Davis v. State, 72549

Decision Date03 September 1986
Docket NumberNo. 72549,72549
PartiesDAVIS v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

William M. Shurling III, Macon, for appellant.

Willis B. Sparks III, Dist. Atty., Graham A. Thorpe, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

SOGNIER, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of two counts of rape, and he appeals.

1. Appellant contends the trial court erred by not granting his motion to sever the first charge of rape from the second rape and kidnapping charges. Appellant contends that under the decision in Dingler v. State, 233 Ga. 462, 211 S.E.2d 752 (1975), it is mandatory that the trial judge, upon motion of the defendant, order separate trials when the offenses are joined solely on the ground that they are of the same or similar character.

In the instant case the first rape charged against appellant occurred on February 20, 1985 in his brother's home. The second rape charged against appellant occurred on June 4, 1985 in an area behind the victim's home. Two different victims were involved and the rapes were unrelated in time or place. In Dingler, supra, our Supreme Court adopted the American Bar Association Standards on Joinder of Offenses. Those standards provide: "Two or more offenses may be joined in one charge, with each offense stated in a separate count, when the offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both: (a) are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan; or (b) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan." ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, p. 289 (1974). On severance, the Standards provide: "(a) Whenever two or more offenses have been joined for trial solely on the ground that they are of the same or similar character, the defendant shall have a right to a severance of the offenses." ABA Standards, supra, p. 291. "The right of severance where the offenses are joined solely on the ground that they are of the same or similar character is 'because of the great risk of prejudice from a joint disposition of unrelated charges.' ABA Standards, supra, p. 288." Dingler, supra at 464, 211 S.E.2d 752.

In the instant case the evidence showed that in both incidents, appellant assaulted women with whom he had seemingly pleasant social connections. After spending time with the women, appellant initiated his attacks by asking the victim to let him "hold" them. When they refused, he forcibly removed them to another location nearby, and when they screamed or fought, he placed his hand over the victims' mouth and nose so they could not breathe. In neither instance was a weapon used nor were overt threats made; rather, appellant relied solely on brute strength to subdue his victims.

In Mack v. State, 163 Ga.App. 778, 779 (1), 296 S.E.2d 115 (1982), we recognized the rule that when offenses are joined solely on the ground that they are of the same or similar character, the defendant has a right to have the offenses severed. We went on to state: "However, where the offenses are so similar that they show a common scheme or plan or have an identical modus operandi, severance is discretionary with the trial court. '[I]f there is a valid reason for joinder other than similarity of offense, then severance of offenses becomes discretionary with the trial court.' [Cit.]" Id. at 778-779, 296 S.E.2d 115. Since the evidence here showed a similar modus operandi, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying appellant's motion for severance of the offenses.

2. Appellant contends the court erred by allowing evidence of a prior similar transaction. The prior incident occurred when appellant met a young woman that he knew at a party. She asked appellant for some marijuana and when they went to appellant's car to get the marijuana, appellant drove to a secluded area about three or four miles from the party's location. When he stopped the car he told the woman he...

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13 cases
  • Brimage v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 21 Septiembre 1994
    ...decreased defendants' chance of detection and kidnapping was not, therefore, incidental to crime of robbery); Davis v. State (Georgia), 180 Ga.App. 190, 348 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1986) (evidence of kidnapping sufficient where victim was forcibly carried to area behind her house prior to rape); S......
  • Coalter v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 17 Junio 1987
    ...liberally extended in the area of sexual offenses. Johnson v. State, 242 Ga. 649, 653(3) (250 SE2d 394) (1978)." Davis v. State, 180 Ga.App. 190, 191-192(2), 348 S.E.2d 730. In the case sub judice, defendant argues that the witness presented by the State fails to establish that the defendan......
  • Dewinters v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 17 Abril 1998
    ...v. State, 233 Ga. 462, 463, 211 S.E.2d 752 (1975); Samples v. State, 217 Ga.App. 509, 460 S.E.2d 795 (1995); Davis v. State, 180 Ga. App. 190(1), 348 S.E.2d 730 (1986). Severance is mandatory, upon defense request, if offenses are joined improperly, i.e., solely because they are of the same......
  • State v. Dixon
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 15 Diciembre 1997
    ...jogger from center of road and dragging her completely off road provided sufficient movement for kidnapping); Davis v. State, 180 Ga.App. 190, 348 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1986) (affirming kidnapping where victim forcibly carried to area behind her house prior to rape); State v. Davidson, 77 N.C.Ap......
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