Davis v. State
Decision Date | 08 January 1999 |
Citation | 737 So.2d 480 |
Parties | Ex parte State of Alabama. In re Adrian Roderick DAVIS v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Cedric B. Colvin, asst. atty. gen., for petitioner.
Thomas M. Goggans, Montgomery, for respondent.
A Chambers County jury convicted Adrian Roderick Davis of murder committed during a robbery, Ala.Code 1975, § 135-40(a)(2), and murder committed during a burglary, § 13A-5-40(a)(4), based on the 1994 death of Artie Kate Harrington. The trial court sentenced Davis to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without parole. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction for murder committed during the course of a robbery, but reversed his conviction for murder committed during the course of a burglary. Davis v. State, 737 So.2d 474 (Ala.Crim. App.1997). On November 14, 1997, this Court denied Davis's petition for certiorari review, without opinion (docket no. 1961981). We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari, to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment reversing the conviction of murder committed during the course of a burglary. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals insofar as it reversed that conviction, and we remand the cause.
The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the evidence in this case tended to show the following:
Before the Court of Criminal Appeals, Davis argued that this evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for murder during a burglary, primarily because, he claimed, there was no evidence showing that he "knowingly and unlawfully enter[ed] or remain[ed] unlawfully" in Harrington's dwelling. See Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-7-5. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the State had presented no evidence establishing these statutory elements. Not only did the evidence presented fail to show a "breaking" of the victim's home, there was no direct evidence establishing how Davis entered the home. There were no signs of forced entry indicating that Davis initially entered the home unlawfully. There was also no indication that Davis entered the home with the victim's permission but then remained unlawfully in the home. The court, concluding that this lack of evidence that Davis in some way trespassed in the victim's home was fatal to the prosecution's case, reversed Davis's burglary-murder conviction.
Davis was indicted for murder committed during a burglary in the first degree, § 13A-7-5, Ala.Code 1975.1 The relevant portion of that statute provides:
Alabama's burglary statute further provides that "[a] person `enters or remains unlawfully' in or upon premises when he is not licensed, invited or privileged to do so." Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-7-1(4). An unlawful entry or unlawful remaining constitutes the trespassory element of burglary, which element, when coupled with the intent to commit a crime inside, forms the nucleus of the burglary offense.
The common law defined the crime of burglary far more narrowly than its statutory successor does. Common-law burglary required a breaking and entering of the dwelling of another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony. Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 8.13 (1986). When Alabama adopted its current burglary statute, as part of the Alabama Criminal Code, by Act No. 607, Reg. Session, Ala. Acts 1977, the legislature expanded the crime of burglary beyond its commonlaw boundaries, by eliminating most of the common-law requirements. The requirement of a "breaking" was one requirement deleted. Perry v. State, 407 So.2d 183 (Ala.Crim.App.1981). The State is no longer required to prove that the defendant broke and entered the premises. Instead, the strictures of that element have been replaced with the general requirement of a trespass on premises through an unlawful entry or an unlawful remaining.
Although the Court of Criminal Appeals did not directly say that Davis's conviction could not stand because there was no proof of a "breaking and entering," the court implied that, by stating that there was no evidence of a breaking and entering and by quoting this statement from Martin v. State, 44 Ala.App. 395, 398, 210 So.2d 704, 707 (1968): "To [prove] burglary it is essential to prove a breaking into and entering of the house in question." Davis, 737 So.2d at 478. As the Court of Criminal Appeals has held repeatedly, this is not the law and has not been the law since the Alabama Criminal Code became effective. Perry, supra; Hollins v. State, 415 So.2d 1249 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Johnson v. State, 473 So.2d 607 (Ala.Crim.App.1985), overruled, Ex parte Gentry, 689 So.2d 916 (Ala.1996).
While the State was not required to prove "breaking and entering," it was required to prove that Davis entered or remained "unlawfully" in Harrington's home with the intent to commit a crime. The "unlawful remaining" prong of Alabama's burglary statute "cover[s] cases where a person enters with license or privilege but remains after termination of such license or privilege." Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-7-1 Commentary.
The Court of Criminal Appeals expressed a reluctance to follow Ex parte Gentry, supra:
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