Davis v. Southland Corp.

• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MADDOX; TORBERT
• Citation: Davis v. Southland Corp., 465 So.2d 397 (Ala. 1985)
• Decision Date: 08 February 1985
• Parties: Carnell DAVIS v. SOUTHLAND CORPORATION & Joyce Pettway. 83-568.

Page 397

465 So.2d 397

Carnell DAVIS v. SOUTHLAND CORPORATION & Joyce Pettway.

83-568.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Feb. 8, 1985.

Roosevelt Simmons, Mobile, for appellant.

John N. Leach and Champ Lyons, Jr. of Coale, Helmsing, Lyons & Sims, Mobile, for appellees.

MADDOX, Justice.

This is a suit for malicious prosecution. The only issues presented are evidentiary.

On October 29, 1984, Carnell Davis was arrested on a charge of trespassing while picketing a Mobile Seven-Eleven store owned by Southland, Inc. A complaint for his arrest was sworn to by Joyce Pettway, the store manager. Davis was acquitted of the charge.

Subsequently, he brought suit for false arrest and malicious prosecution against Southland and Pettway. A directed verdict was granted defendants on the false arrest claim, and the malicious prosecution claim was tried before a jury, which found for the defendants. Davis's motion for new trial was denied.

Davis appeals here, contending that the trial judge committed reversible error by admitting evidence of: (1) Davis's prior arrest; (2) his child support obligations; and (3) his having been terminated from his employment with the Mobile County Personnel Board. We find no reversible error and affirm.

During trial Davis took the stand, and, during cross-examination, the following occurred:

"Q Mr. Davis, Mr. Simmons was asking you about how you felt you were damaged in this case. Do you feel that your reputation was damaged by virtue of being arrested?

"A For trespassing, yes.

"Q Do you feel that you were embarrassed or humiliated in any way by being taken to jail?

"A Yes.

"Q All Right. Now you've been arrested and taken to jail on two prior occasions though, haven't you?

"MR. SIMMONS: I'm gonna object, sir.

"THE COURT: Overruled.

"A Yes.

"Q All right. In fact your common-law wife had charged you previously on two other occasions with disorderly conduct, hadn't she?

"A Right. It was a domestic family type situation.

"Q All right, sir. But she swore a warrant out against you on two separate occasions for disorderly conduct and you were jailed then, weren't you?

"A I was actually incarcerated once. The first time I did not go inside the jail.

"Q All right. But you were arrested and booked, weren't you?

"A Right.

"Q And you paid a fine on both of those occasions, didn't you?

"A Right.

"Q And at the present time aren't you under a court order to make support payments for three illegitimate children?

"MR. SIMMONS: I'm gonna object, sir.

"THE COURT: Overruled.

"A Three illegitimate children?

"Q Yes. Three children. Aren't you under a court order to make payments for three children, three illegitimate children?

"A I am under court order to pay child support to two children.

"Q To two children.

"A I don't consider my children illegitimate.

"Q All right. Have you ever been married?

"A As you say, common-law married. I think here in Alabama if you live with someone for a certain period of time I think it's considered common-law marriage. I don't know the exact law.

"Q All right. These two children are children by a common-law marriage, is that correct?

"A Right.

"Q All right. And as a matter of fact you are now and have been behind on those payments, haven't you?

"MR. SIMMONS: I'm gonna object, sir.

"THE COURT: Well I think we're getting pretty far afield, Mr. Leach. Sustain the objection.

"Q As a matter of fact, aren't you suppose[d] to appear in Court this afternoon in connection with those payments?

"MR. SIMMONS: I'm gonna object, sir.

"THE COURT: Sustained.

"Q Now, Mr. Davis, when you were telling the jury about various places that you had been employed, you did not mention the Mobile County Personnel Board. Weren't you previously employed with the Mobile County Personnel Board?

"A Yes, I have been. If I left them off it was simply by mistake.

