Davis v. Synhorst

Decision Date03 May 1963
Docket NumberCiv. No. 5-1289.
Citation217 F. Supp. 492
PartiesCharles L. DAVIS and Arthur J. Lewis, Plaintiffs, v. Melvin D. SYNHORST, Secretary of State of Iowa, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

Harry H. Smith, Sioux City, Iowa, Robert F. Wilson, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and C. A. Frerichs, Waterloo, Iowa, for plaintiffs.

Evan Hultman, Atty. Gen. of Iowa, Wilbur N. Bump, Sol. Gen. of Iowa, for defendants.

Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judge, and STEPHENSON and McMANUS, District Judges.

VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judge.

This case came on for hearing upon the merits before this duly constituted three-judge court pursuant to assignment on March 28 and 29, 1963. Plaintiffs appeared by Harry H. Smith, Robert F. Wilson and C. A. Frerichs, their attorneys, and defendants appeared by Evan Hultman, Attorney General of the State of Iowa, and Wilbur N. Bump, Solicitor General of the State of Iowa, their attorneys. The respective parties introduced their evidence and rested, argued the case orally and submitted written briefs, whereupon the case was submitted and taken under advisement. This case is now ready for decision.

Plaintiffs Davis and Lewis are citizens of the United States and the State of Iowa and are residents and qualified voters in Polk County, Iowa. They bring this class action in their own behalf and in behalf of other Iowa voters similarly situated. Defendants are state and county officials performing various duties in connection with conducting elections for members of the Iowa General Assembly.

Jurisdiction is asserted by virtue of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983 and 1988, and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3), and relief by way of declaratory judgment is asked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201-2202.

Plaintiffs' action is based upon alleged violation of federally protected rights guaranteed by the equal protection clause found in § 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.1

This action is based upon the teachings of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663. Plaintiffs assert invidious discrimination against them exists by reason of the disparity in their voting rights for members of each House of the Iowa General Assembly. Additionally, plaintiffs claim that other inequitable, irrational and arbitrary factors become the predominant factor in the apportionment of the Legislature and that invidious discrimination exists by reason thereof.

Plaintiffs offered evidence for the purpose of attempting to show that actual discrimination existed against them in the Legislature which impeded the enactment of legislation in which they were interested and which brought about legislation which cast unfair tax burdens upon them.

Plaintiffs' witness Scott Swisher, who has ably served as a member of the Legislature for many years, and defendants' witness William R. Kendrick, who has served for some time as Secretary of the House, each expressed the view that the Legislature has not purposely or intentionally invidiously discriminated against any group or economic interest. There is evidence, as might be expected, of the existence in the Legislature of economic blocks, such as the farm block, the insurance block and the cities group, and that blocks having the largest membership are often more successful in their legislative programs.

As hereinafter pointed out, we believe plaintiffs are entitled to relief if the pattern of representation is invidiously discriminatory. We find it unwise and unnecessary to enter into the political thicket and attempt to determine whether the plaintiffs have established specific instances of discrimination against them and members of their class.

We believe that Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in Baker v. Carr succinctly states the extent of the holding in such case when he says:

"The Court today decides three things and no more: `(a) that the court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter; (b) that a justiciable cause of action is stated upon which appellants would be entitled to appropriate relief; and (c) * * * that the appellants have standing to challenge the Tennessee apportionment statutes.' Ante, pp. 197-198." 369 U.S. 265, 82 S.Ct. 736.

It is of no importance whether or not we agree with the principles announced in Baker v. Carr. We are bound by such decision to the extent that it bears directly upon the issues before us. We believe it to be clear that this court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, that a justiciable cause of action is stated, and that plaintiffs have standing to bring this action.

The basic issues presented for determination are:

1. Do the existing Iowa constitutional provisions relating to representation in the General Assembly, including the 1904 and 1928 amendments as implemented by statute, deny the plaintiffs equal protection of the laws in violation of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution?

2. Is the validity of the proposed amendment known as the Shaff Plan, hereinafter described, ripe for adjudication and if so, is such amendment also violative of the 14th Amendment?

3. The remedy to be granted in the event plaintiffs prevail upon the constitutional attack.

We shall discuss the issues in the order hereinabove stated. We shall set forth the pertinent factual background before stating and applying the law relating to the various issues.

Existing Apportionment.

