by resort to common concepts of morality, logic and consideration of the social consequences of imposing the duty” (Tenuto v. Lederle Labs., Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 90 N.Y.2d 606, 612, 665 N.Y.S.2d 17, 687 N.E.2d 1300 [1997] ; see Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579, 586, 611 N.Y.S.2d 817, 634 N.E.2d 189 [1994] ). A critical consideration in determining whether a duty exists is whether “the defendant's relationship with either the tortfeasor or the plaintiff places...

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