"Q Well, the fact of the matter is that you were fired on September 1, 1982 by the Personnel Board, weren't you?

"A Yes.

"Q All right. And you were fired for conduct unbecoming an employee in the public service and a lack of truthfulness and honesty, weren't you?

"A Those were the reasons set out in my dismissal. They were not true.

"Q All right. But those were the reasons found by Mr. Huffstetler, Dr. Rouse, Mr. McPherson, Mr. Freeman and Ms. Vaughn, the members of the Personnel Board, on November 18, 1982; weren't they?

"A Yes...."

Davis argues that evidence of his prior arrests was improperly admitted. He cites Bracy v. Sippial Electric Co., 379 So.2d 582 (Ala.1980), for the proposition that, in civil cases, evidence of a party's character and reputation is generally inadmissible. He also cites Dean v. Johnston, 281 Ala. 602, 206 So.2d 610 (1968), and Meador v. State, 37 Ala.App. 573, 72 So.2d 418 (1954), arguing that, while a prior conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may be admitted to show a witness's credibility, the evidence elicited from him was inadmissible because it did not pertain to a crime of moral turpitude and was evidence only of an arrest, not a conviction.

Southland and Pettway counter by arguing that, although evidence of a party's character is generally inadmissible in civil cases, in an action for malicious prosecution or for false arrest in which the plaintiff alleges injury to his reputation, the plaintiff's bad general reputation is admissible in mitigation of damages. Key v. Dozier, 252 Ala. 631, 42 So.2d 254 (1949), C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 38.02 (3d ed. 1977). They also argue that, in a case of this nature, evidence of the plaintiff's prior arrests is admissible to show that, in the light of the previous arrests, there was no serious injury to his reputation. Long v. Mann, 259 Ala. 17, 65 So.2d 500 (1953).

We agree with Southland and Pettway. As this Court stated in Long, supra:

"This cross-examination of plaintiff bore directly on the question of whether or not his arrest in the case at bar would in fact have had a tendency to render him embarrassed or nervous or ill in view of his many previous trials and convictions in various courts."

It is undisputed that Davis had been arrested twice previously and that he now claims that the arrest for which he presently seeks damages injured his reputation. Considering this, we see no distinction between the present case and Long, supra. Consequently, we follow the principles of law set out in that case and hold the evidence of plaintiff's prior arrests to have been properly admitted.

Davis's argument that the evidence was inadmissible because it only proved prior arrests, not convictions, is not persuasive. The opinion in Long, although referring to "convictions," nevertheless appears to stand for the proposition that, in these narrow circumstances, evidence of prior trials or arrests is admissible, even though they did not result in a conviction. In any event, the above cited portion of the record concerning the prior arrests clearly shows that Davis admitted paying the fines incident to his previous arrests. It is axiomatic that the payment of a fine in a criminal case is evidence of a conviction. Therefore, any error in admission of the prior arrests was rendered harmless by the subsequent admission of evidence that Davis paid the fines resulting therefrom.

Furthermore, we also note that any error in the admission of Davis's prior arrests and convictions was not properly preserved for appeal because no specific objection was made. It is generally recognized that, in order to preserve an error for appeal, a specific objection, rather than a general objection, must be made. C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 426.01(70) (3rd ed. 1977). This requirement has been incorporated in Rule 46, Ala.R.Civ.P., which provides, in pertinent part:

"[F]or all purposes for which an exception has heretofore been necessary it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor...."

This Court has frequently refused to consider an objection where it was not accompanied by specific grounds. Crawford Coal Co. v. Stephens, 382 So.2d 536 (Ala.1980); Granberry v. Gilbert, 276 Ala. 486, 163 So.2d 641 (1964); Tankersley v. Webb, 263 Ala. 234, 82 So.2d 259 (1955). Although a specific objection is unnecessary where the evidence is patently inadmissible, Crawford Coal Co., supra, such is not the case here. Even though our courts of...