Davis v. Stokes

• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: GARDNER, J.
• Citation: Davis v. Stokes, 214 Ala. 234, 107 So. 76 (Ala. 1926)
• Decision Date: 21 January 1926
• Docket Number: 3 Div. 734
• Parties: DAVIS, Atty. Gen., ex rel. FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH, COLORED, OF MONTGOMERY v. STOKES et al.

107 So. 76

214 Ala. 234

DAVIS, Atty. Gen., ex rel. FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH, COLORED, OF MONTGOMERY v. STOKES et al.

3 Div. 734

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 21, 1926

Appeal from Circuit Court, Montgomery County; Leon McCord, Judge.

Bill in equity by Harwell G. Davis, Attorney General, by the First Baptist Church, Colored, of Montgomery, against Hugo B Stokes and another, individually and as executors of the estate of A.J. Stokes, deceased. From a decree sustaining demurrer to the bill, complainant appeals. Affirmed.

T.E Martin, H.B. Fuller, and Rushton, Crenshaw & Rushton, all of Montgomery, for appellant.

Hill Hill, Whiting, Thomas & Rives, of Montgomery, for appellees.

GARDNER J.

This bill is filed on behalf of the First Baptist Church, Colored of Montgomery, Ala., against the heirs and legatees of A.J. Stokes, deceased, who for many years was pastor of said church, seeking to divest them of title to certain real estate and an accounting for the rents and profits thereof, and also a recovery of $2,750, alleged to have been due the church by said Stokes since January, 1923, when he obtained said sum from the church.

The original bill made the Attorney General of the state a party complainant, but, upon demurrer being sustained, he was stricken by complainant on amendment of the bill. The demurrer to the bill as amended being sustained, plaintiff prosecutes this appeal for a review of the rulings of the court in these respects.

The real estate here in question was purchased for church purposes, and the Attorney General was made a party upon the theory that, for the protection of charitable trusts, the state is interested, and will, through its chief prosecuting officer, obtain the interposition of a court of equity. The authorities so holding, however, rest such decision upon the doctrine of parens partriae respecting charitable trusts. Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen (Mass.) 539, 579, and authorities noted in Ewell v. Sneed, 136 Tenn. 602, 191 S.W. 131, 5 A.L.R. 303. But this doctrine is not recognized in this state. Williams v. Pearson, 38 Ala. 299. No such duties rest upon the Attorney General. The following language of the Tennessee court in Ewell v. Sneed, supra, is applicable here:

"No functionary has been intrusted with the authority and duties of parens patriae respecting charitable trusts. This power still inheres in the sovereign people."

The church is a body corporate with power to institute suits in its own behalf, possess and convey real estate. The interposition of the Attorney General in such litigation has not heretofore been deemed necessary or proper. Tilson v. Graham, 208 Ala. 312, 94 So. 295; Gewin v. Mt. Pilgrim Baptist Church, 166 Ala. 348, 51 So. 947, 139 Am.St.Rep. 41; Blount v. Sixteenth St. Baptist Church, 206 Ala. 423, 90 So. 602. Moreover, the property of this church is not held for the entire public, but for a limited portion of the public, and it may be seriously questioned that even in those jurisdictions admitting the doctrine contended for by complainant that the present case would be brought within its influence (11 Corpus Juris, p. 367), but this need not be here determined. We are of the opinion the Attorney General was not a proper party, and the demurrer taking the point was correctly sustained.

The deed which forms the foundation of the equity of the bill as to the real estate, was executed in 1901; it being alleged that the property therein described was purchased by Stokes with funds of the church, taking the title in his own name rather than in the name of the church. There were other deeds executed and certain exchanges made between Stokes and the church in 1907, and some as late as 1910; but the original fraudulent conduct in acquiring the deed of 1901 forms a foundation for the subsequent conveyances. Under the averments of the bill, Stokes held the property thus acquired as a trustee in invitum, and constituted him a trustee of a constructive trust. It is well recognized that constructive trusts are within the operation of the statute of limitations. Am. Bonding Co. v. Fourth National Bank, 205 Ala. 652, 88 So. 838; Peters Min. Land Co. v. Hooper, 208 Ala. 324, 94 So. 606.

The bill shows that the deeds were duly recorded soon after their execution, and that Stokes remained in possession of the property, and that the bar of the statute of limitations of 10 years was complete some years before this bill was filed. It was therefore incumbent upon complainant to aver sufficient facts and circumstances which would bring the case from without the operation of the statute of limitations. Am. Bonding Co. v. Fourth National Bank, supra.

We are of the opinion the averments of the bill are insufficient in this respect. There are no averments of fraud or fraudulent concealment of any facts on the part of Stokes as to the acquisition of this property. Not only were the deeds of record and Stokes in possession, but the church authorities from subsequent dealings appear to have known thereof and dealt with Stokes accordingly. The case of Peters...