Davis v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512
| Citation | 335 F.Supp.3d 1230 |
| Decision Date | 15 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 18-2206-KHV,CIVIL ACTION No. 15-9160-KHV |
| Parties | Rubye L. DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 512 k/a Shawnee Mission School District, Defendant. Rubye L. Davis, Plaintiff, v. John McKinney, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Charles S. Scott, Jr., Charles S. Scott, Jr., Attorney at Law, Shawnee, KS, for Plaintiff.
Duane A. Martin, I.J. Drew Marriott, Edcounsel, LLC, Independence, MO, Kristen Michael O'Neal, Edcounsel, LLC, Springfield, MO, for Defendant.
Rubye L. Davis brings suit against Unified School District No. 512, known as Shawnee Mission School District (the "District"), John McKinney and Ginny Lyon. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff asserts that based on race, defendants reassigned her teaching position from Shawnee Mission East High School ("SME") to Shawnee Mission West High School ("SMW") in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The case is set for jury trial beginning September 4, 2018. This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Or, In The Alternative, Summary Judgment 1 (Doc. # 190) filed July 13, 2018 and Shawnee Mission School District's Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 134) filed October 31, 2017. For reasons stated below, the Court sustains both motions.
Plaintiff originally asserted claims against only the District. See Complaint (Doc. # 1) filed July 8, 2015 in Case No. 15-9160-KHV.2 On April 5, 2018, regarding the District's motion for summary judgment, the Court found that plaintiff had not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact whether under Section 1983, the District is liable for her claims. See Memorandum And Order (Doc. # 153) at 2-6. More specifically, the Court noted that plaintiff asserted that McKinney and/or Lyon had decided to reassign her to SMW, but she did not show that either of them acted as a final policy maker or that the District was otherwise liable for their decision. See id. The Court found that any complaint about discriminatory conduct by McKinney and/or Lyon belonged in a suit against them personally. See id. The Court noted that Magistrate Judge K. Gary Sebelius had entered an order which allowed plaintiff to amend the complaint to include claims against McKinney and Lyon but thereafter, for reasons not reflected in the record, plaintiff stipulated to dismiss the individual claims without prejudice. See id. at 6-7. The Court directed Magistrate Judge James P. O'Hara to revisit the stipulation and determine whether the Court should recall the stipulation and reinstate plaintiff's claims against McKinney and Lyon individually. See id. at 7-8.
On April 20, 2018, Judge O'Hara recommended that the Court enforce the parties' stipulation and not allow plaintiff leave to amend the final pretrial order to include individual claims against McKinney and Lyon. See Report And Recommendation (Doc. # 160) at 2. Judge O'Hara noted that it appeared that nothing precluded plaintiff from filing the individual claims in a separate lawsuit. See id. at 10-11. He recommended that if by April 26, 2018, plaintiff filed a new action asserting individual claims against McKinney and Lyon, the Court immediately consolidate the new action with the case against the District to promote efficient use of Court and party resources. See id. at 12-13.
On April 26, 2018, plaintiff filed a separate suit asserting individual claims against McKinney and Lyon. See Complaint (Doc. # 1) in Case No. 18-2206-KHV. On May 2, 2018, the Court adopted the magistrate judge report and recommendation and ordered that the two cases be consolidated, with all future filings to be made in the lead case bearing a consolidated case caption. See Memorandum And Order (Doc. # 163) at 5. The Court ordered that all discovery conducted in the lead case be available to the parties in the second case and not be duplicated. See id.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co., 479 F.3d 735, 740 (10th Cir. 2007). A factual dispute is "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A "genuine" factual dispute requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of a party's position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Nahno-Lopez v. Houser, 625 F.3d 1279, 1283 (10th Cir. 2010). Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that genuine issues remain for trial as to those dispositive matters for which the nonmoving party carries the burden of proof.
Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990) ; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). To carry this burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the pleadings but must instead set forth specific facts supported by competent evidence. Nahno-Lopez, 625 F.3d at 1283.
The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Deepwater Invs., Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). It may grant summary judgment if the nonmoving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely on ignorance of facts, speculation or suspicion, and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial. Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988) ; Olympic Club v. Those Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 991 F.2d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 1993). The heart of the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, McKinney and Lyon present an abbreviated statement of material facts. See Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Their Motion For Summary Judgment On The Pleadings Or, In The Alternative, Summary Judgment (Doc. # 190-1) filed July 13, 2018 at 1-4. To provide necessary context, the Court incorporates the factual record regarding the District's motion for summary judgment. See Appendix 1 to Memorandum And Order (Doc. # 153) at 12-21. In addition, the following facts are uncontroverted, deemed admitted or construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.3
SMW has a reputation of having more minority students than SME. Memorandum And Order (Doc. # 153) at 13. For the 2015-16 school year, SME enrollment was 87 per cent white, and 13 per cent black, Hispanic and other minority students. Id. For the same school year, SMW was 56 per cent white and 44 per cent black, Hispanic and other minority students. Id. Students refer to SMW as a "ghetto" school. Id. This is primarily based on lower-income apartment housing that is close to the school, students coming in from neighboring cities, single-parent households, and a higher ratio of low socioeconomic students and families. Id. SMW students have a reputation of being more disruptive and having more behavioral issues than students at SME. Id.
Until the spring of 2015, the District assigned plaintiff to teach Biology I and Human Anatomy/Physiology at SME.4
Plaintiff was the only Human Anatomy/Physiology teacher at SME. As part of the Human Anatomy/Physiology class, plaintiff instructed students in the dissection and examination of organs and internal parts of animal cadavers. Students regarded her Anatomy/Physiology class as a preparatory class for pursuing college education and careers in human health sciences. In addition, plaintiff generally taught two to three biology classes each year. Plaintiff's schedule fluctuated such that in one year she taught more anatomy/physiology classes and in another year she taught more biology classes.
In March of 2015, McKinney, principal of SME, and Lyon, director of certified professional staff for the District, reassigned plaintiff from SME to SMW for the 2015-16 school year. Memorandum And Order (Doc. # 153) at 16-17, 19. Upon reassignment to SMW, plaintiff was assigned to teach Basic Biology I and Introductory Freshman Biology—not the academically advanced and college preparatory course of Human Anatomy/Physiology that she had taught at SME.5 Memorandum And Order (Doc. # 153) at 19. As a result of the reassignment, plaintiff's credentials and stature would be diminished. Id. Also, plaintiff could no longer be involved with the Brain Bee program which she sponsored at SME.6 Id. In plaintiff's view, the reassignment was tantamount to reassigning a calculus teacher to teach basic math. Id.
On August 3, 2015, prior to performing any duties at SMW, plaintiff voluntarily resigned. Had plaintiff not resigned, she would have received the same salary and benefits that she did at SME.
Plaintiff did not want to transfer to SMW because she wanted to continue to teach Anatomy/Physiology as she had for the past eight years at SME. Davis Affidavit ¶ 4. In addition, due to documented disciplinary problems with students at SMW, plaintiff had a serious concern regarding whether ...
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