Davis v. State, 4 Div. 554
Citation | 570 So.2d 791 |
Decision Date | 29 June 1990 |
Docket Number | 4 Div. 554 |
Parties | Ricky Lee DAVIS v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
John M. Pennington, Andalusia, for appellant.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Cecil G. Brendle, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Ricky Lee Davis, was convicted of the unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, in violation of § 13A-12-211, Code of Alabama 1975. He was sentenced to six years in the state penitentiary.
The evidence tended to show that from February until the end of May 1988, Agent Claude Cosey of the ABC Board was working undercover in Covington County, Alabama. Micky Adams, an informant for the State of Alabama, was working with him. During the month of April, Adams got in touch with Kenneth Wayne Harrison, a fellow employee of the appellant, and requested that Harrison attempt to purchase drugs from the appellant. Harrison testified at trial that prior to that time he had never heard that the appellant was a possible source for drugs. Nevertheless, Harrison attempted to arrange a drug buy between Adams and the appellant; however, the appellant informed Harrison that such would not be possible. Harrison conveyed this message to Adams.
Adams continued to call Harrison during the following week, each time requesting that he go back to the appellant and attempt to purchase drugs. The appellant refused to get involved and Adams was so informed. Finally, after being called on a daily basis by Harrison, on behalf of Adams, the appellant reluctantly agreed to try to find the requested cocaine.
Upon learning that the appellant had acquired the requested drugs, Harrison traveled to the appellant's home in Laurel Hill, Florida, accompanied by Adams and Agent Cosey. At that time, the appellant was told by Agent Cosey that he did not want to complete the transaction in Laurel Hill, and he asked the appellant to accompany them in Adams's vehicle out of the city limits. Davis got into the vehicle, a pick-up truck, sandwiched between Adams, who was driving, and Agent Cosey, who was seated by the passenger's door.
The three began their journey out of the city limits of Laurel Hill, headed towards Alabama. It was undisputed at trial that on at least two occasions prior to entering Alabama, the appellant requested that they stop the vehicle. However, Adams continued on into Alabama, where the transaction was subsequently completed.
The dispositive issue for review is whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to negate the appellant's defense of entrapment. "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer." Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932).
Alabama courts follow the so-called subjective approach when deciding whether there is evidence to support an entrapment defense. Trammell v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Ala. State Bar, 431 So.2d 1168 (Ala.1983); Jackson v. State, 384 So.2d 134 (Ala.Cr.App.1979) writ quashed, 384 So.2d 140 (Ala.1980); Tyson v. State, 361 So.2d 1182 (Ala.Cr.App.1978).
(Footnotes omitted.)
W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, Vol. 1, § 5.2(b) (1986).
It is the first inquiry of the two-step test under the subjective approach that is most troubling to this court.
(Footnotes omitted.)
95 Harv.L.Rev. 1122 (1982). Like the United States Supreme Court, neither this court nor our Alabama Supreme Court has ever addressed the issue of whether a third party may claim entrapment when he has been induced to commit crime by an unsuspecting middleman.
In Sorrells, supra, the United States Supreme Court articulated the "origin of intent test." This test permits invocation of the entrapment defense "when the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute." Sorrells, supra, 287 U.S. at 442, 53 S.Ct. at 212-13. The "origin of intent test" appears broad enough both in purpose and scope to allow an indirect entrapment defense. However, judicial treatment of the test seems to be in a state of disarray.
The prevailing view in the federal courts has been that a defendant may not defend based on indirect entrapment. Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944 (9th Cir.1968), exemplifies this view:
Note, 62 B.U.L.Rev. 929, 943 (1982). (Footnotes omitted.)
That case can be distinguished from the case at bar. Carbajal brought Vega into the criminal adventure on his own accord and without any inducement from the government agent. In the case at bar, the appellant was specifically targeted by ABC Agent Claude Cosey.
The United States Courts of Appeals often reach the opposite result based on a more liberal reading of the "origin of intent test." United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191 (3d Cir.1957), is an example:
Notes, 62 B.U.L.Rev. 929, 945-46. (Footnotes omitted.)
This court agrees with the holding in Klosterman and holds that a third party may claim entrapment when he has been induced to commit crime by an unsuspecting middleman. In the case at bar, Harrison, although unaware that he was helping with an undercover operation, was clearly acting as an...
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Com. v. Tracey
...248 F.2d 191 (3d Cir.1957) (unsuspecting middleman may be viewed as agent of the government for entrapment purposes); Davis v. State, 570 So.2d 791, 794 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) (same). We need not squarely decide that issue in this case. We note simply that we have never required a third party ......
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