Davis v. State

• Decision Date: 18 April 1873
• Parties: JOSEPH DAVIS v. THE STATE OF MARYLAND.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

38 Md. 15

JOSEPH DAVIS v. THE STATE OF MARYLAND.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

April 18, 1873

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Washington County.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

In behalf of the appellant this Court was asked to pass an order requiring the Judges of the Circuit Court for Washington County, to certify and transmit to this Court all the testimony taken at the trial of the cause in the Circuit Court; after argument, the prayer of the petitioner was refused.

The cause was then argued before BARTOL, C.J., STEWART, BRENT MILLER and ROBINSON, J., and the rulings of the Circuit Court were unanimously affirmed.

A re-argument being requested by one of the Judges who concurred in the opinion, a re-argument was ordered under the fifteenth rule of the Court, and the cause was re-argued before BARTOL, C.J., STEWART BRENT, BOWIE, GRASON, MILLER and ROBINSON, J.

William P. Maulsby, for the appellant.

The rule in regard to experts is, that the opinion of witnesses possessing superior skill is admissible, whenever the subject-matter so far partakes of the nature of a science, as to require a course of previous habit or study, in order to the attainment of a knowledge of it. But not when the enquiry is into a subject-matter, the nature of which is not such as to require any peculiar habits or study, in order to qualify a man to understand it. Carter vs. Boehme, 1 Smith's Leading Cases, marg. 286, and cases there cited. Jones vs. Tucker, 41 N H. 546; 1 Greenleaf on Ev., (12 Ed.) notes 3, 4, 5 to sec. 440.

The very foundation for the theory of expert testimony is that of his superior knowledge in relation to the subject-matter of which he is permitted to give an opinion, by which he, in a degree, assumes the functions of a jury. Heald vs Thing, 45 Maine, 397, 398; Dickinson vs. Barber, 9 Mass. 225.

A witness cannot be permitted to give his opinion as an expert until it appears, by a preliminary examination, that he is a person of skill in the particular subject-matter in which his opinion is desired, and it must also appear that he has reliable information or knowledge of the facts involved, and on which his opinion is to be founded, before he can testify. An expert must state the circumstances from which he draws his conclusions--in other words, the facts on which he grounds his opinion.

It is incompetent for a physician, who did not hear all the evidence on the subject-matter of his opinion, to give an opinion founded on the portion heard by him. The People vs. Lake, 2 Kernan, 358-63-4.

An expert, who has heard all the evidence, cannot give an opinion on the general question of sanity or insanity. That is the question of fact for the jury. But he may testify whether such a fact proved, indicates insanity.

An expert cannot be allowed to give his opinion upon the case, because the case, in point of fact, upon which he might give his opinion, might not be the case which the jury, on the evidence, would find, and there would be no certain means of knowing whether it was so or not. It is not the province of an expert to draw inferences of fact from the evidence, but simply to declare his opinion upon a known or hypothetical state of facts. United States vs. McGlue, 1 Curtis' C. C. R., 9.

A physician may be called to shew the position, direction and extent of a wound, and the obstacle an instrument might meet with in its progress, but whether in a certain relative position, and in a particular manner, or by a particular motion, certain muscular strength would be equal to the infliction of a certain wound, seems to be more properly a matter for the jury upon the facts. Goodwin's Case, referred to in 3 Phillips Ev., 273.

Third Exception.--The facts, of the description of the wounds, and of the condition of the sink, on which the opinion of the witness is predicated, are not given. It does not appear what those facts were, either from the testimony of the witness, or from any other proof in the record. It shews peculiarly, an assumption by the witness of the province of the jury. He finds facts in his own mind, and keeps them there. The admissibility of the opinion of this witness, in the condition of the record, is denounced by all the authorities.

