Davis v. Valley Distributing Co.

• Decision Date: 30 July 1975
• Docket Number: No. 73-2725,73-2725
• Citation: 522 F.2d 827
• Parties: 10 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1473, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,334 Joe E. DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VALLEY DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 827

522 F.2d 827

10 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1473,

10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,334

Joe E. DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VALLEY DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 73-2725.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

July 30, 1975.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 15, 1975.

George Logan, III, Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellant.

Charles E. Jones (argued), Phoenix, Ariz., for defendant-appellee.

Mary Helen Maunter (argued), E.E.O.C., Washington, D. C., for intervenor-appellant.

OPINION

Before BROWNING and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges, and MARKEY, ^* Judge of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.

BROWNING, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Davis brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ¹ charging that appellee had discharged him because of his religion. The district court entered summary judgment against appellant, apparently on the ground that the complaints he had filed with the Arizona Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had been filed too late.

Appellant was discharged October 31, 1971. He filed his complaint with the Arizona Civil Rights Commission 114 days later, on February 22, 1972. The Arizona Commission dismissed the complaint as barred by Arizona's 60-day statute of limitations. A.R.S. § 41-1481. ² Appellant filed his complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on March 14, 1972, 135 days after his dismissal. On March 29, EEOC referred appellant's complaint to the Arizona Commission. ³ Two days later, 152 days after appellant's discharge, the Arizona Commission returned the complaint to EEOC without further action. EEOC assumed jurisdiction, served notice of the charge upon appellee, and conducted an investigation. On December 12, 1972, EEOC found probable cause to believe appellant's charge was true, and on February 12, 1973, sent appellant notice of his right to sue.

Appellant filed this suit March 19, 1973. Appellee moved to dismiss on the ground that appellant had not filed with the Arizona Commission within 60 days of the alleged discriminatory conduct, as required by A.R.S. § 41-1481, and had not filed with EEOC within 90 days of that conduct as required by section 706(d) of the Civil Rights Act in cases where there has been no prior resort to state proceedings. ⁴ The district court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and, citing Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp., 470 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1972), granted it. ⁵

Clearly the Arizona limitation period was 60 days, and appellant did not meet it. There is a question, however, as to the applicable federal period. When appellant took his complaint to EEOC, the federal time limitations provided by section 706(d) required filing with EEOC within 90 days of the conduct complained of, except where the claimant had first submitted his charge to a state agency. In the latter case the aggrieved person could file with EEOC within 210 days after the discriminatory conduct or 30 days after termination of state proceedings, whichever was sooner. Section 4 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 extended these periods from 90 days to 180, and from 210 days to 300. ⁶ If this amendment applies to appellant, his filing with EEOC (135 days after his discharge) was safely within the shorter of the two federal statutory periods.

The 1972 Act became effective March 24, 1972. The prior 90-day limitation had run on appellant's complaint some 54 days earlier. It is the general rule that subsequent extensions of a statutory limitation period will not revive a claim previously barred. James v. Continental Insurance Co.,424 F.2d 1064, 1065-66 (3d Cir. 1970). But the question is one of legislative intent; ⁷ and though not free from doubt, we think it the more likely conclusion that Congress intended the extended limitations period to apply to all unlawful practices that occurred 180 days before the enactment of the 1972 Act, including those otherwise barred by the prior 90-day limitations period.

Section 14 of the 1972 Act provides:

The amendments made by this Act to section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be applicable with respect to charges pending with the Commission on the date of enactment of this Act and all charges filed thereafter. ⁸ Initially, both the House and Senate bills provided that the amendments to section 706 would Not apply to charges filed prior to the effective date of the amendments. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 10 (1972); S. 2515, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 13 (1972); U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, p. 2137. Section 14 was adopted primarily to make the new authority given EEOC to bring suit against alleged violators applicable to pending claims. EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1355 (6th Cir. 1975); Koger v. Ball, 497 F.2d 702, 708 (4th Cir. 1974). But Congress did not limit section 14 of the 1972 Act to the new remedy, although it would have been simple to do so. The language of section 14 is sweeping. It includes all amendments to section 706. Congress was, of course, aware of the other amendments to section 706 contained in the same bill. The provision extending the limitation periods was called to Congress' attention by committee reports and in floor debate. ⁹ In both the House and Senate, prior court decisions maximizing coverage within the given time limits were noted with approval, and the remedial purpose of extending the 90-day period to 180 days was emphasized. ¹⁰

