Davis v. State

Decision Date16 October 2019
Docket NumberC.A. No. PM-2010-4824
PartiesJOSHUA DAVIS v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
CourtRhode Island Superior Court

DECISION

McGUIRL, J. Before the Court is Joshua Davis's (Petitioner) application for postconviction relief (Application). Petitioner asserts two theories in support of his Application: (1) that his change of plea hearing was in violation of his constitutional rights and Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 11); and (2) that his attorneys rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise the question of his competency or to inform the Court he was being prescribed anti-psychotic medications at the time of the change of plea hearing. Petitioner filed a second amended petition alleging that the Court violated Rule 11 when it failed to advise him that his plea would subject him to sex offender registration and community supervision. See G.L. 1956 §§ 11-37.1-1 et seq.; G.L. 1956 § 13-8-33. Therefore, the Petitioner contends that his attorneys were ineffective for not advising him of this registration requirement and ramification of the community supervision statute prior to entering his plea. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1.

IFacts and Travel

On May 7, 2006, eight-year-old Savannah Smith disappeared from outside her home in Woonsocket, Rhode Island. Petitioner, who resided near the Smith home, was identified as an individual with whom Savannah was last seen. Subsequently, Petitioner was questioned by Woonsocket Police the night of the disappearance and would later lead detectives to Savannah's body in a wooded location in Cranston, Rhode Island. In addition, Petitioner confessed to driving Savannah from Woonsocket to Cranston, engaging in sexual intercourse with her, and strangling her with his hands. A used condom with the Petitioner's semen inside and the victim's blood on the outside was also found near Savannah's body.

Petitioner was charged with first-degree murder, first-degree child molestation, and kidnapping of a minor. The Petitioner was held without bail from the time of his arrest on May 7, 2006 until he entered guilty pleas to all three charges on April 17, 2008. On June 25, 2008, the Petitioner was sentenced to serve life without parole for the murder, and consecutive life sentences for the crimes of first-degree child molestation and kidnapping of a minor.

In August 2011, the Superior Court appointed attorney Glenn Sparr to represent Petitioner in connection with his Application. After reviewing Petitioner's claims, Attorney Sparr moved to withdraw from the case and filed a lengthy memorandum in support of said motion pursuant to Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000). The Superior Court granted Attorney Sparr's motion to withdraw but allowed the Petitioner an opportunity to provide evidence in support of his claims. After review, the Superior Court denied Petitioner's claim. Subsequently, the Petitioner appealed and on November 12, 2015, the Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded the Petitioner's case withinstructions for the lower court to appoint new counsel and provide Petitioner with an evidentiary hearing. Davis v. State, 124 A.3d 428 (R.I. 2015).

Present counsel was assigned, and an evidentiary hearing was held on November 15 and 27, 2018. The Court heard testimony from Dr. Wade Myers, Director of Forensic Psychiatry at Rhode Island Hospital; Scott Tirocchi, Mental Health Clinician; the Petitioner, and defense attorney Anthony Capraro.1 A further hearing was held July 10, 2019 in relation to the Petitioner's second amended petition with no additional testimony heard. After review of submitted evidence and testimony, a Decision is herein rendered.

IIStandard of Review

"'[T]he remedy of postconviction relief is available to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction violated the applicant's constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice."' DeCiantis v. State, 24 A.3d 557, 569 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Page v. State, 995 A.2d 934, 942 (R.I. 2010)) (further citation omitted); see also § 10-9.1-1. Postconviction relief motions are civil in nature and thus, are governed by all the applicable rules and statutes governing civil cases. Ferrell v. Wall, 889 A.2d 177, 184 (R.I. 2005). Thus, '"[a]n applicant for such relief bears '[t]he burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such relief is warranted' in his or her case.'" Brown v. State, 32 A.3d 901, 907 (R.I. 2011) (quoting State v. Laurence, 18 A.3d 512, 521 (R.I. 2011)).

