Davis v. Shalala

Citation985 F.2d 528
Decision Date09 March 1993
Docket NumberNo. 91-7453,91-7453
Parties, Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 17223A Lillie DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Booker & Lassiter, Byron A. Lassiter, Fairhope, AL, for plaintiff-appellant.

J.B. Sessions, III, U.S. Atty., Mobile, AL, Bruce R. Granger, Elyse Sharfman, Joseph P. Palermo, III, Mary Ann Sloan, Mack A. Davis, Office of the General Counsel, Atlanta, GA, for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.

Before HATCHETT, EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges.

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:

In this Social Security case, as a matter of first impression in this circuit, we hold that the applicable regulations require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to consider the combined impact of a claimant's impairments when determining whether the claimant meets or equals the second requirement under section 12.05(C) of the Listing of Impairments.

BACKGROUND

On April 22, 1986, Lillie Davis, the appellant, applied for Supplemental Security Income, alleging disability due to allergic rhinitis and vasomotor rhinitis. In support of her application, Davis submitted the report of Dr. Clark who diagnosed Davis as suffering from allergic rhinitis and vasomotor rhinitis and stated that Davis's prognosis for treatment was unfavorable. Davis's application also included the report of Dr. Harris who concluded that Davis's allergies were controllable if she followed the treatment directions. The Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary), the appellee, denied Davis's application initially and after reconsideration. Davis requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ).

At the hearing, Davis testified that she was allergic to "everything," and that the allergy medication made her "spaced out" and did not relieve her symptoms. Davis also testified that she suffered from arthritis in her right arm, hand, and shoulder, and also suffered from numbness in her left hand and weakness in her knees. On January 16, 1987, the ALJ concluded that Davis was not disabled, finding that the medical evidence establishes a "severe allergic condition and possibly early rheumatoid arthritis," but that Davis's impairment or combination of impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment and that she has the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work. On April 2, 1987, the Appeals Council denied Davis's request for a review of the ALJ decision, and thus the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Secretary. On April 28, 1987, Davis filed this case attacking the Secretary's final decision in the district court. The district court adopted the Recommendation of a United States Magistrate and remanded the case for further evaluation in light of newly submitted evidence.

On remand, Davis contended that she met the requirements for disability under the Listing of Impairments. Davis testified and presented evidence to the ALJ about her mental health treatments to deal with symptoms of depression, insomnia, nervousness, and auditory hallucinations. Davis also presented several medical reports to the ALJ, including: (1) Dr. Harris's records indicating that Davis had taken allergy shots consistently between May, 1986 and February, 1989; (2) Dr. Hardin's evaluation suggesting that Davis may suffer from mild carpal tunnel syndrome, even though he experienced difficulty determining the presence of the disease; (3) Dr. Foster's two-sentence letter, stating that Davis was permanently disabled because of her rheumatoid arthritis and chronic allergies; (4) Dr. Bender's report that Davis did not suffer any orthopaedic-related disability; (5) Dr. Welsh's report which stated that Davis was mildly retarded based on her I.Q. scores, but reported that he found no evidence of significant depression, anxiety, psychotic thinking, or manic behavior.

After considering Davis's application in light of the additional evidence, the ALJ again concluded that Davis was not disabled. In sequential evaluation steps one and two, the ALJ found that Davis had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February, 1986, and that Davis has "a medically severe impairment resulting On February 9, 1990, Davis filed this lawsuit in the district court, alleging that the Secretary's final decision is erroneous under the applicable regulations and that substantial evidence does not support it. The district court accepted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge and affirmed the final decision of the Secretary, finding that substantial evidence did support the final decision of the Secretary.

                from borderline retardation." 1  Applying the regulations on the Listing of Impairments, the ALJ determined that Davis had a valid I.Q. of 69, but concluded that neither her carpal tunnel syndrome, her adjustment disorder, nor her allergies constituted "an additional and significant" impairment, under 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.05(C) (1992).   Lastly, the ALJ found that Davis has the residual functional capacity to perform work related activities "except for work involving mentally complex jobs," because of her borderline retardation.   On January 30, 1990, the Appeal Council denied Davis's request for a review and affirmed the ALJ's decision
                

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

On appeal, Davis contends that the ALJ misapplied section 12.05(C) of the Listing of Impairments. Specifically, Davis argues that the ALJ evaluated her claims of additional and significant work-related impairments separately rather than in combination, as required in the regulations concerning multiple impairments. In addition, Davis contends that substantial evidence does not support the Secretary's final decision denying her disability under section 12.05(C). The Secretary concedes that Davis meets the first prong of section 12.05(C) based on her valid I.Q. score of 69, and also concedes that the ALJ considered Davis's other impairments separately rather than evaluating whether their combined effects cause an additional and significant work-related impairment. The Secretary, however, contends that the ALJ determined properly that Davis did not satisfy the second prong of section 12.05(C) because the regulations do not always require that an ALJ consider the combined effect of a claimant's impairments in sequential evaluation step three. The Secretary also contends that substantial evidence does support the ALJ's determinations.

ISSUES

Thus, the issues presented are (1) whether the regulations require an ALJ to consider the combined effect of alleged impairments when making a determination under the second part of section 12.05(C); and (2) whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determinations.

DISCUSSION

In reviewing the Secretary's determination on a claim for benefits, this court has the limited role of determining whether substantial evidence supports the Secretary's factual determinations. See Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir.1987). This court, however, reviews the Secretary's legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary's determination of the proper legal standards to be applied in evaluating claims. Bridges, 815 F.2d at 624; Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir.1982).

To establish a disability under section 12.05(C), a claimant must establish: "a valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ score of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing additional and significant work-related limitation of function." 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 12.05(C) (1992); see Edwards by Edwards v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 1513, 1517 (11th Cir.1985) (recognizing that "significant" We consider the claims of the parties in light of the general rules on evaluating disability set forth in sections 416.920 through 416.923. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.901(d); §§ 416.920(a)-(f); see also McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir.1986) (explaining the five steps). In step one of the sequential evaluation, the Secretary determines only whether a claimant is engaged in substantial, gainful activity and gives no consideration to a claimant's alleged disabilities either separately or in combination. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). In sequential evaluation step two, the Secretary determines whether a claimant has a "severe" impairment or combination of impairments that causes more than a minimal limitation on a claimant's ability to function. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If the Secretary finds, at step two, "a medically severe combination of impairments, the combined impact of the impairments will be considered throughout the disability determination process." See 20 C.F.R. § 416.923. In sequential evaluation step three, the Secretary determines whether a claimant's impairment meets or equals a disability described in the Listing of Impairments, which describes impairments that are considered severe enough to prevent a person from doing any gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925(a). Finally, in sequential evaluation steps four and five, the Secretary makes an assessment of a claimant's residual functional capacity, in light of a claimant's past work experience, age, and education. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e) and 416.920(f).

                under section 12.05(C) involves something more than slight or minimal, but less than "severe").   As stated previously, the Secretary concedes that Davis meets the first part of this requirement based on her valid I.Q. score of 69.   But, the Secretary argues that the use of "a" physical or other mental impairment in section 12.05(C) precludes the consideration of the combined effect of impairments under the second prong of section 12.05(C).   Davis argues that the regulations require an ALJ to consider the combined
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