Davis v. State

Decision Date22 March 1968
Docket NumberNo. 30915,30915
Citation234 N.E.2d 853,250 Ind. 54,13 Ind.Dec. 456
PartiesRobert DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

John J. Dillon, Atty. Gen., Donald R. Ewers, Asst. Atty. Gen., DueJean C. Garrett, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

JACKSON, Judge.

Appellant was charged, by indictment, filed in the Allen Circuit Court, March 25, 1965, with the crime of murder in the second degree.

The indictment, omitting formal parts and signatures, reads as follows, to-wit:

'The Grand Jury of the County of Allen, State of Indiana, upon their oath, do present that Robert Davis on the 6th day of March, 1965, in the County of Allen in the State of Indiana, unlawfully, feloniously, purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, did kill and murder Clarence Miller, a human being, by then and there unlawfully, feloniously, purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, shooting at and against the said Clarence Miller, with a certain .38 caliber revolver, loaded and charged with gunpowder and a bullet, and thereby mortally wounded the said Clarence Miller with said bullet, discharged and shot as aforesaid, from which mortal wound the said Clarence Miller then and there died, and so, the Grand Jurors, as aforesaid, upon their oath, as aforesaid, do say and charge that the said Robert May 17, 1965, appellant waived arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the charge embodied in the indictment. On the same day appellant waived his right to trial by jury.

Davis did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, purposely and maliciously but without premeditation, kill and murder the said Clarence Miller, in manner and form aforesaid, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.'

Trial was had to the court, without the intervention of a jury, beginning July 28, 1965, and continuing through July 30, 1965. Following the trial, the court found the appellant, Robert Davis, guilty of the offense of murder in the second degree as charged in the indictment.

Thereafter, on August 26, 1965, appellant filed his motion for a new trial, such motion, omitting formal parts and signatures, in pertinent part reads as follows:

'Comes now the defendant in the above entitled cause and respectfully moves the court for a new trial thereon and in support of said motion alleges and says:

1. That the finding of the court is contrary to law.

2. That the finding of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence.

3. That an error of law occurred at the trial, in this, that the court erred in sustaining objections by the State of Indiana to questions put to defendant by his counsel on re-direct examination, which questions, objections, ruling of the court and offer to prove are set out in full in an exhibit, which exhibit is attached hereto, made a part hereof and marked Exhibit A.

WHEREFORE, the defendant prays the court for a new trial in said cause.

EXHIBIT A

EXCERPT FROM TESTIMONY OF ROBERT DAVIS ON JULY 30, 1965

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION

By Mr. Leas:

Q. You said something about your being scared?

A. I was scared.

Q. Do you have any condition of your body or organs or did you have at that time or since that time or before that time?

Q. Yes.

MR. HELMKE: Objection to the question. Just a minute. He said 'Do you have any condition of the organs' and I don't quite understand what the question is and whether it relates to physical health or mental health.

Q. Physical health. I'm asking if anything happens when he gets scared?

A. Yes, it does.

Q. What?

A. My heart.

Q. How long have you had a heart condition?

MR. HELMKE: Objection. This is medical testimony. He said he had a heart condition.

THE COURT: This is re-direct, Judge. I don't want to eliminate anything that might be important.

MR. LEAS: This is important because this was brought out on cross-examination that he was scared and I want to know about what his condition was at the time of this episode.

THE COURT: Will counsel come forward, please?

(Conference at the bench between the Court and all attorneys)

MR. LEAS: Is there a question before the witness now? Question read by the reporter as follows: How long have you had a heart condition?

MR. HELMKE: And I objected. Is my objection shown?

MR. LEAS: Before the objection was taken may I make an offer to prove? I think that's the rule.

THE COURT: I think the Court rules and then you make your offer, is that not it, sir?

MR. LEAS: No, sir, I'm sorry, and i ask that we may make this offer to prove before the objection is taken.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LEAS: After the objection is taken but before the Court rules, I think that's the rule, the defendant offers to prove at this time that he has had for two years a heart condition; that when he becomes excited and scared it affects his actions in that he breaks out into a sweat and his heart flutters and this defendant will testify that that happened at the time of this crisis.

MR. HELMAKE: If the Court please, it's strictly self-serving. I suppose any one of us can say the same things when we become excited and scared our heart skips a beat or two. There has been no testimony by a doctor that attended Mr. Davis to this effect. This was not brought out on direct examination and it is not relevant to the issue at hand.

THE COURT: The objection is sustained.'

On August 26, 1965, appellant also filed a Petition for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis along with his motion for a new trial. Such petition reads in pertinent part as follows:

'Comes now the defendant, Robert Davis, and files his petition for a writ of error coram nobis and in support of his petition alleges and says:

1. That on the 6th day of March, 1965, at about 10 o'clock a.m. petitioner was apprehended and placed in custody by officers from the Fort Wayne Police Department, Fort Wayne, Indiana.

