Davis v. Seeley

• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: KINNE
• Citation: Davis v. Seeley, 91 Iowa 583, 60 N.W. 183 (Iowa 1894)
• Decision Date: 04 October 1894
• Parties: DAVIS v. SEELEY.

91 Iowa 583

60 N.W. 183

DAVIS

v.SEELEY.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 4, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Lee county; J. M. Casey, Judge.

Action for malicious prosecution. Trial to a jury. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Reversed.W. B. Seeley, Casey & Stewart, and James C. Davis, for appellant.

O. C. Herminghausen and A. H. Stutsman, for appellee.

KINNE, J.

1. Plaintiff was charged by defendant with having burned an unoccupied dwelling house, the property of defendant. Defendant caused an information to be filed charging plaintiff with the commission of the crime. He was arrested thereon, and, upon preliminary hearing before a justice of the peace, was discharged. Plaintiff then instituted this suit against the defendant for malicious prosecution. On the trial, plaintiff, as a witness, was asked how much of a family he had, what the condition of his family was at the time; also as to having a crippled son, who was under medical treatment, and with whom he sat up nights. Defendant moved to exclude all of this evidence, as being incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant; a motion being made to each item of evidence separately. The motions were overruled, and exceptions taken. It is said that the only purpose of offering this testimony was to show special damages based upon an injury resulting to the plaintiff's family; that no such claim was made in the petition; and that it could not be entertained, even if pleaded. That this evidence was not admissible for the purpose above stated is clear. Hampton v. Jones, 58 Iowa, 319, 12 N. W. 276. And see, also, Welch v. Jugenheimer, 56 Iowa, 14, 8 N. W. 673;Huggins v. Kavanagh, 52 Iowa, 369, 3 N. W. 409;Bunyan v. Loftus (Iowa) 57 N. W. 687. We think, however, that this evidence was properly admitted. Mental pain and suffering is an element of actual or compensatory damages in this class of cases. Parkhurst v. Masteller, 57 Iowa, 480, 10 N. W. 864. Whatever may, then, legitimately tend to show the character and extent of such pain and anguish, is clearly admissible. It needs no argument to show that one's mental condition may, and generally will, be affected more or less by his immediate surroundings. If, as in this case, a man is arrested and charged with a crime, and he has a family depending upon him for support, one of whom is sick and needing his care, it would be natural that such circumstances should tend to increase his mental anguish.

2. The court admitted in evidence the record of the examining magistrate made on the preliminary examination. Among other things contained therein was a record of the fixing the penalty of the bond at $5,000, and of the order discharging the defendant in that proceeding. The purpose of introducing this record entry, so far as it concerned the bond, was evidently to show that the penalty of the bond was excessive, and therefore the damages should be increased. We do not find that the defendant herein was instrumental in inducing the justice to fix the penalty of the bond. He had no control over that matter. It was within the power of the justice to exact such a bond as he deemed just and proper, and, in the absence of a showing that he was by the defendant herein persuaded to demand a bond in an unreasonable sum, he cannot be charged with responsibility for the act of the justice in that respect. Nor does it appear in this case that the amount fixed as a penalty in the bond could have added to the injury to the plaintiff, as he was never confined in jail, but immediately gave bond, and regained his liberty. Montgomery v. Sutton, 58 Iowa, 700, 12 N. W. 719. The court erred in admitting so much of this record as pertained to the bond. This record of the justice was admissible for one purpose only,--to show the defendant's discharge. The instruction asked by the defendant, which directed the jury to consider this record only for the single purpose of establishing the fact that plaintiff was acquitted of the charge made against him, should have been given, as the evidence was improper for any other purpose. There is a controversy as to whether or not that part of the record, which recited that the costs were taxed against the prosecuting witness, went to the jury, or was excluded. As the case must be reversed for error in admitting the record relating to the bond, it is not essential that we determine the fact as to the record relating to costs. It would have been error to have admitted the record entry in so far...