Davis v. State, 03-98-00221-CR

• Decision Date: 25 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 03-98-00221-CR,03-98-00221-CR
• Citation: Davis v. State, 989 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App. 1999)
• Parties: John Jay DAVIS, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 859

989 S.W.2d 859

John Jay DAVIS, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 03-98-00221-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas Austin.

March 25, 1999.

Ray Bass, Law Offices of Bass & Smith, P.C., Austin, for appellant.

Eugene D. Taylor, County Atty., Brandy Byrd, Asst. County Atty., Williamson County, Georgetown, for State.

Before Justices JONES, PATTERSON and ONION ^*

JOHN F. ONION, Jr., Justice.

This is an appeal from an order deferring adjudication of guilt and placing appellant John Jay Davis, Jr. on community supervision. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(j) (West Supp.1999); Dillehey v. State, 815 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (defendant who receives deferred adjudication probation may appeal from ruling on pretrial motion).

Appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere before the trial court to an information charging him with the misdemeanor offense of possession of fenfluramine in an amount of less than 28 grams. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.117(a)(h) (West Supp.1999). The court rendered an order deferring adjudication of guilt and placing appellant on community supervision for 24 months subject to certain conditions.

Point of Error

In a single point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained by an illegal warrantless detention and arrest. Appellant claims that the initial detention of the vehicle in which he was a passenger violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Appellant presents only a federal question. We will sustain the point of error and reverse the judgment of conviction.

Facts

The record at the suppression hearing reflects that Georgetown Police Officer Timothy Allen Stengle was on patrol on March 3, 1996, about 6:00 p.m. on Highway 29 when he received a dispatch. Stengle testified that the dispatcher reported having received information from a caller on a "cell phone" about a full-sized black Chevy Blazer with dealer's tags 5D1180 in the area of mile post 259 on I-35 driving in a northbound direction; that the vehicle was occupied by three white males; that the vehicle was being driven recklessly--"that the vehicle has passed the caller on the shoulder of the roadway back in Round Rock"; and that the occupants were "possibly smoking marijuana."

Stengle proceeded to I-35 and pulled off to the side of the road between mile posts 261 and 262. He then received a radio report from Officer Pitcher that a black Blazer was headed northbound on I-35 in the direction of Stengle's position. As a full-sized black Blazer with three white males passed Stengle's position, he began to follow and confirmed the dealer tag number as given by the dispatcher. Using his police unit's overhead lights, Stengle pulled the Blazer over north of Williams Drive at mile post 263 on I-35.

Stengle acknowledged that he observed no traffic offense being committed and saw no violation of law; he stopped the Blazer solely on the basis of the information in the dispatch. He did not know the anonymous caller and had never seen or talked to such person. The unknown informant had not given a name or address, although it was the policy of the Georgetown Police Department to ask for identification. Office Stengle acknowledged that no one stopped at the scene of the detention and identified himself or herself as the caller.

Stengle testified that after the Blazer stopped, the driver got out and came to the rear of the vehicle to meet the officer. The driver was ordered to return to the vehicle and get back inside. Stengle explained that this was a policy he followed with traffic stops. After the driver complied with the officer's instruction, Stengle approached the driver's window and smelled the overwhelming odor of marihuana. ¹ About this time, Officer Pitcher arrived on the scene. Stengle removed the driver, who was identified as Bryon Harlan, from the car. Officer Pitcher then removed appellant who was the right front seat passenger. A pat-down search of appellant revealed a pipe in one of his socks that the officers considered to be narcotic paraphernalia. Eric Bugen was removed from the back seat. A search of the back seat revealed marihuana on top of a black bag under a shirt and boxer shorts. The marihuana was believed to belong to Bugen. In the luggage storage area, a shaving kit was found that contained cocaine, narcotic paraphernalia, and a razor blade. Harlan admitted the cocaine was his. At the jail, two pills were found in appellant's left pocket. These pills form the basis of the instant prosecution.

Officer Frederick Pitcher testified that on the date in question he was a Georgetown police officer; that about 6:00 p.m., he heard the dispatch which referred to the caller as a female; and that the dispatch said the caller believed that they (three while males) "were smoking something referred to as marijuana." Pitcher revealed that he then drove south on I-35 and about a minute later observed a black Blazer northbound on I-35. He then radioed Officer Stengle of his observation. Officer Pitcher related that the dispatch referred only to a female caller. No name, age, or location of the caller was given.

The two officers were the only witnesses at the suppression hearing. The dispatcher did not testify and there was no evidence as to whether a tape had been made of the cellular phone call or whether any efforts had been made to locate the caller.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court overruled the motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal detention. The trial court made no separate findings of fact.

Standard of Review

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court must determine the applicable standard of review. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Guzman has recently clarified the standard of review to be used. In Loserth v. State, 963 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), the court made clear that Guzman is to be applied to all motions to suppress evidence. Although great weight should be given to the inferences drawn by trial judges and law enforcement officers, determination of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)); ² Hunter v. State, 955 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (question of whether defendant was "detained" under Fourth Amendment is to be reviewed de novo); State v. Ensley, 976 S.W.2d 272, 274-75 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd).

The Applicable Law--Reasonable Suspicion

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) recognized three categories of police-civilian interaction: (1) encounter; ³ (2) temporary detention or stop; and (3) arrest. ⁴ See also State v. Simmang, 945 S.W.2d 219, 222-23 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1997, no pet.); Francis v. State, 896 S.W.2d 406, 408-09 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), pet. dism'd improvidently granted, 922 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Only detentions and arrests amount to "seizures" of persons. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868.

In the instant case, we are confronted with a detention or stop arising out of an anonymous tip. Law enforcement officers may stop and briefly detain persons suspected of criminal activity on less information than is constitutionally required for probable cause to arrest. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). To justify the intrusion, the officer must have specific articulable facts which, in light of his experience and personal knowledge, together with inferences from those facts, would reasonably warrant the intrusion on the freedom of the citizen detained for further investigation. See Comer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Johnson v. State, 658 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Simmang, 945 S.W.2d at 222. These "specific articulable facts" must create in the individual officer's mind a reasonable suspicion that "some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or had occurred, some suggestion to connect the detained person with the unusual activity, and some indication that the activity is related to a crime." Johnson, 658 S.W.2d at 626. Thus, such a detention requires the officer to have a reasonable suspicion that the person detained is involved in criminal activity. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319; Harris v. State, 913 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1995, no pet.). The officer making a Terry stop must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. See United States v. Sokolow 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); Williams v. State, 621 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).

The reasonableness of an investigative detention turns on the totality of the circumstances in each case. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 561, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (Powell, concurring); Shaffer v. State, 562 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd); Davis v. State, 794 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Tex.App.--Austin 1990, pet. ref'd). Reasonable suspicion is dependent upon both the content of the information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). "Both factors--quantity and quality--are considered in the totality of the circumstances--the whole picture ... must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion." Id. (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).

We observe that the "as consistent with...