Davis v. State, 975S208

CourtSupreme Court of Indiana
Citation267 Ind. 152,368 N.E.2d 1149
Docket NumberNo. 975S208,975S208
PartiesMargie DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
Decision Date01 November 1977

Page 1149

368 N.E.2d 1149
267 Ind. 152
Margie DAVIS, Appellant,
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 975S208.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
Nov. 1, 1977.

[267 Ind. 154] Keith A. Dilworth, Public Defender, Richmond, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., James N. Shumacker, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

Page 1150

DeBRULER, Justice.

On January 10, 1975, appellant was charged by indictment with the offenses of first degree (felony) murder (in the commission of a robbery), Ind.Code § 35-13-4-1, and second degree murder, Ind.Code § 35-1-54-1 (Burns 1975), repealed October 1, 1977. Both counts charged appellant as an accessory before the fact, alleging that she had aided and abetted Carrie Lee Gentry, also known as Carole Lee Smith, and Gladys Hobbs, in beating to death one Adrian Miller in the course of an attempted robbery. Appellant was tried separately from the principals and convicted of first degree murder as an accessory.

Subsequently Gladys Hobbs was allowed to plead guilty to the offense of voluntary manslaughter, Ind.Code § 35-13-4-2 (Burns 1975), repealed October 1, 1977, for her part in this crime. Carrie Gentry was tried by jury and convicted only of assault and battery, Ind.Code § 35-1-54-4 (Burns 1975), repealed October 1, 1977. Hobbs is now on parole and Gentry has served her sentence.

Appellant filed a motion to correct errors and perfected an appeal prior to disposition of Hobbs' and Gentry's cases. Thereafter appellant filed with the trial court under Ind. R.P.C. 1 a petition for post-conviction relief seeking vacation of her conviction and sentence because of the variance between her conviction and Gentry's. The trial court denied the petition pursuant to Bright v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 495, 289 N.E.2d 128, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear appellant's petition while her appeal was pending. Appellant seeks to raise the issue contained in her post-conviction relief petition by filing a "supplemental brief" and "supplemental record." The State argues that appellant may not "supplement" her appeal, and moves to strike the supplemental materials.

[267 Ind. 155] I.

Appellant argues that Bright does not apply to her petition because it seeks correction of an erroneous sentence, which can be made "at any time." She relies on the language of Post-Conviction Rule 1, § 1(a):

"(a) Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime by a court of this state, and who claims:

(1) that the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state;

(2) that the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;

(3) that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise erroneous;

(4) that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;

(5) that his sentence has expired, his probation, parole or conditional release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint;

(6) that the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy;

may institute at any time a proceeding under this Rule to secure relief."

Two factors prevent us from accepting appellant's argument. First, as is apparent from the text of section 1(a), the phrase "at any time" refers to all of the grounds for post-conviction relief enumerated in that section. Therefore it offers no basis for distinguishing Bright. Moreover, appellant does not seek to correct an erroneous sentence. Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Her argument is that the conviction for murder cannot stand in view of the inconsistent conviction of her principal. We find no merit to appellant's argument that this case constitutes an exception to Bright.

[267 Ind. 156]

Page 1151


In Logal v. Cruse, 368 N.E. 235 (1977, 1077 S 746), this Court provided a procedure for consideration of motions for relief from civil judgments under Ind. R.Tr.P. 60(B). This procedure requires an appellant seeking relief from the judgment being appealed to obtain permission from the appellate court for the trial court to entertain his motion. The appellate court preliminarily screens the motions and remands to the trial court those cases in which an arguably meritorious motion is sought to be made.

Two considerations underlie our decision in Logal. One is the unfairness of requiring a litigant to elect either an appeal or motion for relief as remedy for an improper judgment against him. The other is the economy of judicial...

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  • Wallace v. Duckworth, 85-1247
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • 19 Noviembre 1985
    ...out in the margin.) 3 Page 1221 Indiana also has a court-made rule for raising new issues while an appeal is pending. See Davis v. State, 267 Ind. 152, 157, 368 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (1977); Coulson v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 471 N.E.2d 278, 279 (Ind.1984). As we shall see, infra at 11......
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    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • 23 Noviembre 1998
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    • 26 Abril 2007
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    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • 1 Febrero 2017
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