Davis v. United States

• Decision Date: 02 October 1900
• Docket Number: 810,811.
• Parties: DAVIS et al. v. UNITED STATES (two cases).
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

104 F. 136

DAVIS et al. v. UNITED STATES (two cases).

Nos. 810, 811.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

October 2, 1900

These cases are of a similar nature, and will be considered together. They involve the right to issue a warrant under the Revised Statutes of the United States (section 1014) for the purpose of removing appellants from the Southern district of Ohio to the Northern district of Texas for trial under certain indictments alleging violation of section 10, par. 3 of the act to regulate commerce (1 Supp.Rev.St.p. 687). The one case is an appeal from an order made in the district court of the United States for the Southern district of Ohio directing the removal of the appellants for trial to the Northern district of Texas. The other is a proceeding in habeas corpus, whereby the appellants sought to be discharged from custody under said order, which was refused. Appellants were indicted in the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Texas. The indictment contains two counts. The first charges, in substance, that the appellants under the name of the Ault Woodenware Company, of the city of Cincinnati, county of Hamilton, and state of Ohio, did, on or about March 15, 1899, deliver woodenware of the weight of 15,000 pounds, tin sifters of the weight of 750 pounds, also tin sieves of the weight of 124 pounds, for continuous carriage and shipment from Cincinnati to Dallas, Tex., by certain carriers, who did then and there carry and transport the said woodenware, tin sifters, and tin sieves from Cincinnati to Dallas, over the route formed by them, the carriers being subject to the said act; said goods were then and there delivered to the carriers, and the defendants then and there, by the false and fraudulent representation of same unto said carriers, and by then and there falsely reporting same as being 15,000 pounds of woodenware, whereas, in truth, they, at the time of delivery, well knew that the merchandise consisted of three kinds above mentioned; that the defendants, by means of such billing, false and fraudulent representations, and false reporting of the property as aforesaid, in violation of the act of congress and the several supplements and amendments thereof, obtained transportation for the same at less than the regular freight rates then duly established under the said act to regulate commerce, then legally in force, for said continuous carriage and shipment.

Judson Harmon and Phillip Roettinger, for appellants.

William E. Bundy, for the United States.

Before LURTON, DAY, and SEVERENS, Circuit Judges.

DAY Circuit Judge, after stating the foregoing facts, .

The question presented is, was such a charge and showing made of the commission of an offense against the laws of the United States in the Northern district of Texas as to warrant an order directing the appellants to be taken to that district for trial? The statute under cover of which the indictment is drawn reads as follows:

'Any person and any officer or agent of any corporation or company who shall deliver property for transportation to any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act, or for whom, as consignor or consignee, any such carrier shall transport property, who shall knowingly and willfully, by false billing, false classification, false weighing, false representation of the contents of the package, or false report of weight, or by any other device or means, whether with or without the consent or connivance of the carrier, its agent or agents, obtain transportation for such property at less than the regular rates then established and in force on the line of transportation, shall be deemed guilty of fraud, which is hereby declared to be a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction thereof in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction within the district in which such offense was committed, be subject for each offense to a fine not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.'

This act undertakes to define the crime, and provide for the punishment of certain persons who shall, by means of the fraudulent practices described in the act, obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates. The act defines certain classes of persons who are amenable to its provisions, and they are: (1) Any person, officer, or agent of any corporation or company who shall deliver property for transportation; (2) any person, officer, or agent of any corporation or company for whom, as consignor or consignee, any such carrier shall transport property. If either of these classes of persons shall knowingly and willfully, by false billing, etc., obtain transportation for such property at less than the regular rates, they shall be deemed guilty of fraud.

The acts charged against the appellants in both counts are misrepresentations by false billing and classification of the property described, delivered by them to the railroad company at Cincinnati for transportation from that city to the city of Dallas, Tex., by which means transportation between said cities was obtained at less than the regular established rates. It is apparent from the reading of the act that the object thereof is to prevent shippers from obtaining undue advantage by procuring transportation for their property over interstate lines at less than the regular rates which are charged others similarly engaged. The shipper is to be punished whether he acts with or without the consent or connivance of the carrier or its agents. The reading of the indictment, as well as the fact stated in the bill of exceptions, shows that the acts alleged to have been committed by appellants were all done and performed in the city of Cincinnati, in the Southern district of Ohio. The false representation of the character...