Davis v. State

Citation608 S.W.3d 283
Decision Date30 July 2020
Docket NumberNO. 01-19-00756-CR,01-19-00756-CR
Parties Laurie Michel DAVIS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

Craig Stewart, Jordan Lewis, Flood-Lewis and Associates, 219 Washington, Houston, Texas 77007, for Appellant.

Kim Ogg, District Attorney, Harris County, Texas, Eric Kugler, 500 Jefferson St., Ste. 600, Houston, Texas 77002, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Goodman, and Hightower.

Richard Hightower, Justice

A jury convicted appellant, Laurie Michel Davis, of the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI).1 The trial court sentenced Davis to 180 days in county jail, suspended the sentence, placed her on 15 months' community supervision, and assessed a $750 fine. On appeal, Davis challenges the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress blood test results, arguing that (1) the government analyzed her blood sample without a search warrant because the warrant authorized only seizure of the blood sample, but not analysis of the blood, and (2) even if the warrant implicitly authorized the government's analysis of the blood, the analysis was not performed until after the warrant had expired.

We affirm.

Background

On December 4, 2017, Davis caused a car crash by rear-ending Prudence Bolding and pushing Bolding's vehicle into the rear of the vehicle in front of her, driven by Ashley Stricker. Stricker observed that Davis's "body language was off," and Davis was slurring words. Bolding also noticed "an extremely strong smell of alcohol" coming from Davis. Davis did not want to involve the police, but Stricker called them.

Deputy E. Sanchez with the Harris County Sheriff's Office (HCSO) arrived at the scene. He noticed Davis's slurred speech, poor balance, red glassy eyes, and an odor of alcohol. Davis admitted to drinking two beers, and there was also an open beer in the side compartment of Davis's door and several other cans in the vehicle. Deputy Sanchez believed, based on her behavior, that Davis was intoxicated. He performed field sobriety tests, and dashboard camera footage showed Davis swaying, having trouble balancing, stepping off the line, and putting her foot down repeatedly.

Davis declined to take a breath test, so Deputy Sanchez obtained a search warrant to take a blood sample. The record indicates that Deputy Sanchez provided the magistrate with an affidavit explaining his arrest of Davis for DWI, his administration of field sobriety tests, and his observations supporting his belief that she was intoxicated at the time of the crash. The warrant issued by the magistrate referenced the HCSO incident report. The search warrant further provided:

YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to forthwith search the body of the person therein named, to wit: Laurie Davis, ... with the authority to search for and to seize any and all evidence that may be found therein, namely blood samples.
FURTHERMORE, pursuant to Article 18.08 Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the officer executing this warrant may call to his or her aid any number of citizens in Harris County, who shall be bound to aid in the execution of this search warrant. The officer executing this warrant is therefore directed to execute this warrant by taking the subject to any medical personnel, paramedic, nurse, doctor, or other person qualified to draw blood and that person is hereby bound to assist the officer in his attempt to obtain the requested sample.

The blood sample was collected on December 4, 2017, at approximately 11:00 p.m. The samples were submitted to the Harris County Institute of Forensic Science (HCIFS), which then tested the sample on December 28, 2017, and again on January 9, 2018. The analysis showed that Davis's blood alcohol content was 0.22, almost three times the legal limit.

Davis moved to suppress the blood alcohol analysis, arguing that the warrant did not authorize analysis of the blood and, even if it did, the warrant had expired by the time HCIFS conducted the testing. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The trial court found that the search warrant was properly executed because the blood was drawn the same day the warrant issued. The trial court also found:

In regards to the second issue that defense counsel raises about the search warrant [needing to specifically provide for a limit to] the testing of the blood alcohol level, I am going to deny that motion as well. The magistrate or ... judge can issue the [warrant] as long as there's probable cause that supports the facts for a DWI specifically.

The jury was presented with the results of the blood alcohol analysis. It also heard evidence from Stricker, Bolding, and Deputy Sanchez, and it was presented with the dash camera footage. The jury found Davis guilty of DWI, and the trial court assessed punishment at 180 days in county jail, suspended the sentence, placed Davis on 15 months community supervision, and assessed a $750 fine. This appeal followed.