The current apportionment of the Iowa General Assembly is fixed by Iowa Constitution Article 3, §§ 6, 34, 35, 36 and 37 as amended, and by Iowa Code §§ 41.1, 42.1-.3, I.C.A.

The Iowa General Assembly consists of a senate of 50 members and a house of 108 members. The state is divided into 50 senatorial districts, each of which elects one senator. Each of Iowa's 90 least populous counties elects a representative, while the 9 most populous counties2 elect two apiece.

Iowa Const., art. 3, § 35, as amended, provides:

"The House of Representatives shall consist of not more than one hundred and eight members. The Ratio of representation shall be determined by dividing the whole number of the population of the state as shown by the last preceding state or national census, by the whole number of counties then existing or organized, but each county shall constitute one representative district and be entitled to one representative, but each county having a population in excess of the ratio number, as herein provided of three fifths or more of such ratio number shall be entitled to one additional representative, but said addition shall extend only to the nine counties having the greatest population."

Iowa's population under the 1960 census is 2,757,537. Iowa's 99 counties range in population (1960 census) from 7,468 (Adams) to 266,315 (Polk). Thus nearly one-tenth of the state's population is concentrated in Polk County. Polk County is nearly 36 times as populous as Adams County, yet it has only twice the number of representatives in the House. While this is an extreme example, it is not a singular one. Six of Iowa's counties have less than 10,000 inhabitants. Thirty-five counties have a population of less than 15,000 and 76 counties, or over three-fourths of the total number of counties, have a population under 25,000 and hence less than the mean county population of 27,854. Schedule "A" attached to this opinion as an appendix provides a general picture of the population distribution among the Iowa counties as of various periods.

It is seen from Schedule "A" that 9 counties have a population in excess of 50,000. Such 9 counties have a combined population of 1,024,485, which is over 37% of the total state population. Their combined representation in the House consists of 18 members or one-sixth of the House membership. The 18 smallest counties also have 18 representatives collectively but their combined population is 179,861, or about 6½% of the state's population. The House is at least potentially controlled by the 55 smallest counties; 27.4% of Iowa's total population elect a majority of the representatives.

Schedule "A" also shows substantial disparities in representation within the one-representative and the two-representative county groups. The 6 counties falling between 40 and 50 thousand population have two or three (or more) times the population of the 58 counties with populations under 20 thousand. Yet all of them have just one representative. Similarly, the 9 populous counties having two representatives range from 53,663 to 266,315 population, the latter figure being about 5 times as great as the former.

With regard to the Senate, the Iowa Constitution, art. 3, § 34, as amended, provides:

"The Senate shall be composed of fifty members to be elected from the several senatorial districts, established by law and at the next session of the general assembly held following the taking of the state and national census, they shall be apportioned among the several counties or districts of the state, according to population as shown by the last preceding census, but no county shall be entitled to more than one (1) senator." (Emphasis added.)

The italicized clause was added by amendment in 1928.

In spite of the constitutional mandate to apportion "according to population," the limitation of one Senator per county works a substantial discrimination against the more populous counties.

The average or mean Senatorial district population is 55,151, or one-fiftieth of the total Iowa population. As seen in Schedule "A" again, there are 7 counties with populations substantially greater than 55,000, and they can have at most one representative each in the Senate. Five of these counties have from twice to 5 times the population of the average district.

The Senatorial districts established by the 59th General Assembly are set out in Iowa Code § 41.1, I.C.A. (1962). Each of the seven largest counties constitutes one district, so the disparities in representation are minimized in that regard. However, many of the other...

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    ...which most nearly approach the majority position are Moss v. Burkhart, 220 F.Supp. 149 (W.D.Oklahoma 1963) and possibly Davis v. Synhorst, 217 F. Supp. 492 (Iowa 1963).8 In Moss v. Burkhart, supra, the court was faced with a recalcitrant and rebellious Legislature which refused to comply wi......
  • Lucas v. General Assembly of State of Colorado
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    ...368; Baker v.Carr, D.C., 206 F.Supp. 341; Mann v. Davis, D.C., 213 F.Supp. 577; Toombs v. Fortson, D.C., 205 F.Supp. 248; Davis v. Synhorst, D.C., 217 F.Supp. 492; Nolan v. Rhodes, D.C., 218 F.Supp. 953; Moss v. Burkhart, D.C., 207 F.Supp. 885; Lisco v. Love, D.C., 219 F.Supp. 922; Wisconsi......
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