Davis v. State

CourtArkansas Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtDonald L. Corbin
CitationDavis v. State, 367 Ark. 330, 240 S.W.3d 115 (Ark. 2006)
Decision Date28 September 2006
Docket NumberNo. CR 05-1257.,CR 05-1257.
PartiesTravis Wayne DAVIS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

Patrick J. Benca, John Wesley Hall, Jr., and Jeff Rosenzweig, Little Rock, for appellant.

Mike Beebe, Att'y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

DONALD L. CORBIN, Associate Justice.

Appellant Travis Wayne Davis, Jr., appeals the judgment and commitment order of the Lonoke County Circuit Court convicting him of (1) manufacturing a controlled substance, methamphetamine; (2) possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to deliver; (3) possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine; (4) possession of drug paraphernalia; (5) possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, third offense; and (6) maintaining a drug premises. Appellant filed a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to Ark. R.Crim. P. 24.3(b), whereby he reserved his right to appeal from the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during the nighttime search of his business. Appellant was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment on each, to run concurrently. On appeal, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress because (1) the judge who signed the search warrant was not a neutral and detached magistrate due to his concurrent position as an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Arkansas, and (2) the good-faith exception, enumerated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), does not apply when the affidavit for the search warrant did not recite sufficient facts to warrant a nighttime search and the warrant does not make a finding to justify a nighttime search. As this case involves an issue of first impression, our jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(b)(1).1 We find no error and affirm.

Because Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him, it is not necessary to recite the facts in great detail. On April 17, 2004, around 4:28 a.m., Detective Keenan Carter presented an affidavit for a nighttime search warrant to District Judge Joseph Svoboda. The affidavit contained information from outside sources, as well as Detective Carter's own observations, that a controlled substance, methamphetamine, was being manufactured at the business, Core, Inc. Based upon this affidavit, Judge Svoboda issued a nighttime search warrant for Core, Inc., owned and operated by Appellant. At the time he issued the warrant, Judge Svoboda also was an Assistant Attorney General for the State, in the criminal division, handling state and federal habeas corpus matters.

On June 22, 2004, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search. On June 7, 2005, a hearing was held on the matter. The circuit court orally denied Appellant's argument that Judge Svoboda was not a neutral and detached magistrate because of his employment with the State. Furthermore, in a June 20, 2005, letter opinion, the circuit court confirmed its ruling denying the motion to suppress based upon arguments of the partiality of the magistrate. The court also ruled that the warrant issued did not contain a judicial finding in compliance with Ark. R.Crim. P. 13.2(c); however, the court denied the motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the officer's actions were warranted under the good-faith exception.

On August 8, 2005, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration. The court denied this motion. Subsequently, Appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to Rule 24.3(b), preserving his right to appeal from the court's denial of his pretrial motion to suppress. This appeal followed.

I. Neutral and Detached Magistrate

For his first argument, Appellant maintains that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the issuing judge was not a neutral and detached magistrate. Specifically, he asserts that Judge Svoboda cannot be a neutral and detached magistrate because he also was a full-time assistant attorney general at the time he signed the search warrant.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we conduct a de novo review based on the totality of the circumstances. See Dickinson v. State, 367 Ark. 102, 238 S.W.3d 125 (2006). We reverse only if the ruling denying a motion to suppress is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id.

In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) (footnote omitted), the United States Supreme Court stated:

The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.

The Supreme Court has carved out two main ways in which a magistrate can deviate from his judicial role of neutrality and detachment: (1) when he has a substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, or (2) when he is acting in a law-enforcement capacity. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979); Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 97 S.Ct. 546, 50 L.Ed.2d 444 (1977); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972); Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972); Coolidge v. State, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927). The issue in this case involves the latter of the two.

This court has adopted the rule that a magistrate cannot be neutral and detached if he is acting in a law-enforcement capacity. See Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 952, 936 S.W.2d 509, 526 (1996) (holding that "[w]hen a judicial officer becomes so involved in the investigation as to be deemed a participant, he has abandoned this role"). While this court has not reviewed the situation where an issuing magistrate is also an assistant attorney general, other jurisdictions have dealt with comparable situations.

In Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, a state attorney general, authorized as a justice of peace, issued a warrant authorizing the search of an automobile and was actively in charge of the investigation, as well as the prosecution at trial. The Supreme Court found that the attorney general's actions disqualified him as a neutral and detached magistrate as required by the Fourth Amendment. Id. Specifically, the Court concluded that the search and seizure of the appellant's automobile could not "constitutionally rest upon the warrant issued by the state official who was the chief investigator and prosecutor." Id. at 453, 91 S.Ct. 2022. Additionally, in Lo-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, the Supreme Court found that "[t]he Town Justice did not manifest that neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer when presented with a warrant application for a search and seizure" because "[h]e allowed himself to become a member, if not the leader, of the search party which was essentially a police operation." Id. at 326-27, 99 S.Ct. 2319. These cases stand for the rule that an issuing magistrate cannot be neutral and detached if he is actively involved in the investigation and the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14, 68 S.Ct. 367.

In the present case, Judge Svoboda is both a part-time district judge and an assistant attorney general. Appellant has presented no evidence, besides the nature of Judge Svoboda's employment with the State, that the judge was not neutral and detached. Specifically, no evidence was presented that Judge Svoboda actively involved himself in the investigation similar to the magistrates in Coolidge and Lo-Ji Sales. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in finding that the judge was a neutral and detached magistrate.2

Moreover, this conclusion is supported by decisions from both federal circuit courts and state supreme courts. See United States v. McKeever, 906 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir.1990) (holding "a magistrate may retain certain law enforcement duties without losing her neutrality"); State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 517, 133 P.3d 48, 91 (2006) (quoting Green v. State, 676 N.E.2d 755, 761 (Ind.App.1996)) (holding that an issuing judge is neutral and detached, despite previously representing the defendant, as "`[t]he requirement that a warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate does not equate to a constitutional mandate requiring that a judge have no contact with or knowledge of the case or the defendant'"); Wilson v. State, 263 Ind. 469, 333 N.E.2d 755, 760-61 (1975) (holding "that a law partner of a deputy prosecutor is not ipso facto disqualified from issuing a search warrant in a case in which the deputy may be or may become involved in any degree"). See also United States v. Waters, 786 F.Supp. 1111, 1117 (N.D.N.Y.1992) (holding that a magistrate, who was formerly an Assistant United States Attorney, was a neutral and detached magistrate when there was no "concrete evidence that [the magistrate] was involved in his prior capacity as Assistant United States Attorney in an investigation of defendant in an open criminal file to which he was assigned"). Thus, our holding that Judge Svoboda was a neutral and detached magistrate when he signed the search warrant is in line with other jurisdictions. As such, the circuit court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.

II. Nighttime Search

Appellant's second argument asserts that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress based upon its ruling that the good-faith exception applied when the affidavit for the search warrant did not recite sufficient facts to warrant a...

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14 cases
  • Vance v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 2 Junio 2011
    ...supporting his convictions, we need only recite the evidence presented that relates to the issues on appeal. See Davis v. State, 367 Ark. 330, 240 S.W.3d 115 (2006). Suffice it to say at this point that the crimes at issue here were the result of a single incident occurring in the victim's ......
  • Osburn v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 10 Septiembre 2009
    ...here and will set forth the more specific facts relevant to the points on appeal, as they are discussed. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 367 Ark. 330, 240 S.W.3d 115 (2006). On August 27, 2006, the car of seventeen-year-old Casey Crowder was found along the side of Highway 65 in Dumas, Arkansas.......
  • Kelley v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 6 Diciembre 2007
    ...only repeats the boilerplate language of Rule 13.2(c), the Leon good-faith exception does not apply. More recently, in Davis v. State, 367 Ark. 330, 240 S.W.3d 115 (2006), we reiterated that when there is no recorded testimony given in support of an affidavit, this court does not look to fa......
  • Grubbs v. Hindes
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • 5 Marzo 2008
    ...v. Van Hoose, 371 Ark. 267, 265 S.W.3d 93 (2007); Thomas v. Avant, 370 Ark. 377, 260 S.W.3d 266 (2007). See also Davis v. State, 367 Ark. 330, 240 S.W.3d 115 (2006); Alphin v. Alphin, 364 Ark. 332, 219 S.W.3d 160 (2005); Regions Bank v. Griffin, 364 Ark. 193, 217 S.W.3d 829 (2005); State Fa......
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