Motion to Suppress

Davis challenges the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress the blood alcohol analysis.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Ruiz , 577 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) ; State v. Martinez , 570 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. 2019). Under the bifurcated standard, the trial court is given almost complete deference in its determination of historical facts, especially if based on an assessment of demeanor and credibility, and the same deference is afforded the trial court for its rulings on application of law to questions of fact and to mixed questions of law and fact, if resolution of those questions depends on an evaluation of demeanor and credibility. Martinez , 570 S.W.3d at 281. Our review of questions of law is de novo. Id. We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and uphold the ruling if it is supported by the record and is correct under any theory of the law applicable to the case. Ruiz , 577 S.W.3d at 545.

B. Analysis

In her first issue, Davis argues that, because the plain language of the search warrant authorized only a blood draw, the State violated her Fourth Amendment rights by analyzing the sample. Davis acknowledges that the warrant was "not a general warrant on its face, because it gives very specific instructions about who may be searched, and what may be seized," and she concedes that the blood sample was taken pursuant to a warrant. She asserts, however, that the analysis of the blood sample is an independent search that was likewise protected by the Fourth Amendment and was not covered by the warrant issued in this case. Thus, we construe Davis's argument as asserting that the State exceeded the scope of the warrant in testing the blood sample.

To comply with the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant must describe the things to be seized with sufficient particularity to avoid the possibility of a general search. See Groh v. Ramirez , 540 U.S. 551, 558–61, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) (discussing various purposes for particularity requirement); Thacker v. State , 889 S.W.2d 380, 389 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd) ; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized"); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18.01(c) (setting out requirements for affidavits supporting search warrants).

"The scope of a search is governed by the terms of the warrant, and the scope includes spatial restrictions as well as the items to be seized." Drayton v. State , 559 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref'd). When the affidavit in support of the search warrant is incorporated into the warrant, the two may be considered together in construing the warrant. See Long v. State , 132 S.W.3d 443, 446 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (considering affidavit incorporated by reference into warrant in defining the place to be searched; stating that "the description in the affidavit controls over the language in the warrant itself"); see also Strange v. State , 446 S.W.3d 567, 572–73 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (determining scope of search warrant by examining affidavit incorporated therein).

In determining whether a search and seizure fell within the warrant's scope, we "follow a common sense and practical approach, not a ‘Procrustean’ or overly technical one." Long , 132 S.W.3d at 448 (quoting Ker v. California , 374 U.S. 23, 33, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) ); see State v. Elrod , 538 S.W.3d 551, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (magistrate may use logic and common sense to make inferences based on facts in affidavit); Faulkner v. State , 537 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (holding that courts interpreting affidavits and search warrants "must do so in a common sense and realistic fashion and avoid hypertechnical analysis"). The degree of specificity required is flexible and will vary according to the crime being investigated, the item being searched, and the types of items being sought. United States v. Richards , 659 F.3d 527, 537 (6th Cir. 2011) ; see also Thacker , 889 S.W.2d at 389 (holding that items to be seized must be described with sufficient particularity such that executing officer is not left with any discretion to decide what items may be seized, but "requirements for the particularity of the description of an item may vary according to the nature of the thing being seized").

The search warrant in this case incorporated by reference the HCSO's incident report, and it authorized law enforcement to collect blood samples in connection with Davis's DWI prosecution. Giving the language of the warrant its common sense and practical meaning, see Long , 132 S.W.3d at 448, and considering the crime being investigated, the nature of the search, and the...

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3 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Bowens
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • October 19, 2021
    ...analysis which places no additional burden on the person may take place beyond the expiration of the warrant. Accord Davis v. State , 608 S.W.3d 283, 290 (Tex. App. 2020) (holding that three-day requirement for execution of warrant applied to acquisition of a blood sample from the defendant......
  • Balderas v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 29, 2021
    ...Other courts of appeals—including this one—have distinguished Martinez on similar grounds. See, e.g., Davis v. State , 608 S.W.3d 283, 290 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (" Martinez deals with a different question—whether ‘an individual has an expectation of privacy in bl......
  • Ybarra v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • May 5, 2021
    ...the same day the warrant was issued and, therefore, it was executed within the timeframe allowable under Article 18.07. See Davis v. State, 608 S.W.3d 283, 290 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). Ybarra further argues that the search warrant did not allow the blood sample to be t......

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