Davis v. State
| Decision Date | 31 May 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 17346,17346 |
| Citation | 116 Idaho 401,775 P.2d 1243 |
| Parties | Lavern G. DAVIS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Lance D. Churchill, Churchill & Vander Boegh, Boise, for appellant.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., David R. Minert and Eric E. Nelson, Deputy Attys. Gen. (argued), Boise, for respondent.
This is an appeal under the post-conviction procedure act, I.C. § 19-4901 et seq. In his application, Lavern Davis alleged that he had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel at his trial for possession of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded Davis was not entitled to any relief and denied the application. We affirm.
The following background is pertinent to this appeal. In January, 1984, Davis' ex-wife, Judy, informed the Wendell Police Department that Davis had marijuana at his home. Based upon this information, a magistrate issued a warrant to search Davis' residence. At the time the police executed the warrant, Davis was not at home but another man--Terrel Carmichael--was found by police at Davis' residence. The police removed Carmichael from the premises and proceeded with their search. They found quantities of marijuana and drug paraphernalia in the house. Shortly thereafter, Davis was arrested at the home of Ms. Davis.
After arraignment, the district court appointed counsel for Davis. Although the attorney appointed to represent Davis had previously handled criminal cases, this appointment resulted in the attorney's first trial of a felony. During Davis' trial, the state called as witnesses Ms. Davis and various law enforcement officials involved in Davis' arrest and in the search of his home. Davis' attorney called no witnesses, even though both Carmichael and Ms. Davis were subpoenaed to appear as defense witnesses at trial. Rather, the attorney relied on a defense that the state had failed to prove that Davis was in possession of the drugs and drug paraphernalia in his home at the time of his arrest. The jury found Davis guilty as charged and also found him to be a persistent violator. I.C. § 19-2514. In August, 1984, Davis received a thirty-year indeterminate sentence. After his sentencing hearing, Davis was immediately transferred to the Idaho State Correctional Institution. Approximately ten days after Davis' sentencing hearing, his attorney wrote a letter to Davis at the penitentiary stating that he, the attorney, believed that Davis' case presented no issues for appeal. Davis did not file an appeal from his judgment of conviction.
Davis obtained new counsel in 1986, and filed his application for post-conviction relief in the present case, alleging that Davis' former attorney had failed to render effective assistance of counsel during the investigation phase of Davis' case, during Davis' trial, and by failing to file a timely appeal from Davis' judgment of conviction. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied relief on Davis' application. This appeal followed.
Davis raises the following issues. First, he contends that the district court erred by failing to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to support a denial of his application for post-conviction relief. Second, he submits that, contrary to the district court's decision, he was not provided effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he maintains: (a) that his attorney failed to file a timely motion to suppress evidence; (b) that his attorney failed to properly investigate the state's case or to interview any of the state's witnesses; (c) that his attorney failed to object to irrelevant and prejudicial evidence at trial; (d) that his attorney failed to present a defense in his behalf; (e) that his attorney failed to object to the court's jury instructions; and (f) that his attorney failed to appeal the judgment.
Davis first argues that the district court's written decision failed to satisfy the statutory requirement that the court make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to each of the issues presented by the accused on an application for post-conviction relief. See I.C. § 19-4907(a). The district court's decision rejected each of Davis' claims, stating--without elaborating--either that Davis had failed to adduce evidence of his trial attorney's alleged deficiencies, that the trial attorney's conduct was not ineffective, or that the trial attorney's acts were to be construed as "tactical trial decisions," and would not be second-guessed on review. 1
Davis submits that the court's perfunctory treatment of his claims has severely hampered his presentation of issues on appeal. Specifically, he contends that it is impossible to determine whether the court based its denial of his application on correct standards of law, or to determine whether his trial attorney's acts were within the bounds of proper professional conduct.
Proceedings under the post-conviction procedure act contemplate the receipt of pleadings and evidence by the parties, followed by the district court's decision based upon findings of fact and conclusions of law. See State v. Morris, 101 Idaho 120, 609 P.2d 652 (1980). I.C. § 4907(a) provides that "[t]he court shall make specific findings of fact, and state expressly its conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented." [Emphasis supplied.] The purpose behind these requirements is to afford the appellate court an adequate basis upon which to assess any appeal arising from the denial of an application for post-conviction relief. Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 700 P.2d 115 (Ct.App.1985). Failure to provide such a record can result in reversal of the district court's denial of the application. See State v. Morris, supra. However, the failure of a district court to make specific findings of fact or to state its conclusions of law upon denial of a petitioner's post-conviction claim does not necessarily require reversal. Maxfield v. State, supra. The absence of such findings of fact or conclusions of law can be disregarded, but only if the record is clear and yields an obvious answer to the relevant questions raised on appeal. Id. Our review of the district court's written decision reveals that it does not thoroughly address each of Davis' post-conviction claims. However, based upon our examination of the record, including the trial transcript, the transcript of the evidentiary hearing on Davis' post-conviction application, and the exhibits provided to us on appeal, we conclude that the district court properly denied Davis' application. Because our holding on this issue is based upon our review of each of Davis' claims, we will incorporate our discussion of these issues into the next part of our opinion, setting forth our reasons for affirming the district court's decision.
With respect to Davis' specific claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we preliminarily note our standard of review. The accused in a criminal trial is guaranteed effective assistance of counsel based upon the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the applicant must show that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Aragon v. State, supra; Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52, 764 P.2d 129 (Ct.App.1988). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. State v. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 760, 760 P.2d at 1176. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for his attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of his trial would have been different. Id.
The applicant bears a heavy burden in proving that his attorney's performance was deficient. Because of the distorting effects of hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance--that is, "sound trial strategy." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Therefore, strategic or tactical decisions made by trial counsel will not be second-guessed on review, unless those decisions are made upon a basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231, 628 P.2d 1065 (1981), post-conviction proceeding, Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 764 P.2d 439 (Ct.App.1988). Both the deficient performance and prejudice components of this standard are mixed questions of law and fact. Young v. State, supra. On appeal of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we will defer to the facts found upon substantial evidence by the trial court, but we will freely review application of the law to the facts thus found. Id.
In the instant case, Davis contends that, due to his attorney's lack of preparation, ignorance of the law, and failure to present a timely defense to his case at trial and on appeal, this Court should ignore the presumption favoring the attorney's performance and find that he did not render effective assistance of counsel. Because Davis has asserted several specific instances of attorney misconduct, we will address each of these allegations in turn.
Davis initially contends that his attorney failed to file a timely suppression motion with the district court regarding evidence seized during the search of Davis' home, and during the search...
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