Davis v. Strus
| Decision Date | 22 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:17-cv-00062-SMJ,2:17-cv-00062-SMJ |
| Citation | 474 F.Supp.3d 1163 |
| Parties | Barbara DAVIS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of G.B., deceased, Plaintiff, v. Jennifer STRUS, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Heidi Kaas, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Melissa Kehmeier, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; James Desmond, individually and in his official capacity acting under the color of state law; Cassie Anderson, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Brina Carrigan, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Maggie Stewart, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Lori Blake, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Shannon Sullivan, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Susan Steiner, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Cameron Norton, individually and in his official capacity acting under the color of state law; Sarah Oase, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Rana Pullom, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Donald Williams, individually and in his official capacity acting under the color of state law; Chris Mejia, individually and in his official capacity acting under the color of state law; Riverside School District No. 416, a Municipal Corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Washington State; Juanita Murray, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Roberta Kramer, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Sarah Ramsden, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Caroline Raymond, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Cheri Mcquesten, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Sarah Ramsey, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Tami Boone, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Melissa Reed, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Ann Stopar, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Kristina Griffith, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Wendy Supanchick, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Sherry Dornquast, individually and in her official capacity acting under the color of state law; Gary Vanderholm, individually and in his official capacity acting under the color of state law; Roger Pratt, individually and in his official capacity acting under the color of state law; Chris Nieuwenhuis, individually and in his official capacity acting under the color of state law; and John Does 1–50, individually and in their official capacities acting under the color of state law, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Washington |
James P. Ware, Mark Douglas Kimball, Dennis Kasimov, Mdk Law, Bellevue, WA, Richard Norman Boe, A Boe Law Firm PS, Bremerton, WA, for Plaintiff.
Carl Perry Warring, Attorney General of Washington, Spokane, WA, Elizabeth Anna-Marie Baker, Attorney General of Washington, Olympia, WA, for Defendants Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, Heidi Kaas 102 New Haven Lane Port Angeles, WA 98362.
Carl Perry Warring, Joseph Ehle, Attorney General of Washington, Spokane, WA, Elizabeth Anna-Marie Baker, Attorney General of Washington, Olympia, WA, for Defendants Jennifer Strus, Melissa Kehmeier, James Desmond, Cassie Anderson, Brina Carrigan, Maggie Stewart, Lori Blake, Shannon Sullivan, Susan Steiner, Cameron Norton, Sarah Oase, Rana Pullom, Donald Williams, Chris Mejia.
Michael E. McFarland, Jr., Evans Craven & Lackie PS, Spokane, WA, for Defendants Riverside School District No. 416, Juanita Murray, Roberta Kramer, Sarah Ramsden, Caroline Raymond, Cheri McQuesten, Sarah Ramsey, Tami Boone, Melissa Reed, Ann Stopar, Kristina Griffith, Wendy Supanchick, Gary Vanderholm, Roger Pratt, Chris Nieuwenhuis.
Jerry John Moberg, James Edyrn Baker, Moberg Rathbone Kearns, Mary Moberg Rathbone, Jerry Moberg & Associates PS, Ephrata, WA, for Defendant Sherry Dornquast.
Carl Perry Warring, Joseph Ehle, Attorney General of Washington, Spokane, WA, for Defendants Tom Stokes, Jeremy Kirkland, Jane Doe Stokes, Jane Doe Kirkland.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING STATUTORY BENEFICIARIES
On July 14, 2020, the Court heard oral argument on the Individual State Defendants’1 "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Statutory Beneficiaries" ("Defendants’ Motion"), ECF No. 347, and Plaintiff's "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Statutory Beneficiaries" ("Plaintiff's Motion"), ECF No. 361. The Riverside Defendants2 and Defendant Sherry Dornquast joined in Defendants’ Motion. ECF Nos. 350, 351.
This case arises out of the death of G.B., a minor child. Defendants sought dismissal of all Plaintiff's claims brought on behalf of G.B.’s minor siblings, S.D.A. and D.M.A.,3 on the grounds that because those individuals were adopted after G.B.’s death, they are no longer statutory beneficiaries under the Washington State wrongful death statute. ECF No. 347. Plaintiff sought summary judgment that S.D.A., D.M.A., and Vida Mercedes Cruz, an adult sibling of G.B., were and remain statutory beneficiaries under the Washington state wrongful death statute and that Plaintiff may recover non-economic damages on their behalf. ECF No. 361. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court found S.D.A. and D.M.A.’s adoption did not sever their sibling relationship under the wrongful death statute and thus granted Plaintiff's Motion and denied Defendants’ Motion. This order memorializes and supplements the Court's oral ruling.
This case arises out of the tragic death of G.B., a minor child, in April 2015 while in the custody of his aunt. See ECF No. 1 at 13–14. The detailed factual background of G.B.’s death has been set forth in multiple prior orders, see ECF Nos. 221, 281 & 368, and the Court finds it unnecessary to repeat that general background in full here.
At the time of his death, G.B. had three siblings: minors S.D.A. and D.M.A., and Vida Mercedes Cruz. ECF No. 362. When G.B. died, he as well as well as S.D.A. and D.M.A. were wards of the state. ECF No. 1 at 19. On September 14, 2016 G.B.’s grandmother, on behalf of G.B.’s Estate and the Estate's statutory beneficiaries, brought this action against the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services ("DSHS") and the Riverside School District, along with numerous employees of those entities. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff has identified S.D.A., D.M.A., and Cruz as statutory beneficiaries. ECF No. 349 at 7–8. On November 14, 2016, S.D.A. and D.M.A. were adopted. Id. at 11–12, 13–14.
The Individual State Defendants asked Plaintiff to admit that S.D.A. and D.M.A. were no longer statutory beneficiaries for purposes of the wrongful death statute. ECF No. 347 at 2. When Plaintiff denied the request for admission, Defendants filed Defendants’ Motion and Plaintiff later filed Plaintiff's Motion. Id.
The Court must grant summary judgment if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.
In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 657, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ). Thus, the Court must accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court may not assess credibility or weigh evidence. See id. Nevertheless, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading but must instead set forth specific facts, and point to substantial probative evidence, tending to support its case and showing a genuine issue requires resolution by the finder of fact. See Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Washington law provides a wrongful death action may be pursued: (1) "for the benefit of the spouse, state registered domestic partner, child or children, including stepchildren," or (2) "[i]f there is no spouse, state registered domestic partner, or such child or children, such action may be maintained for the benefit of the parents or siblings of the deceased." Wash. Rev. Code § 4.20.020. The interpretation of this statute is a matter of law. See Matter of Estate of Reid , 200 Wash.App. 137, 401 P.3d 437, 439 (2017), review denied , 189 Wash.2d 1035, 407 P.3d 1138 (2018).
When the Court engages in interpretation, it must "endeavor to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent." In re Estate of Blessing , 174 Wash.2d 228, 273 P.3d 975, 976 (2012). If "the statute's meaning is plain on its face," then the Court must give effect to that meaning. Id. The Court discerns a statute's plain meaning by reference to the "ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in...
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