Davis v. Scott

• Citation: 175 N.E.3d 344 (Table)
• Decision Date: 10 September 2021
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-PL-424
• Parties: Eileen DAVIS, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Carolyn SCOTT, Louis Richards, Theresa Richards, and Robert Richards, Appellees-Defendants
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

175 N.E.3d 344 (Table)

Eileen DAVIS, Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.Carolyn SCOTT, Louis Richards, Theresa Richards, and Robert Richards, Appellees-Defendants

Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-PL-424

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED September 10, 2021

Attorney for Appellant: Andrew B. Arnett, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorney for Appellee: Andrea E. Rahman, Hewitt Law & Mediation, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

May, Judge.

[1] Eileen Davis appeals following the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Carolyn Scott, Louis Richards, Theresa Richards, and Robert Richards (collectively, "Defendants"). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 1983, Helen and Clyde Richards – who were the parents of Eileen Davis, Carolyn Scott, Louis Richards, Theresa Richards, Robert Richards, and Dennis Richards – met with attorney Peter DePrez for estate planning purposes.¹ Helen and Clyde each executed a will in 1983, and Helen contacted DePrez over the years whenever she had additional estate planning questions. She consulted with DePrez after Clyde's death in 2002 regarding administration of Clyde's estate and updates to her estate plan. She also spoke with DePrez about updating her estate plan after her son Dennis passed away in 2010.

[3] In August and September of 2011, Helen and DePrez had at least three telephone conversations regarding her estate plan and the contents of her will. Helen's initial questions concerned the legalities of disinheriting one of her children. Helen then revealed that she wanted to disinherit Eileen and remove Eileen as the executor of her estate. DePrez prepared a revised draft of Helen's will.

[4] On September 27, 2011, Carolyn drove Helen to DePrez's law firm because Carolyn was visiting from California at the time and Helen had never learned to drive. Louis met Helen and Carolyn in the law firm's parking lot, and the three then walked into the office's reception area. DePrez met with Helen privately in his office to the discuss the terms of her revised will. This meeting lasted for approximately a half hour, and DePrez observed that Helen "appeared to be physically well, alert, spoke without hesitation and fully engaged in our conversation, asking appropriate questions and providing appropriate answers to my questions." (App. Vol. II at 33-34.)

[5] Item Two of Helen's revised last will and testament provided:

I further acknowledge my daughter Eileen Davis and for reasons sufficient unto myself, I give, devise and bequeath nothing to her under the terms of this my Last Will and Testament.

(Id. at 18.) Helen bequeathed the remainder of her estate in equal shares to the defendants. Helen signed the updated will and attached to the will a self-proving declaration. Helen asserted in the declaration that she "executed the Will as her free and voluntary act for the purposes expressed in it[.]" (Id. at 21.) She also affirmed in the declaration that she was of sound mind and over the age of eighteen when she signed the will. Two witnesses, DePrez's administrative assistant and a law partner, also signed the will and the self-proving declaration. Carolyn and Louis were present when Helen signed the will, but DePrez did not recite the terms of the will to them. DePrez's administrative assistant then tore up Helen's will from 1983. DePrez retained the newly executed will in his safe.

[6] Helen passed away on January 9, 2020, and the will was probated. Eileen subsequently discovered that the will did not bequeath any assets to her, and she filed a verified complaint against her living siblings on April 8, 2020. The complaint alleged:

The Will is a direct result of undue influence imposed on Helen Mary Richards by the Defendants. The defendants occupied a position of confidence with the decedent prior to the decedent's death. During the time that this confidential relationship existed between the decedent and the Defendants, the decedent's mental capabilities were weakened and easily subjected to the influence of the Defendants. The Defendants kept the decedent isolated and were verbally abusive to her. Because of the trust and confidence placed in the Defendants by the decedent, and the decedent's weakened mental state caused by advanced age, combined with physical and mental infirmities, the decedent complied with the directions and instructions of the Defendants and was susceptible to undue influence by the Defendants. The Defendants suggested the provisions of the purported Will to the decedent and caused the same to be drawn up by family members for the decedent's signature. The decedent was unduly influenced by the Defendants in the making of the purported Will, which was not made by the decedent as a voluntary, independent act and which, in the absence of the undue influence imposed on the decedent by the Defendants, the same would not have been executed by the decedent. The Defendants, under the purported Will, are the primary beneficiaries of the decedent's estate.