2. That at that time said officers knew or should have known that this investigation had been narrowed to, and in effect focused upon, this petitioner.

3. That at that time said officers commenced questioning petitioner regarding the facts of a certain alleged commission of a crime, namely homicide, with the sole and expressed purpose of eliciting a confession and statement from petitioner.

4. That during the time of the oral interrogation of petitioner, said petitioner did not have an attorney and did not make a request for same for the following reasons:

(a) Petitioner did not know the name of any attorney at law and did not know who he could call, contact or notify.

(b) Petitioner did not have funds available at that time to pay an attorney.

(c) Petitioner did not know he had any right whatsoever to have an attorney represent and advise him.

5. That the officer did not advise petitioner at any stage of the investigation, interrogation or preliminary procedures of his right to an attorney, his right to remain silent or of the fact that his statements, being then verbal and later written, could be used against him to convict him of murder in the second 6. That immediately after interrogation of petitioner by said officers, a typed statement was furnished and delivered to petitioner and he was requested to sign same; further, that he did in fact sign said statement which was admitted in evidence during the trial of the cause.

degree, or, finally, that upon conviction he could be sentenced to life imprisonment in the Indiana State Prison.

7. That during the time of the examination and signing of said written statement, petitioner did not have an attorney and did not make a request for same for the following reasons:

(a) Petitioner did not know the name of any attorney at law and did not know who he could call, contact or notify.

(b) Petitioner did not have funds available at that time to pay an attorney.

(c) Petitioner did not know he had any right whatsoever to have an attorney represent and advise him.

8. That petitioner has never been convicted of a crime before the conviction in the above entitled cause and therefore had had no experience in dealing with criminal law matters; further, that petitioner is semi-literate in that he has obtained a fourth-grade education only and is not familiar with his constitutional rights and privileges or matters of general knowledge in this particular field.

9. That thereafter, on the 11th day of March, 1965, Gordon Franke, M.D., Allen County Coroner, visited the Allen County Jail in the company of a stenographer and interrogated petitioner and during the course of said interrogation required said stenographer to take speed notes and thereafter type said notes into a statement and requested petitioner to sign same which petitioner did. That on said date and at said time, there was a statute in full force and effect, which statute is set out in full hereinbelow.

'WITNESSES--SUBPOENAS--POST MORTEM

All person desirous of being heard shall be examined as witnesses; and the coroner may cause witnesses to be summoned by subpoena, issued by him, and served by a constable, who shall answer all questions asked them, on oath, touching such death. When a surgeon or physician is required to attend such inquest and make a post mortem examination, the coroner shall certify such service to the Board of County Commissioners, who shall order the same paid out of the County Treasury.'

(2 RS 1852, Ch. 7, Section 8, p. 13.)

10. That said Allen County Coroner violated the petitioner's statutory rights in that the above cited statute was not complied with in any respect by said coroner.

11. That at the time of said coroner's interrogation, petitioner did not have an attorney and did not make a request for same for the following reasons:

(a) Petitioner did not know the name of any attorney at law and did not know who he could call, contact or notify.

(b) Petitioner did not have funds available at that time to pay an attorney.

(c) Petitioner did not know he had any...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Franklin v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • July 21, 1977
    ...of an issue involves the weight to be given evidence of the credibility of witnesses, it is improper to direct a verdict. Davis v. State, (1968) 250 Ind. 54, 233 N.E2d 642; State v. Patsel, (1960) 240 Ind. 240, 163 N.E.2d 602; State v. Torphy, (1940), 217 Ind. 383, 28 N.E.2d " * * * Althoug......
  • Platt v. State, 372A156
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • November 2, 1972
    ...Judgment affirmed. ROBERTSON, P.J., and LOWDERMILK, J., concur. 1 Tuggle v. State (1969), 253 Ind. 279, 252 N.E.2d 796, Davis v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 54, 234 N.E.2d 853, and Kondrup v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 320, 235 N.E.2d ...
  • Buckner v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • June 24, 1969
    ...each element of the crime alleged to sustain the verdict. Greenwalt v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 608, 209 N.E.2d 254, Davis v. State (1968), Ind., 13 Ind.Dec. 456, 234 N.E.2d 853; Corbin v. State (1968), Ind., 13 Ind.Dec. 208, 234 N.E.2d 261. Appellant does not show the Court any specific 'inf......
  • New v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • June 19, 1970
    ...he cannot form specific intent, where the crime charged involves a specific intent, that intoxication can be a defense. Davis v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 54, 232 N.E.2d 867. The question of whether or not the degree of intoxication was such as to prevent the appellant from forming a specific ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT