Davis v. State
| Decision Date | 16 August 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 1083S350,1083S350 |
| Citation | 481 N.E.2d 387 |
| Parties | Daniel Ray DAVIS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
William H. Bender, Allyn, Givens & Bender, Poseyville, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Lisa M. Paunicka, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Following a jury trial, Defendant (Appellant) was convicted of attempted murder, a class A felony, Ind.Code Secs. 35-42-1-1, 35-41-5-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.), and attempted battery, a class C felony, Ind.Code Secs. 35-42-2-1(3), 35-41-5-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of forty (40) years and two (2) years imprisonment. We restate the contentions he raises in this direct appeal as the following three issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred in imposing various limitations on voir dire of prospective jurors.
2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence testimony that Defendant previously had been incarcerated.
3. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider evidence that one of the victims had attempted to borrow a firearm shortly before the crimes occurred.
We find no error and affirm the judgment below.
The facts most favorable to the State revealed that Defendant attended a party the night of December 31 to January 1, 1982-83, and there met the eventual homicide victim, Miller, and Miller's companion, Howard. Eventually Defendant left the party with Miller and Howard and went to a bar. Defendant returned to the party, and Miller and Howard also eventually returned. Howard was very intoxicated by this time, and at approximately 3:00 a.m. he started a fight with Defendant. Miller attempted to separate them, or at least to suggest that they take their altercation outside the premises, when Defendant stabbed both men with a knife. Miller died of his wounds, and Howard was injured.
Defendant was charged with murder and battery. At trial Defendant claimed that he had acted in self defense. The trial court gave the jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of attempted murder and attempted battery, and the jury convicted Defendant of these crimes. Other facts relevant to specific issues are stated below.
Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in imposing various limitations on voir dire of the jury. We do not agree.
The court allowed each counsel to submit ten (10) questions which, with additional questions from the trial judge, were asked of the entire jury venire. After twelve (12) prospective jurors were seated, the court allowed each counsel to interrogate them for twenty (20) minutes. The court then allowed counsel to exercise peremptory challenges, but stated that, under the court's rule, any juror passed at that point would be empaneled "unless some other development occurs."
Defendant claims error in the trial court's limiting examination of the prospective jurors to twenty (20) minutes, and in requiring counsel to exercise peremptory challenges or accept the jurors then seated. However, this Court has accorded trial judges substantial discretion in regulating voir dire, and specifically has approved 20-minute time limits for such purposes, especially where, as here, counsel are allowed to submit written questions which are asked by the trial judge before counsel begins questioning the prospective jurors. See, Murphy v. State (1984), Ind., 469 N.E.2d 750, 752 and authorities cited.
Defendant further argues that his opportunity to exercise peremptory challenges was unduly restricted when the trial court required both counsel to strike simultaneously after the 20-minute questioning period or to accept the prospective jurors then seated. However, this Court has held that the trial judge may impose reasonable limitations on the exercise of peremptory challenges so long as neither party is required to strike or accept the prospective jurors without having had the opportunity to consider the other party's voir dire. Here, Defendant heard the State's voir dire before being required to strike. See, McBrady v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 719, 722; Marsh v. State (1979), 272 Ind. 178, 179-81, 396 N.E.2d 883, 884-85; Schondel v. State (1910), 174 Ind. 734, 736-37, 93 N.E. 67, 68; McDonald v. State (1909), 172 Ind. 393, 396-401, 88 N.E. 673, 675-76; accord, Killian v. State (1984), Ind.App., 467 N.E.2d 1265, 1267-68.
Defendant relies on the Appellate Court's decision in Veach v. McDowell (1962), 133 Ind.App. 628, 184 N.E.2d 149. Veach is distinguishable in that there the trial court required the plaintiff to exercise peremptory challenges without giving her an opportunity to consider the defendant's voir dire. Veach is thus consistent with this Court's decisions, and does not support Defendant's position here. See also, Marsh, 272 Ind. at 180, 396 N.E.2d at 885. We find no error.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence testimony that Defendant had told the victims, Miller and Howard, that he previously had been in prison. We find no error in this case.
At the beginning of trial the court issued an order in limine that prevented the State from presenting evidence of Defendant's prior criminal record. Defendant subsequently based his case on self defense. To support the self-defense claim Defendant introduced testimony through one Coomes, who had been with Defendant throughout the evening of the crimes, that early in the evening Howard and Miller, in Defendant's presence, had discussed their experiences in prison together, and in particular their participation in sexual assaults and stabbings of other inmates. Defendant introduced this testimony to show that he feared these two men and that, when Howard attacked him, he reasonably believed that one or the other of them would seriously injure or kill him. During the same conversation, however, Defendant had mentioned that he also had been in prison, but he gave Howard and Miller no details concerning his experiences while so incarcerated.
After the trial court had allowed Defendant to present Coomes' testimony of the statements by Howard and Miller, the court lifted its order in limine and allowed the State to cross-examine Coomes concerning Defendant's statement to them that he also had been in prison. The State argued that this cross-examination would help rebut the self-defense claim by showing that Defendant, having been in prison, would be less apprehensive than persons who had not when told of Miller's and Howard's experiences while incarcerated.
Defendant objected to this cross-examination, and now claims that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing it because the evidence that Defendant had been in prison was highly prejudicial and inflammatory, and of little or no relevance in rebutting the self-defense claim. We hold that in presenting evidence of the conversation between Howard and Miller Defendant "opened the door" to the cross-examination complained of, and that the trial court did not err in concluding that the relevance of this evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect, if any.
The State may carry its burden of meeting a self-defense contention "by rebutting the defense directly; by affirmatively showing defendant did not act in self defense; or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in...
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Miller v. State
...truth of the matter asserted, but to explain the defendant's state of mind as it related to his self-defense claim.); cf. Davis v. State, 481 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Ind.1985) (Where victim made no threat against defendant prior to the altercation, evidence that victim retrieved a gun from a neigh......
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Brand v. State
...by a defendant to show his apprehension of the victim must imply a propensity for violence on the part of the victim. See Davis v. State, 481 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Ind.1985). Moreover, the evidence must relate specifically to the victim, not to his family or a third party such as a close friend ......
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Lewis v. State
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Fox v. State
...to strike or accept the prospective jurors without having had the opportunity to consider the other party's voir dire. Davis v. State, 481 N.E.2d 387, 388 (Ind. 1985). In this case, the trial court set forth the policy that once a juror was impaneled, that juror could only be excused for ca......