Whilst to make the opinion evidence, even if the facts on which it was founded were disclosed, it must appear that the subject-matter so far partook of the nature of a science as to require a course of previous habit or study, in order to the attainment of a knowledge of it; it does appear from the proof of the witness, that the subject matter was not of that character--that only one of the elements of the opinion partook of a scientific character--his knowledge of the anatomy of the skull; and that as to all the other elements, his knowledge had no relation to science, study or habit. It is a case in which the witness ought to have been confined to a statement of his professional knowledge, the anatomy of the skull, and that fact given to the jury in connection with all other facts of description of wounds, and of condition of sink, to have enabled the jury to form its own opinion on the point involved in the question put to the witness.

The fact is, the subject-matter on which these experts testified, was accident, and nothing else. The question was, could the wound have been, or was it likely to have been, inflicted by accident?

These views are equally applicable to the eighth, twelfth and fourteenth exceptions.

The ninth and fourteenth exceptions present the case of witnesses giving opinions who had not heard all the testimony--the testimony in the fourteenth being obnoxious to that objection, as well as to the objections presented in the third, eighth and twelfth.

The thirteenth exception presents the case of an opinion formed on the declarations of others, on a description of wounds and of sink--given to witness out of Court--and an opinion formed on those declarations when made, confirmed by the proof in Court, and an examination of the skull of deceased. But, however viewed, it still appears that the declarations made by the Attorney-General out of Court, formed an element, in the basis of facts, on which the witness predicated his opinion. It was formed on the declarations. It was only confirmed by the proof.

The third, eighth, twelfth and fourteenth exceptions raised, also, the question of the competency of the question put by the State to each of the witnesses, to wit: Could such wound or fracture have been, or was it likely to have been, inflicted by the deceased, accidentally falling into the sink, &c? The question in the twelfth exception being substantially identical with that in the others.

The State was bound to prove the issue on its part--that death had resulted from means employed by the prisoner. It was competent only for the State to offer evidence tending to prove that fact. Whether the deceased might or not have come to his death by accident, in one way or another, did not tend to prove that the prisoner had murdered him, as laid in the indictment. The proof was incompetent, because not pertinent to the issue. Whether it might have been admissible in reply, if the prisoner had offered proof tending to shew a probability of accidental death by falling into the sink, is not the question. The questions objected to were not asked in reply, but in chief.

The question stated in the first exception is liable to the same class of objection. It was not competent for the State to prove what kind of instruments could have inflicted the wounds, or in the language of the witness, might have done so, but only to prove what kind of instruments did inflict, or did probably inflict the wounds.

The second exception ought to be sustained, because the cross-examination was legitimate and proper. No more fair, plain, direct question could be asked to test a witness' knowledge. It was the knowledge of the witness as an expert, the extent and correctness of his information, which was immediately in question; and to that, and that only, the question was addressed. The exception shows that the cross-examination was proper, and sought only to test the witness' knowledge, and did not seek to have the statements of a book to be given to the jury. The witness had stated that a particular thing, touching his scientific knowledge, was to be found in a particular book. Was that thing to be found in that book? If so, nothing could be more plain, fair, and direct, than to ask the witness to find it! If it were not so, then it followed that the scientific knowledge of the witness, necessarily founded on books, to an extent at least, was inaccurate to the extent involved in the question, and answer. How far such inaccuracy might affect the confidence of the jury in the accuracy and value of the testimony of the witness, is, by law, a matter for the jury alone.

In the fourth exception the Circuit Court assumed that no state of facts could be testified to in the case other than had been. In most cases there are two sides, and only one is heard at a time. But, as shown by this exception, it was assumed that the other side could have no state of facts to which to apply the proof sought to be given. But, it is submitted, that adopting the Court's view, that the defence could not be allowed to prove any facts inconsistent with the State's theory, the question was clearly admissible. The only scientific knowledge which the witness had, was, as to the anatomy of the skull, and the thickness of the skull bone and it would be hard, indeed, if the defence could not be allowed to get out all the knowledge of the witness on the very subject to which he had testified. He had just proved that the wound and fracture could not be caused by accident,...