IIIAnalysis
APlea Colloquy

Petitioner alleges that he was not competent when he entered his guilty plea on April 17, 2008 because the prescribed anti-psychotic medications he was on at the time, in combination with side effects of his mental illness, prevented a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights as required by Rule 11. According to Rule 11, the court "shall not accept [a guilty] plea . . . without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea." Rule 11.1; see also Njie v. State, 156 A.3d 429, 434 (R.I. 2017). Pursuant to Rule 11, the trial justice must speak with the defendant to the extent necessary to establish that '"the defendant understood the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea."' Njie, 156 A.3d at 434 (quoting State v. Frazar, 822 A.2d 931, 935 (R.I. 2003)).

In addition, the focus of a competency probe is whether a defendant has the capacity to understand the proceedings. State v. Cook, 104 R.I. 442, 446, 244 A.2d 833, 835 (1968). A defendant's competency to plead guilty is contingent on his capacity to '"first, . . . understand[ ] the nature of the charges brought against him; second, . . . appreciate[ ] the purpose and object of the trial proceedings based thereon; and third, that defendant has the mental capacity to assist reasonably and rationally his counsel in preparing and putting forth a defense to the criminal charges of which he stands accused.'" State v. Thomas, 794 A.2d 990, 994 (R.I. 2002) (quoting Cook, 104 R.I. at 447, 244 A.2d at 835-36). Finally, the party challenging the validity of a plea has the burden of establishing "by a preponderance of the evidence, that he did not already understandthe nature of the charges and the rights he was giving up, either through prior experience with the criminal courts of this state or by reason of having been so advised by counsel." Ouimette v. State, 785 A.2d 1132, 1136 (R.I. 2001) (citing Hall v. Langlois, 105 R.I. 642, 645, 254 A.2d 282, 284 (1969)).

During the plea proceedings, the justice questioned Petitioner thoroughly before accepting his plea as knowing and voluntary. First, the trial justice established that the Petitioner had his GED, could read and write, and was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the plea.2 Next, the trial justice asked Petitioner's counsel, John Hardiman (Attorney Hardiman), if he had reviewed the rights form with the Petitioner. Attorney Hardiman replied "[a] number of times . . . not only today, yesterday, and again on Tuesday, earlier this week, when we went over it very extensively . . . ." (Plea Hr'g Tr. 9:17-20, Apr. 17, 2008.) Attorney Hardiman further advised the Court that he was "satisfied not only that [Petitioner] understands the entire process that he is giving up, I'm also satisfied he understands each and every one of the rights on the rights form and that he is competent to acknowledge those rights and understands the reading of them." Id. at 10:11-15. The Court further questioned Attorney Hardiman as to the Petitioner's understanding of his plea and subsequently confirmed Petitioner's desire during the following exchange:

"THE COURT: Did you go over with him the possible penalties that could be imposed as a result of this plea?
"MR. HARDIMAN: I indicated to him that when he did plead, that he was going to be acknowledging to the three counts, of murder in the first degree, first degree child molestation and kidnapping of a minor, which all carries a penalty of life, with the condition that first degree murder also had a possibility of life without parole. I told him the life criteria for life with parole would be satisfied. The issues of whether or not the killing was done by torture or aggravated batteryor by felony murder, by his very plea, he is acknowledging that that has been satisfied for the purpose of this plea and he could be facing a sentence of life without parole as related to the murder charge.
"THE COURT: Now, you heard the recitation of your attorney, Mr. Davis, is what he said to you; correct?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"THE COURT: And after talking to him about this and hearing from him about this, is it still your desire to go forward at this time and plead guilty to these three charges?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is, your Honor." Id. at 10:16-11:1-13.

Next, the trial justice reviewed the possible sentences which Petitioner may receive, including the possibility of life without parole, which the Petitioner then acknowledged. Specifically, the following exchange occurred during the colloquy:

"THE COURT: Now, the proposed sentence in this matter, as to Count I, which is first degree murder, the sentence is life in prison with the possibility in this case of life without parole; and then with regard to Count II, the potential sentence is up to life in prison, and that's the child molestation charge; and then on Count III, which is the kidnapping of a minor charge, again, the potential is for up to life in prison. Those sentences could be meted out by me so that they could be concurrent with each other, meaning running together, or they could be consecutive. So, there's a potential that
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