Davis v. State

• Decision Date: 13 November 1997
• Docket Number: No. CR,CR
• Citation: 330 Ark. 501,956 S.W.2d 163
• Parties: Jeffrey DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 97-251.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 163

956 S.W.2d 163

330 Ark. 501

Jeffrey DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 97-251.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Nov. 13, 1997.

Robert E. Irwin, John R. Irwin, Russellville, for Appellant.

Winston Bryant, Atty. Gen., Sandy Moll, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for Appellee.

ARNOLD, Chief Justice.

The appellant, Jeffrey Davis, was sentenced to concurrent life sentences for three counts of rape and ten years' imprisonment for first-degree sexual abuse, for which he was also fined $10,000.00. He raises seven issues on appeal, none of which has merit. We affirm.

The State alleged that the appellant thrice raped his seven-year-old daughter by engaging in oral sex with her, by penetrating her vagina with his penis, and by penetrating her vagina with a foreign object. It was also alleged that appellant engaged in sexual contact with his daughter. A fifth charge, endangering the welfare of a minor, was dismissed at trial.

During the appellant's jury trial, the victim testified that, on several occasions, her father "took his private part and stuck it in my private part," but "it wouldn't fit in all the way." When the appellant was "through," "white stuff would come out" on the victim's leg that she described as "gooey." According to the victim, the appellant also "made me put his private part in my mouth and suck on it." He touched her "private" with his tongue and stuck the tip of a lotion bottle and a vibrator into her "private part." The victim further described how she would rub on the appellant's "private." It was the victim's testimony that the appellant kept ladies' slips and "all kinds of stuff" under his bed. He would tie the slips in a knot to keep them from falling down because they were too big for the victim. The appellant would also make the victim look at dirty magazines and watch pornographic movies. According to the victim, these acts occurred in her parents' bedroom while her mother was gone. On cross-examination, the victim admitted to recanting the allegations to her foster parent, Ms. Ward, because, according to her, "it wasn't her business," and she "wouldn't leave me alone."

In addition to the victim's testimony, the State also offered the testimony of Tammy Coney, a family service worker for the Arkansas Department of Human Services, who testified that it was not unusual for child sexual-abuse victims to recant their allegations. The victim's elementary school counselor, Melissa Cox, related that the victim had emotional problems at school. Nurse Paula McAlister and Dr. George Richison saw the victim at St. Mary's Hospital on January 5, 1996. While Dr. Richison testified that the victim's exam was normal, he also stated that the victim's account would be consistent with her hymenal ring being intact. Officer Bryce Davenport testified that suggestive pictures and pornographic magazines and movies were found at the appellant's residence. According to the officer, a bag containing white lace material and a small night shirt was located under the appellant's bed.

The appellant testified in his own defense and denied the charges. His wife and the victim's mother, Tracy Davis, testified on her husband's behalf that the victim "always acted like a grown up" and had emotional problems with adjusting to a new school that caused her to make the allegations. At the close of all the evidence, the jury found the appellant guilty as charged.

1. Sufficiency of the evidence

At the close of the State's case in chief, the appellant moved for a directed verdict as follows:

Your Honor, at the end of the State's testimony the defendant, Jeff Davis, moves for a directed verdict on all the remaining counts of the information.

After the trial court denied this motion, appellant presented his case to the jury. At the close of all the evidence, the appellant made the following motion:

At the conclusion of all the evidence, the defense evidence and the State's evidence, the defendant renews his motion for directed verdict on the ground that there is insufficient evidence to make a prima facie case.

The trial court again denied the motion. On appeal, the appellant complains that the only evidence to support the State's charges of rape against him was the testimony of the child-victim, who had earlier recanted her allegations.

A directed-verdict motion is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and requires the movant to apprise the trial court of the specific basis on which the motion is made. Stewart v. State, 320 Ark. 75, 894 S.W.2d 930 (1995). Arguments not raised at trial will not be addressed for the first time on appeal, and parties are bound on appeal by the scope and nature of the objections and arguments they presented at trial. Id. In the present case, the appellant's directed-verdict motion was not specific. Under these circumstances, we will not address the merits of appellant's argument. In any event, even if we were to address the merits of his argument, it would fail. We have held many times that the uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim is sufficient to support a conviction. Rains v. State, 329 Ark. 607, 953 S.W.2d 48 (1997).

