Davis v. Westchester Cnty. Family Court
| Decision Date | 26 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 16-CV-9487 (KMK),16-CV-9487 (KMK) |
| Parties | JAMEEL DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. WESTCHESTER COUNTY FAMILY COURT; MAGISTRATE ROSA CABANILLAS, in her official capacity; MAGISTRATE ROSA CABANILLAS, in her individual capacity; WESTCHESTER COUNTY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Appearances:
Jameel Davis
New York, NY
Michael A. Berg, Esq.
Office of the Attorney General, New York State
Sean T. Carey, Esq.
Westchester County Attorney's Office
White Plains, NY
Plaintiff Jameel Davis, proceeding pro se, brought this Action against Defendants Westchester County Family Court, Magistrate Rosa Cabanillas (together, "State Defendants"), and Westchester County, challenging a judgment against him in state court ordering him to pay certain amounts of allegedly past-due child support payments. Before the Court are Defendants' Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (See Dkt. Nos. 24, 53.) For the reasons to follow, the Motions are granted.
The following facts are taken from the Complaint and are assumed true for purposes of the Motions.
On September 12, 2011, Plaintiff was deceived into signing an Acknowledgement of Paternity at Phelps Memorial Hospital in Sleepy Hollow, New York. (See Compl. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff believed that he was signing the birth certificate of a baby boy born to a woman with whom he had had a relationship, (see id. ¶ 26), but he learned several years later that the document was in fact an Acknowledgement of Paternity, (see id. ¶ 27). Plaintiff later also learned that the Acknowledgement of Paternity designated him as a non-custodial parent and obliged him to make payments and endure "regular billings, delinquency notices, liens on property, seizure and sale of property, garnishment of wages, federal imprisonment, [and] fines." (Id. ¶ 29.) In Plaintiff's view, the Acknowledgement of Paternity is "an adhesion document that violates the fabric and fiber of the United States Constitution, New York Bill of Rights, and freedom and liberty." (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff denies that he is a non-custodial parent or any other title that would oblige him to make child support payments. (See id. ¶ 33.)
On October 3, 2013, Plaintiff attended an expedited proceeding in Westchester County Family Court before Magistrate Christine Patneaude Krahulik. (See id. ¶ 34.)1 As a result of thathearing, Plaintiff entered into a voluntary stipulation requiring him to pay child support, plus 60 percent of unreimbursed healthcare and childcare expenses. .) Plaintiff alleges that he "did not understand the nature of the proceeding," (Compl. ¶ 37), and that Magistrate Krahulik was "attempting to coerce [him] into entering a contract," (id. ¶ 36). There is no indication or allegation that Magistrate Rosa Cabanillas Thompson, a Defendant named in this lawsuit, presided over or was otherwise involved in the October 3 proceeding.2
On April 19, 2016, Plaintiff attended an "expedited administrative hearing" in Westchester County Family Court presided over by Magistrate Thompson. (See id. ¶¶ 90-91.) At the hearing, Plaintiff was arrested by a court officer after being told by the officer multiple times to "shut up" and to not "say one more word," (id. ¶ 92), despite the fact that "Plaintiff was not offensive, aggressive[,] or unlawful in anyway [sic]," (id. ¶ 93). Plaintiff was charged with contempt of court, and the charge was subsequently dismissed after "five special appearance hearings." (Id. ¶¶ 94, 96.)
On June 16, 2016, at another proceeding in Westchester County Family Court, Magistrate Thompson entered a money judgment against Plaintiff in the amount of $5,848 in past due child support payments, as well as $25 in costs. (See Berg Decl. Ex. C; see also Compl. ¶ 112.) The money judgment resulted in the filing of a lien against Plaintiff in the Westchester County Clerk's Office. (See Compl. ¶ 122.) On October 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed what he calls a "certified demand for proof of jurisdiction," but has never received any such proof. (See id.)
Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff refers to the "title IV-D" or the "IV-D" program. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 74, 85.) To the best of the Court's and Defendants' understanding, Plaintiff is referencing Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, which authorizes federal appropriations "for the purpose of enforcing the support obligations owed by noncustodial parents to their children." 42 U.S.C. § 651. In New York, the Department of Social Services is "designated as the single state agency to supervise the administration of the state's child support program," N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 111-a(1), and is authorized "to distribute to local districts the full amount of federal incentive payments received under title IV-D of the federal social security act," id. § 111-f.
Plaintiff seeks damages for what he alleges were various violations of his constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff brings the following claims: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation of his constitutional rights; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim for conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim for neglect or failure to prevent violation of his constitutional rights; (4) undue influence; (5) civil conspiracy; (6) abuse of process; (7) breach of fiduciary duty; (8) constructive fraud; (9) fraud in the inducement; (10) duress; (11) infliction of emotional distress; and (12) "Promissory Note—House Joint Resolution 192-Promissory Note Dishonor." (See Compl. ¶¶ 123-64.) Under each of the first 11 counts, Plaintiff provides only the following details:
(See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 124-25.)
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on December 8, 2016 in Manhattan, naming as Defendants Westchester County Family Court, Westchester County Child Support Enforcement, and Magistrate Rosa Cabanillas. (See Dkt. No. 1.) The Action was thereafter transferred to the White Plains Division of the Southern District of New York. (See Dkt. No. 2.) On January 10, 2017, State Defendants filed a letter seeking leave to file a Motion To Dismiss. (See Dkt. No. 13.) During this time, Plaintiff filed a number of requests for miscellaneous relief. (See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 9, 12, 14-16, 21.) On January 12, 2017, the Court entered a briefing schedule for State Defendants' Motion. (See Dkt. No. 18.) On February 6, 2017, the Court issued an Order denying Plaintiff's various requests for relief and directing the Clerk of Court to substitute Westchester County in place of Westchester County Child Support Enforcement. (See Dkt. No. 22.)
On February 8, 2017, State Defendants filed their Motion To Dismiss and accompanying papers. (See Dkt. Nos. 24-26.) Plaintiff filed his opposition on February 24, 2017, (see Dkt. No. 33), and State Defendants replied on March 2, 2017, (see Dkt. No. 37). Plaintiff continued to file miscellaneous motions, (see Dkt Nos. 28, 31, 34-36, 40), which were again denied, (see Dkt. No. 43). On June 2, 2017, service of the summons and Complaint was effected on Westchester County. (See Dkt. No. 50.) Westchester County filed a letter shortly thereafter asking for leave to file its own Motion To Dismiss. (See Dkt. No. 48.) The Court granted that application and set a briefing schedule. (See Dkt. No. 49.)
On June 29, 2017, Westchester County filed its Motion To Dismiss and accompanying papers. (See Dkt. Nos. 53-56.) Plaintiff opposed the Motion on July 12, 2017, (see Dkt. No. 58), and Westchester County filed its reply papers on July 21, 2017, (see Dkt. No. 59).
"The standards of review for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim are substantively identical." Gonzalez v. Option One Mortg. Corp., No. 12-CV-1470, 2014 WL 2475893, at *2 (D. Conn. June 3, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Neroni v. Coccoma, No. 13-CV-1340, 2014 WL 2532482, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 5, 2014) (same), aff'd, 591 F. App'x 28 (2d Cir. 2015). "In deciding both types of motions, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Gonzalez, 2014 WL 2475893, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Seemann v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 11-CV-206, 2012 WL 1999847, at *1 (D. Vt. June 4, 2012) (same). However, "[o]n a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, . . . the party who invokes the Court's jurisdiction bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that subject matter jurisdiction exists, whereas the movant bears the burden of proof on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Gonzalez, 2014 WL 2475893, at *2; see also Sobel v. Prudenti, 25 F. Supp. 3d 340, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) . This allocation of the burden of proof is "[t]he only substantive difference"...
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