Davis v. Steward Energy II, LLC

Decision Date14 May 2021
Docket NumberCiv. No. 20-966 KG/JHR
PartiesGERALD DAVIS, JR., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. STEWARD ENERGY II, LLC, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, a Completions and Production Consultant, worked for Defendant from May 2018 through April 2020. Defendant is an oil and natural gas exploration and production company. Plaintiff brings this collective action lawsuit to recover unpaid overtime wages and other damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act (NMMWA). Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated the FLSA and the NMMWA by paying him and other similarly situated oilfield workers (Putative Class Members) "a daily rate with no overtime pay and improperly classified them as independent contractors." (Doc. 1) at ¶ 4.

On October 22, 2020, Defendant filed the instant "Defendant's Motion to Dismiss" (Motion to Dismiss) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and moves to dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice. (Doc. 6). The matter is now fully and timely briefed. See (Docs. 12, 13, and 14). The Court notes jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Having considered the briefing, the Original Collective Action Complaint (Complaint), the controlling law, and for the following reasons, the Court denies the Motion to Dismiss.

I. The Complaint (Doc. 1)1

Plaintiff alleges that he "worked exclusively for [Defendant] from May 2018 through April 2020 as a Completions and Production Consultant." (Doc. 1) at ¶ 23. Plaintiff's "primary job duties included ensuring that the completion of the well, and production following completion, was carried out according to [Defendant's] specifications and well plan, as needed." Id. at ¶ 24. Plaintiff contends that Defendant did not employ him "on a project-by-project basis." Id. at ¶ 45.

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant classified him as an independent contractor and paid him "a day-rate with no overtime compensation." Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff describes the day rate as a "flat amount" or "flat sum for each day worked, regardless of the number of hours that [he and Putative Class Members] worked that day (or in that workweek)...." Id. at ¶¶ 9 and 22.

Plaintiff also maintains that he "worked well in excess of 40 hours each week while employed by [Defendant]." Id. at ¶ 24. Indeed, Plaintiff asserts that he "regularly worked ... in excess of 40 hours each week." Id. at ¶ 2. For example, Plaintiff alleges that, similar to Putative Class Members, he was "often scheduled for 12-hour shifts for weeks at a time." Id. at ¶ 47. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant "failed to pay [him] overtime for all hours that [he] worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek...." Id. at ¶ 9.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant improperly classified him as an independent contractor. Given that improper classification, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant "violated the FLSA andNMMWA by failing to pay [him] ... overtime at one and one-half times the regular rate of pay under the hourly system, for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek."2 Id. at ¶ 66.

II. The Motion to Dismiss

Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's FLSA and NMMWA claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for two reasons. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible FLSA overtime claim for individual relief. Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not an "employee" covered by the NMMWA. Plaintiff opposes the Motion to Dismiss in its entirety but, in the alternative, he "seeks leave to amend his Complaint if the Court deems amendment necessary." (Doc. 12) at 9.

III. The Rule 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Emps.' Ret. Sys. of R.I. v. Williams Cos., Inc., 889 F.3d 1153, 1161 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Asheroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Free Speech v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 720 F.3d 788, 792 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In making this assessment, courts "accept as true 'all well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Kerber v.Qwest Grp. Life Ins. Plan, 647 F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir. 2011)).

IV. Discussion
A. Whether Plaintiff has Stated a Plausible FLSA Overtime Claim for Individual Relief

The Court notes that "the Tenth Circuit has yet to adopt a specific approach for determining the level of detail needed in an FLSA ... claim to overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Gandy v. RWLS, LLC, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1220, 1223 (D.N.M. 2018). Defendant cites Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, wherein the Fourth Circuit reviewed the divided case law addressing that issue. Hall, 846 F.3d 757, 776 (4th Cir. 2017).