(Id. at 12.)

[7] On August 10, 2020, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In support of their motion, Defendants designated the pleadings, an affidavit from DePrez, and the parties’ discovery responses. DePrez affirmed in his affidavit the history of his representation of Helen and the process he followed to update her will in 2011. Defendants argued in support of their motion that through discovery Eileen "provided no factual or legal basis supporting the Will Challenges .... On the other hand, Defendants have provided facts that refute and disprove the Will Challenges." (Id. at 102.) Defendants then went on to assert:

the following facts are established by the Defendants:

a) No undue influence;

b) Will was drafted as Decedent requested;

c) No family members involved in making the will;

d) Will was executed voluntarily; and

e) Will is a self-proved will.

(Id. ) Eileen filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in which she argued "that the Defendants occupied a position of confidence and trust with the Decedent, and the Defendants benefited from the will offered to probated [sic]. This gives rise to a presumption of undue influence which shifts the burden to the Defendants to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence." (Id. at 107.) In reply to Eileen's response, Defendants argued that the self-proving clause of the will created a rebuttable presumption that the will was executed without undue influence and that Eileen offered "no evidence to contradict the Affidavit of the drafting attorney who oversaw the execution by the decedent of her will." (Id. at 201.)

[8] The trial court held a hearing on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on January 26, 2021. On February 11, 2021, the trial court issued an order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its order:

12. The Affidavit of attorney Peter DePrez refutes the vast majority of the allegations contained in Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint. Mr. DePrez was the attorney for the decedent. He consulted with her privately several times about the provisions of the 2011 will, he drafted the will and reviewed it with her alone. Further, Mr. DePrez testified that he had dealings with the decedent may times over 36 years and noted no decrease in her cognitive abilities.

13. Plaintiff, having failed to offer any contrary evidence, cannot rebut the presumption created by the self-proving clause of the will, that the will was properly executed.

14. Plaintiff presents no evidence that the Defendants and decedent had a confidential relationship as a matter of law other than as parent-child.

15. Plaintiff's allegation of a factual position of trust between Defendants and the decedent rests entirely on the claim that decedent relied on the Defendants for all transportation.

16. It is undisputed that the decedent did not drive, but the only evidence offered of any of the Defendants driving her was Carolyn Scott driving decedent to Mr. DePrez's office when the will was signed. However, Ms. Scott was only visiting from California.

17. Plaintiff designated no evidence that the decedent suffered from any type of mental infirmity.

18. Having failed to put forth any evidence of a confidential relationship with Defendants as the dominant parties, the issue of undue influence is moot. However, for the record it should be noted that neither party offered any substantive evidence as to whether or not Plaintiff took money from the decedent, but the only evidence as to the origin of the claim is that it came from the decedent, not the Defendants.

(Id. at 205-06.)

Discussion and Decision

[9] Our standard of review following a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is well-settled:

Summary judgment shall be granted where "the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Trial Rule 56(C). "We construe all evidence in favor of and resolve all doubts as to the existence of a material issue in favor of the non-moving party." Stafford v. Szymanowski , 31 N.E.3d 959, 961 (Ind. 2015).

St. Mary's Ohio Valley Heart Care, LLC v. Smith , 112 N.E.3d 1144, 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. "Although the trial court's specific findings of fact and conclusions of law assist our review, they are not binding upon us." Est. of Williams v. BorgWarner Morse TEC Inc. , 110 N.E.3d 1148, 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). We may affirm on any basis supported by the designated evidence. Id.

[10] Courts rarely resolve undue influence claims at summary judgment because the claims typically require fact-intensive inquires. See Gast v. Hall , 858 N.E.2d 154, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) ("Undue influence is essentially a question of fact that should rarely be disposed of via summary judgment."), reh'g denied , trans. denied. However, rarely does not mean never, and we have affirmed...