Davis v. Smart Corporation, Civil Action No. 3:96cv213-D-A (N.D. Miss. 12/__/1997)
| Decision Date | 01 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:96cv213-D-A. |
| Parties | JESSICA ANN DAVIS, PLAINTIFF, v. SMART CORPORATION, DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Presently before this court is the Defendant Smart Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment. Having considered said motion and the opposition thereto, the court is of the opinion that the motion is only partly well-taken and should be granted in part and denied in part.
On January 29, 1996, the Plaintiff's ex-husband, Daniel Davis, filed an action to modify his and the Plaintiff's divorce decree in the Chancery Court of Tippah County, Mississippi. Specifically, Mr. Davis sought a modification of the child custody provisions of the decree. On or about March 20, 1996, Mr. Davis' attorney Sean Akins caused a subpoena duces tecum to issue from the Chancery Court of Tippah County upon Magnolia Regional Health Center (Magnolia), a hospital located in Corinth, Mississippi. The subpoena directed Magnolia to produce the Plaintiff's medical records relative to the Plaintiff's stay at Magnolia in November 1995 following an attempted suicide by the Plaintiff.
Melissa Garner, an employee of Sean Akins, served the subpoena. The parties disagree, though, as to whom Ms. Garner served. The Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Garner served Barbara McPeters, a Smart Corporation (Defendant) employee who works in the Medical Records Department of Magnolia pursuant to an copying services agreement between the Defendant and Magnolia. The Defendant on the other hand asserts that Ms. Garner cannot recall to whom she served the subpoena. After service of the subpoena, someone at Magnolia hand-delivered copies of the Plaintiff's medical records to Ms. Garner. Again, the parties disagree as to the identity of the person who hand-delivered the copies. The Plaintiff asserts that the person was Ms. McPeters. The Defendant asserts that the person was not Ms. McPeters.
On March 22, 1996, Mr. Akins noticed upon reviewing the records that a page was missing from them. He contacted Magnolia to request another copy, and the copy was transmitted to him by facsimile that day. This time, the parties agree that it was Ms. McPeters who transmitted the records. However, the Defendant asserts, and the Plaintiff denies, that Magnolia directed Ms. McPeters to perform the transmission.
How the parties subsequently used the medical records is also at dispute. At the state court modification proceeding, Mr. Akins attempted to examine the Plaintiff regarding her stay at Magnolia, and the Plaintiff's counsel objected based upon Mississippi's patient-doctor privilege. The chancellor sustained the objection, and the medical records were not presented at the proceeding. However, the Plaintiff denies that "[t]he medical records obtained via subpoena were not used at the custody trial." Plaintiff's Itemization of Material Facts ¶ 13. By this denial, the Plaintiff is presumably referring to the fact that Mr. Akins questioned the Plaintiff on the dates of her stay at Magnolia and on the events leading up to her stay. However, the Plaintiff points to no evidence specifically showing the use of the medical records at the proceeding. In any event, it is undisputed that Mr. Davis knew of the Plaintiff's attempted suicide prior to the release of the medical records, and that Mr. Davis filed the petition for modification prior to the release of the medical records.
As a result of these events, the Plaintiff has filed the present action based on this court's diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Plaintiff alleges that she is a citizen of Mississippi, that the Defendant is not a citizen of Mississippi, and that the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.00.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In her complaint, the Plaintiff alleges numerous causes of action, most of which are based on negligence, invasion of privacy, or Mississippi Code sections governing confidentiality of medical records. The Defendant now moves for summary judgment as to these claims.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The burden rests upon the party seeking summary judgment to show to the district court that an absence of evidence exists in the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); see Jackson v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1996); Hirras v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 95 F.3d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 1996). Once such a showing is presented by the moving party, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate, by specific facts, that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Texas Manufactured Housing Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1996); Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1994). Substantive law will determine what is considered material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 40 (5th Cir. 1996). Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see City of Nederland, 101 F.3d at 1099; Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995). Further, "[w]here the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see City of Nederland, 101 F.3d at 1099. Finally, all facts are considered in favor of the non-moving anc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198 (5th Cir. 1995); Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1994); Matagorda County v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir.1994). However, this is so only when there is "an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994); Guillory v. Domtar Industries Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996); Richter v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 83 F.3d 96, 97 (5th Cir. 1996). In the absence of proof, the court does not "assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted); see Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990).
III. Discussion
The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant violated a number of sections of the Mississippi Code: §§ 13-1-21, 73-31-29, 41-9-3, 41-9-63, 41-9-65, 41-9-67, 41-9-77, 41-9-83, 41-9-101, 41-9-103, 41-9-105, 41-9-107, 41-9-109, and 41-21-97. In light of the tenor of the Plaintiff's argument, this court presumes that the Plaintiff asserts that these sections provide private rights of action. The following analysis of these statutes does not impact upon whether the sections may provide guidance as to appropriate standards of care under the Plaintiff's negligence theories. The court is merely addressing whether they provide a private right of action, and if so whether they apply to the Defendant.
Section 13-1-21 of the Mississippi Code provides in relevant part, "All communications made to a physician, osteopath, dentist, hospital, nurse, pharmacist, podiatrist, optometrist or chiropractor by a patient under his charge or by one seeking professional advice are hereby declared to be privileged, and such party shall not be required to disclose the same in any legal proceeding. . . ." Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-31(a). The statute further provides, "Any physician, osteopath, dentist, hospital, nurse, pharmacist, podiatrist, optometrist, or chiropractor shall be civilly liable for damages for any willful or reckless and wanton acts or omissions constituting . .. violations [of this statute]." Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-21(c). Therefore, this section provides a private right of action by which a plaintiff may sue "[a]ny physician, osteopath, dentist, hospital, nurse, pharmacist, podiatrist, optometrist, or chiropractor."
Accordingly, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant is civilly liable under this provision. The Defendant, on the other hand, argues that § 13-1-21 does not apply here. Specifically, the Defendant argues that it, a company engaged in copying services, is not one of the parties which § 13-1-21 lists as a potential defendant. See § 12-1-21 (). The Plaintiff responds that the Defendant is an agent of Magnolia and therefore must comply with the statutes as well as Magnolia. By this argument the Plaintiff apparently seeks to invoke Mississippi's doctrine of respondeat superior, to which the Plaintiff referred in the paragraph of her complaint claiming a violation of § 13-1-21. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, ¶ 7.
Generally under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held liable for the negligent acts of its employee performed in the course and scope of the employment. McKee v. Brimmer, 39 F.3d 94, 96 (5th Cir. 1994) ( Mississippi case law). The facts at bar do not follow those of the typical respondeat superior scenario. In the typical scenario, a plaintiff seeks to hold an employer liable for the tortious acts of the employee. See James W. Sessums Timber Co. v. McDaniel, 635 So. 2d 875 (Miss. 1994); FSC Securities Corp. v. McCormack, 630 So. 2d 979 (Miss. 1994). Here, on the other hand, the Plaintiff seeks to hold the purported employee...
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