Davis v. State
| Decision Date | 20 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 108814,ED 108814 |
| Citation | 622 S.W.3d 721 |
| Parties | Tommy J. DAVIS, Movant/Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Defendant/Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Maleaner R. Harvey, 1010 Market St. Ste. 1100, St. Louis, MO 63101, for Movant.
Gregory L. Barnes, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102, for Respondent.
Tommy J. Davis ("Movant") appeals the motion court's judgment denying his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief ("PCR") without an evidentiary hearing.1 Movant appeals the PCR denial on two grounds. First, Movant argues the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim that he was denied access to basic legal materials and facilities to effectively prepare his defense and adequately represent himself at trial. In his second point, Movant argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel because appellate counsel failed to raise on direct appeal a claim that the trial court erred in overruling Movant's objection to proceed with his trial because he was ill-equipped and unprepared to try his case as a result of the county jail's lack of basic legal materials in its law library. Finding that the motion court did not err, we affirm.
In June of 2014, Movant was charged with first-degree assault and armed criminal action, which stemmed from the shooting of Christopher Watson ("Victim") over Movant's belief that Victim possessed some of his belongings. During the more than three years prior to trial, Movant was represented by five different attorneys, two of them in private practice and three from the public defender's office. Each attorney was removed from Movant's case at his insistence. Movant also represented himself pro se numerous times during those three years, even with repeated advice from the trial court that doing so was not advisable and that he was entitled to a public defender. Nevertheless, prior to his trial, Movant appeared in front of the trial court consistently expressing his wish to represent himself. Movant also filed numerous motions with the trial court, all of which were written from jail, on his own behalf during the time he was detained and awaiting trial.
In November of 2017, a jury trial was held, and Movant appeared in person pro se. Before the venire panel entered the courtroom, Movant was vocal about his refusal to proceed with the trial for multiple reasons, including that he was not provided the necessary materials to properly represent himself, did not receive certain non-relevant or non-existent documents from the court, generally declared the trial court to be without authority or jurisdiction over him, and believed there was a conspiracy against him by the "bar association." Movant ultimately chose to proceed pro se and also chose not to attend the trial, stating "there's no way" he would agree to proceed, and returned to his cell for the duration of the trial. The trial court informed Movant that if he wanted to participate in the trial at any point, he could return to the courtroom. The trial court informed the venire panel of Movant's choice to both represent himself and to not be present for trial and explained that they could not presume guilt based on the fact that Movant did not testify or attend the trial.
The State presented testimony from three officers, the evidence technician who processed the scene of the shooting, and Victim. The State also entered into evidence photos of the crime scene, photos of Victim's wounds, a shell casing, and the bullet that struck Victim. The State's witnesses’ testimony revealed that Movant called police around 3:00 a.m. on the morning of June 4, 2014 to report items—shorts and tennis shoes—he believed were left at Victim's house by his girlfriend. The officer that responded to Movant's residence testified that Movant was agitated and wanted the officers to accompany him to Victim's house, about a five to ten minute drive from Movant's residence, to retrieve his items right away. When the officer explained that this was a civil matter because the items were not stolen and that it would be better to retrieve his belongings during daylight hours, Movant became more agitated and demanded to speak to a supervisor, saying he would do "anything to get his stuff back." The supervising police sergeant then responded to Movant's address around 4:00 a.m. and testified Movant was agitated, hostile, and wanted his belongings that were left at Victim's house by his girlfriend. The sergeant observed a black Chrysler car in the garage and noted Movant was wearing a black shirt and dark colored shorts, and, after speaking with him, Movant eventually agreed to contact the police department during daylight hours to have an officer accompany him to Victim's house. At approximately 4:15 a.m., the patrol officer and sergeant left the scene. At approximately 5:00 a.m. that same morning, dispatch reported shots fired at Victim's address.
Victim testified that around 5:00 a.m. he had just returned to his house from work when he heard someone banging on his door. Before he could answer, Movant pushed the door open, "smirked" at Victim, and fired a shot into his stomach, which required emergency surgery. Additionally, the State presented evidence showing that Movant's black Chrysler car was being tracked by police with a GPS tracker for an unrelated reason at the time, and the tracker placed the Chrysler at Movant's residence during his initial interactions with the patrol officer and sergeant, and then at Victim's address at the time of the shooting.
The jury found Movant guilty of first-degree assault and armed criminal action. Following the jury trial, Movant was sentenced in December of 2017 to thirty years’ imprisonment on Count I and twenty years’ imprisonment on Count II, to be served consecutively.
This Court affirmed Movant's convictions and sentences in State v. Davis , 580 S.W.3d 26 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) and issued its mandate on September 5, 2019. On April 9, 2018, while Movant's appeal was pending, he filed a premature Rule 29.15 motion. Appointed counsel filed a motion to hold open the premature filing pending the direct appeal. Following the issuance of the mandate, the trial court granted post-conviction counsel an additional thirty days to file the amended motion. The amended motion was timely filed on December 4, 2019. On February 11, 2020, the motion court denied Movant's amended Rule 29.15 motion for PCR without an evidentiary hearing.
This appeal follows.
Our review of a motion court's Rule 29.15 judgment "is limited to a determination of whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous." Price v. State , 422 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting Moore v. State , 328 S.W.3d 700, 702 (Mo. banc 2010) ); Rule 29.15(k). "In reviewing the overruling of a motion for post-conviction relief, the motion court's ruling is presumed correct," and we must uphold the motion court's judgment if it is sustainable on any grounds. McLaughlin v. State , 378 S.W.3d 328, 336–37 (Mo. banc 2012) ; McGuire v. State , 523 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017).
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, a movant must establish both elements of the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; Meiners v. State , 540 S.W.3d 832, 836 (Mo. banc 2018). First, he must prove that the appellate counsel's performance was deficient and that counsel "failed to exercise the level of skill and diligence that a reasonably competent counsel would in a similar situation." McIntosh v. State , 413 S.W.3d 320, 324 (Mo. banc 2013). The alleged error on appeal must be "so obvious that a competent and effective lawyer would have recognized and asserted it." Williams v. State , 168 S.W.3d 433, 444 (Mo. banc 2005). Second, a movant must show prejudice. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Prejudice exists where "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
A movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if: (1) he pleaded facts, not conclusions, warranting relief; (2) the facts alleged are not refuted by the record; and (3) the matters complained of resulted in prejudice to movant. McLaughlin , 378 S.W.3d at 337. To obtain an evidentiary hearing, a movant "must allege facts, not refuted by the record, showing that counsel's performance did not conform to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney and that the movant was thereby prejudiced." Morrow v. State , 21 S.W.3d 819, 823 (Mo. banc 2000).
In his first point, Movant alleges the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 29.15 motion for PCR without an evidentiary hearing because he alleged facts that warranted relief and that were not clearly refuted by the record. Specifically, Movant alleges he was denied access to basic legal materials and facilities to effectively prepare his defense and adequately represent himself at trial.
"The right of self-representation so implied into the Sixth Amendment is applicable to the states by way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and prevents a state from forcing upon a defendant unwanted counsel." State v. Black , 223 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Mo. banc 2007) ; see also Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts, "which can be met by adequate law libraries for a pro se defendant, but also by other alternative means, including proffering assistance from available counsel." Garth v. State , 411 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013).
On the day of his jury trial, Movant insisted on proceeding pro se. Before voir dire, Movant...
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