The Fourth Circuit in Hall adopted the following approach: "to make out a plausible overtime claim, a plaintiff must provide sufficient factual allegations to support a reasonable inference that he or she worked more than forty hours in at least one workweek and that his or her employer failed to pay the requisite overtime premium for those overtime hours." Id. at 777. Although "plaintiffs seeking to overcome a motion to dismiss must do more than merely allege that they regularly worked in excess of forty hours per week without receiving overtime pay," the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the standard it adopted "does not require plaintiffs to identify a particular week in which they worked uncompensated overtime hours." Id. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit concluded that "to state a plausible FLSA overtime claim, plaintiffs 'must provide sufficient detail about the length and frequency of their unpaid work to support a reasonable inference that they worked more than forty hours in a given week.'" Id. (citation omitted). "A plaintiff may meet this initial standard 'by estimating the length of her average workweek during the applicable period and the average rate at which she was paid, the amount of overtime wages she believes she is owed, or any other facts that will permit the court to find plausibility.'" Id. (citation omitted).

Relying primarily on Hall, Defendant complains that Plaintiff only vaguely alleges that he worked in excess of 40 hours a week and that Defendant "often" scheduled him to work 12-hour shifts. See (Doc. 1) at ¶¶ 24 and 47. Defendant further complains that "Plaintiff fails to allege the general length of hours worked in any given week and fails to provide any indication of how many hours of overtime he was required to work in any given week." (Doc. 6) at 4. Finally, Defendant complains that Plaintiff does not "identify any sort of tasks he was required to perform during the alleged overtime hours." Id. Defendant asserts that "[e]ven under a more relaxed pleading standard, these allegations are insufficient to state a claim under the FLSA." Id.

Notwithstanding the non-binding standard set forth by the Fourth Circuit in Hall in 2017, this Court concluded recently that "[in] light of the persuasive authority from other district courts in the Tenth Circuit, the Court is convinced that a complaint need not specify either the dates on which the plaintiff worked over forty hours per week, or the number of hours worked over forty." Guereca v. Cordero, 487 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1155 (D.N.M. 2020). As to any allegation about the frequency of unpaid overtime work, district courts in the Tenth Circuit have held that terms like "routinely" or "regularly" provide sufficient factual context to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See Florece v. Jose Pepper's Restaurants, LLC, 2021 WL 722822, at *4 (D. Kan.) (observing that unpublished Tenth Circuit case, ElHelbawy v. Pritzker, 663 Fed. Appx. 658 (10th Cir. 2016), "suggests it would be sufficient for an FLSA plaintiff to allege that he or she was regularly required to work in excess of forty hours per workweek without proper payment") (emphasis added); Guereca, 487 F. Supp. 3d at 1155 (quoting from Kansas district court opinion: "Indeed, numerous courts continue to find that dismissal of FLSA claims is not appropriate when the complaint alleges only that non-exempt employees regularly worked more than 40 hours per workweek and that they were not paid time-and-a-half for those overtime hours" (citationomitted) (emphasis added); Thomas v. Pauls Valley Boomarang Diner, LLC, 320 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1260-61 (W.D. Okla. 2018) (finding allegation that plaintiff "'routinely worked' in excess of 40 hours per week for the defendants without receiving any overtime compensation" sufficient under Rule 12(b)(6)); Gandy, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (having considered FLSA caselaw, including Hall, district court found plausible overtime claim under the NMMWA when plaintiff used "'routinely' or 'regularly,' which is some detail beyond merely repeating the language of the statute") (emphasis added). Considering this persuasive and extensive caselaw by Tenth Circuit district courts, including this Court, the Court will follow that caselaw rather than Hall in discerning the standard for pleading an FLSA overtime claim.

Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he "worked well in excess of 40 hours each week while employed by" Defendant. (Doc. 1) at ¶ 24. Defendant employed Plaintiff from May 2018 through April 2020. Id. at ¶ 23. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant "often" scheduled him "for 12-hour shifts for weeks at a time" and that he "regularly worked ... in excess of 40 hours each week." Id. at ¶¶ 2 and 47. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant "failed to pay [him] overtime for all hours that [he] worked in excess of 40 hours...

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