2. Prosecutorial misconduct

In his opening statement to the jury, the prosecutor remarked that the case involved "a man who delights and takes pleasure in the sexual perversion of children." When appellant objected to this statement and requested that the trial court admonish the jury, the trial court agreed and issued the admonishment. Later, during the appellant's case-in-chief, he testified as follows:

I can't stop being her father, not for her--not only for her but for me; and if everything goes, I'm not quitting. I feel like I've got a problem that needs to be solved; and if permitted, I want to fix it. Whatever it is; and I'll say it again, the first I ...

During his initial cross-examination of the appellant, the prosecutor stated, then asked, "You've got a problem that needs to be fixed. How long have you been a pervert?" Before the appellant could respond, his attorney objected to the question. The trial court sustained the objection and agreed to the appellant's request to admonish the jury. The appellant made a motion for mistrial, which the trial court denied. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the appellant renewed his motion for mistrial and asked the trial court to set aside the verdict on the ground that the prosecutor's comment during opening statement, when taken together with his improper question asked during cross-examination, amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. The trial court again denied the motion.

A mistrial is a drastic remedy that is granted only where the error is so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing the trial or where the fundamental fairness of the trial itself has been manifestly affected. Williams v. State, 329 Ark. 8, 946 S.W.2d 678 (1997). The trial court is afforded broad discretion in making its ruling, and a mistrial will not be declared when the prejudice can be removed by an admonition to the jury. Id.

It is obvious to us that the prosecutor's object in the present case was to label the appellant as a "pervert." While we may not approve of this trial tactic, we cannot say that the prosecutor's conduct was so drastic as to warrant a mistrial. See Sullinger v. State, 310 Ark. 690, 840 S.W.2d 797 (1992); Burkhart v. State, 301 Ark. 543, 785 S.W.2d 460 (1990). When viewing the strong admonitions the trial court issued at the time the prosecutor's remarks were made, we hold that any potential prejudice was cured and that the trial court did not abuse its wide discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.

3. Testimony of Tammy Coney

Next, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing Tammy Coney, a family service worker for the Arkansas Department of Human Services, to offer expert testimony that it was not unusual for child sexual abuse victims to recant their allegations.

We recently summarized the law regarding the qualifications of an expert witness in Smith v. State, 330 Ark. 50, 55-56, 953 S.W.2d 870 (1997):

Whether a witness qualifies as an expert in a particular field is a matter within the trial court's discretion, and we will not reverse such a decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Mace v. State, 328 Ark. 536, 944 S.W.2d 830 (1997). If some reasonable basis exists demonstrating that the witness has knowledge of the subject beyond that of ordinary knowledge, the evidence is admissible as expert testimony. Id. The general test of admissibility of expert testimony is whether it will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence presented or determining a fact in issue. A.R.E. Rule 702; Matthews v. State, 327 Ark. 70, 938 S.W.2d 545 (1997); Stout v. State, 320 Ark. 552, 898 S.W.2d 457 (1995). In addition, expert testimony must be relevant and not misleading or confusing to the jury. Stewart v. State, 316 Ark. 153, 870 S.W.2d 752 (1994). In determining the relevance of the testimony, the proponent must show that the evidence is reliable and sufficiently related to the facts of the case to aid the trier of fact in resolving the dispute. Prater v. State, 307 Ark. 180, 820 S.W.2d 429 (1991).

In the case at bar, Ms. Coney testified that she had been involved in investigating child-abuse cases for six and one-half years and had received eight weeks of new-worker training that covered different aspects of abuse, neglect, and family dynamics. Three years prior to trial, Ms. Coney had received one hundred-fifty hours of additional training. In view of Ms. Coney's training and experience, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in qualifying Ms. Coney as an expert and allowing her testimony, as it is apparent that she had knowledge of child abuse-cases beyond that of an ordinary person. See Poyner v. State, 288 Ark. 402, 705 S.W.2d 882 (1986).

The appellant also complains that the trial court should not...