The words of section 14 affirmatively suggest an intention to encompass discriminatory conduct that occurred before the Act was passed. "(C)harges pending with the Commission on the date of enactment of this Act" could only involve conduct occurring prior to that date. It might be contended that a charge filed with EEOC after the pre-amendment 90-day limitation had expired, as in this case, was not "pending" on the effective date of the Act. It is unnecessary to argue the point. Section 14 also makes the amendments applicable to "all charges filed thereafter." Since appellant's claim was not formally "filed" until EEOC assumed jurisdiction after the claim was returned by the Arizona Commission, ¹¹ it fell within the literal words of the statute.

There is no substantial reason for giving less than their full meaning to the words of section 14. Even as extended, the time limits under the statute are exceedingly short, particularly since, as Congress noted, most complainants are laymen representing themselves. ¹² The Equal Employment Opportunity Act is a remedial statute to be liberally construed in favor of victims of discrimination. EEOC v. Wah Chang Albany Corp., 499 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1974). Accordingly, "courts confronted with procedural ambiguities in the statutory framework have, with virtual unanimity resolved them in favor of the complaining party." Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc.,431 F.2d 455, 461 (5th Cir. 1970).

We conclude, therefore, that the applicable period for an initial filing with EEOC was 180 days rather than 90 days, and appellant's complaint was timely filed on the date when it was returned to EEOC's by the Arizona Commission and formally "filed." Appellee argues that failure to file within the state limitations period denies appellant the longer federal limitation period available to a complainant who properly invokes the state remedy. Since we have held that appellant has the benefit of the 1972 amendments, and since he filed within the 180-day period applicable where there is no prior resort to state proceedings, it is irrelevant whether the longer federal period was also available to him. That question we do not reach. Cf. Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975).

The remaining question is whether appellant's federal judicial remedy is barred because he failed to file his complaint with the Arizona Commission within the 60-day state limitation period. We conclude that it is not. If the state in which the unlawful practice occurred affords a remedy, prior resort to that remedy is a precondition to intervention by EEOC and suit in federal court. EEOC v. Wah Chang Albany Corp., supra, 499 F.2d at 189 n.3. If access to EEOC and the federal court were also conditioned upon invocation of the state remedy within a period of limitation shorter than that required for application to EEOC, the state and not the federal period of limitations would control the availability of the federal remedy. The complainant would be required to file his charge of discrimination, not within the period fixed by Congress, but within the period fixed by the state in which the unlawful practice occurred.

"If Congress explicitly puts a limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it created, there is an end of the matter. The Congressional statute of limitation is definitive." Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395, 66 S.Ct. 582, 584, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946). The shorter of the two federal limitation periods represents the judgment of Congress as to the proper balance between the time reasonably required by the employee to prepare and file a claim of discrimination, and protection of the employer from a stale claim. It is unlikely that Congress intended that its judgment with respect to the maximum period within which a claim of employment discrimination affecting interstate commerce might be made could be displaced by legislatures of the states.

" In so saying we are not passing upon the validity of any state limitation period as applied to claims of employment discrimination filed with it, but merely noting that the state limitation period cannot govern the efficacy of the federal remedy." Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co.,supra, 511 F.2d at 1232. Presumably the state has chosen its limitation period on the basis of what it considers proper for protection of the state right. But the state remedy may be significantly different in kind or scope from the federal remedies afforded by Title VII. The sole remedy offered by the...