Davis v. State of Kansas
| Decision Date | 10 June 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. W-4524.,W-4524. |
| Citation | 327 F. Supp. 963 |
| Parties | Richard DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF KANSAS et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
James Foster, of Foster & Foster, Wichita, Kan., Leon J. Greenspan, of Greenspan, Aurnou & Davis, White Plains, N. Y., for plaintiff.
Keith Sanborn, County Atty., Wichita, Kan., Leonard D. Munker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Topeka, Kan., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
On January 8, 1971, the plaintiff commenced an action in this Court which purports to be pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is this Act, in conjunction with 28 U. S.C. § 1343(3) and § 2201, that the plaintiff urges upon this Court as creating jurisdiction to entertain the present action and grant the injunctive and declaratory relief discussed below. Vern Miller, Attorney General of Kansas, has been substituted as the proper party defendant instead of his predecessor in the office of Attorney General, who was originally named as a defendant in his official capacity. Issue has been joined here by the motion of defendants to dismiss the complaint. The facts as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, and as were developed more fully in a hearing held before this Court on January 25, 1971, are as follows.
On June 17, 1967, the plaintiff was convicted by a jury of forgery and possession of a fraudulent certificate of title to a motor vehicle in violation of K. S.A. 21-113 and 21-616, in the District Court of Sedgwick County, Kansas. On July 10, 1967, the state court sentenced plaintiff to confinement for a period not to exceed seven years on the forgery count, and one to five years on the possession count. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. The convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Kansas Supreme Court on direct appeal. State v. Jarvis, 201 Kan. 678, 443 P.2d 272 (1968).
The defendant Keith Sanborn, Sedgwick County Attorney, has filed an affidavit stating that the plaintiff is, and has been since the commencement of the present action, a fugitive from justice willfully concealing himself from the processes of the State of Kansas. The plaintiff also alleges in his complaint that he "is not physically within the custody of officials of the State of Kansas, but remains at large outside the borders of the State of Kansas subject to immediate arrest." Since the hearing held on January 25, 1971, the Court has been advised by plaintiff's counsel that plaintiff is no longer a fugitive from justice, having been taken into custody by police officers of the State of Utah, pursuant to the warrants and other process of the State of Kansas.
In his complaint, as amended, the plaintiff seeks to have this Court declare that his conviction and sentence are in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and enjoin the State of Kansas from enforcing the same. In the alternative, plaintiff seeks to have this Court treat his complaint as an application for a writ of habeas corpus and similarly rule that his conviction and sentence are invalid. In brief, plaintiff contends that he has been subjected to double jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishment, and denial of due process of law in violation of the Constitution. He also complains of certain evidentiary rulings and jury instructions in the state trial court.
For the reason that this action is really nothing more than a collateral attack on a state court conviction disguised as an action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and even though this Court may have jurisdiction in the "power" sense to adjudicate the dispute on its merits, which is extremely doubtful under the present state of the law, for the several legal reasons appearing below, the Court determines that the action should be dismissed under the doctrine of abstention.
At inception, this Court is met by what appears to be a solid statutory bar under the present state of stare decisis to granting relief under the complaint before the Court. The gravamen of the complaint is that a federal court bar present and future action of state courts to enforce a judgment valid on its face. This judgment of conviction and sentence of the complainant, of course, represents an existing or past judicial action of Kansas state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 is quite clear in saying:
"A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
The decisions under this statute, and independently of it as a matter of comity, hold that this area of interference with state court suits, especially in the criminal field, is a red-flag area to be entered into not at all or with extreme caution and hesitancy. In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L. Ed.2d 22 (1965), the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to resolve the question as to whether suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 come under the "expressly authorized" exception to § 2283. This Court knows of no new Supreme Court decision since then that has so held, although there is presently before the high court the case of Samuels v. Mackell, and several companion cases, which have already been argued and which will probably give a newer legal view of the meaning of § 2283. Even then, if § 2283 is held to have exceptions, it is almost certainly in those cases where the parties seeking injunctive relief were engaged in organized activities relating directly to free speech, and where the prosecution sought to be enjoined was part of an unconstitutional scheme illegally to regulate or otherwise impinge on their freedom of expression. Indeed, there exist many valid legal reasons why a suit under the Civil Rights Act should not be regarded as an "open sesame" or a judicial remedy superior to and overriding all others, including the Great Writ, as a protector of personal liberty.
The federal courts are quick to dismiss attempts to disguise habeas corpus petitions as civil rights actions due to the fact that exhaustion of state remedies is a prerequisite to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Grayson v. Montgomery, 421 F.2d 1306 (1st Cir. 1970). The same is true of declaratory judgment suits which are in essence habeas corpus applications. Waldon v. Iowa, 323 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1963). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also held that "the Civil Rights Act cannot be used by a state prisoner to circumvent the requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that state remedies must be exhausted." Hamrick v. Norton, 436 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1971). See also, Smartt v. Avery, 411 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1969).
Even if this Court were wont to indulge in legal pioneering and find that plaintiff's action is a proper claim for relief under the Civil Rights Act, the federal courts have been most reluctant to exercise their jurisdiction under this Act to intervene in the state criminal process. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 72 S.Ct. 118, 96 L.Ed. 138 (1951) (); Douglas v. City of Jeannette...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Martin v. Duffie
... ... Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (1963). They are: (1) that the defendant act "under color of" state or local law, and (2) that the plaintiff be subjected to a "deprivation of any rights, privileges, ... ...