Davis v. State
Decision Date | 10 November 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 65A01-1004-PC-208,65A01-1004-PC-208 |
Parties | WILLIAM C. DAVIS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
SUSAN K. CARPENTER
Public Defender of Indiana
VICKIE YASER
GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Attorney General of Indiana
IAN MCLEAN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
APPEAL FROM THE POSEY SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable James M. Redwine, Special Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATIONBROWN, Judge William C. Davis appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Davis raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as:
We affirm and remand.
The relevant facts as discussed in Davis's direct appeal follow:
Davis v. State, No. 65A01-0605-CR-212, slip op. at 2-4 .
On November 4, 2005, Davis moved to sever the six counts into four different trials, as follows: both counts related to J.C., both counts related to J.H., the sole count for acts against R.H., and the count for failing to register as a sex offender. Id. at 4. Subsequently, Davis filed his Amended Motion for Severance, seeking consideration of the six counts in three trials—a separate trial for the sex-offender-registry count and a separate trial for the count alleging acts against R.H. Id. The State stipulated to severance of the count for Failure to Register as a Sex Offender. Id. As to severance of the count for acts against R.H., the trial court denied Davis's motion, concluding that the five counts constituted a common modus operandi. Id. Meanwhile, Davis movedunsuccessfully to suppress evidence of the statements he made to Agent Mohr in Fargo. Id. Davis renewed both objections during the trial. Id.
Davis moved for change of venue from Posey County, citing pre-trial publicity. The court denied Davis's motion, and the parties stipulated to bringing in jurors from Monroe County. Id. at 4 n.4. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
The jury acquitted Davis on the counts alleging acts against J.H., but found him guilty of Child Molesting as Class A and C felonies for acts against J.C. and Child Molesting as a Class C felony for acts against R.H. Slip op. at 4. The trial court entered judgment of conviction on the three verdicts and sentenced Davis to forty-five yearsimprisonment for the Class A felony conviction, seven years imprisonment on the Class C felony conviction for acts against J.C., with those sentences running concurrently, and seven years imprisonment on the Class C felony conviction for acts against R.H., to run consecutive to the prior sentences. Id. at 4-5. Thus, Davis received an aggregate sentence of fifty-two years. Id. at 5.
On direct appeal, Davis argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance and abused its discretion in admitting evidence of statements Davis made while identifying himself. Id. at 2. This court affirmed. Id.
On August 22, 2008, Davis filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief which included eighty-five numbered claims with most of the claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Davis also included an eighty-four page handwritten brief detailing the facts in support of his claims. On September 15, 2008, Davis filed a motion for change of judge. On September 22, 2008, a Deputy State Public Defender entered her appearance on behalf of Davis, but filed a motion to withdraw her appearance on January 12, 2009, because Davis requested that she withdraw her appearance and "remained firm in his intention to proceed pro se in this matter." Appellant's Appendix at 135. The court granted the motion to withdraw.
On April 7, 2009, the court granted Davis's motion for change of judge. On August 19, 2009, August 20, 2009, and August 21, 2009, the court held progress and evidentiary hearings on Davis's petition. At the beginning of the second day, the court informed Davis: "Mr. Davis, you have gone over the same point for about six straight hours, and I just want to tell you that courts do not have unlimited time," and that thepoint Davis began the hearing with was "the very same point [Davis] made numerous times yesterday." Post-Conviction Transcript at 206. Throughout the hearing, Davis's trial counsel informed Davis that he should be represented.
On September 1, 2009, Davis filed a twenty-one page motion to amend his petition for post-conviction relief, which the court granted on September 9, 2009. The court also granted Davis's motion to supplement the record by affidavit. On April 8, 2010, the court denied Davis's petition for post-conviction relief.5
Before discussing Davis's allegations of error, we note the general standard under which we review a post-conviction court's denial of a petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004); Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). When appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment. Fisher, 810 N.E.2d at 679. On review, we will not reverse the judgment unless the evidence as a whole unerringly and unmistakably leads to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Id. Further, the post-conviction court in this case entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon in accordance with Indiana...
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