Davis v. Williams

• Decision Date: 29 June 1901
• Citation: 30 So. 488,130 Ala. 530
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: DAVIS ET AL. v. WILLIAMS ET AL.

30 So. 488

130 Ala. 530

DAVIS ET AL. v. WILLIAMS ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 29, 1901

Appeal from chancery court, Macon county; W. L. Parks, Chancellor.

Bill by J. L. Williams and George E. Salter against Mary C. Davis and Hubert T. Davis. Decree for complainants, and defendants appeal. Reversed.

Sharpe and Dowdell, JJ., dissenting.

The bill was filed to compel the specific performance of a contract which was made by R. T. Davis and Mary C. Davis with the Georgia & Alabama Construction Company, by which contract R. T. Davis and Mary C. Davis, his wife, agreed, upon certain conditions, to convey to the Georgia & Alabama Construction Company one-half interest in 40 acres of land in Macon county. The conditions of this contract, as stated in the opinion, were fulfilled, and the contract was assigned by the Georgia & Alabama Construction Company to the complainants. After the execution of the contract R. T. Davis died, and the title to the lands vested in his wife, Mary C. Davis, and Hubert T. Davis and Fort Davis, his children, who survived him. Mary C. Davis purchased the interest of Fort Davis, and at the time of the filing of the present bill she and Hubert T. Davis owned the lands as tenants in common. The other facts of the case necessary to an understanding of the decision on the present appeal are sufficiently stated in the opinion. On the submission of the cause on the pleadings and proof the chancellor rendered a decree granting the relief prayed for, and directed the defendants to execute and deliver to the complainants a deed to a one-half interest in the lands in dispute.

S. B Paine, H. T. Davis, and W. W. Pearson, for appellants.

Watts Troy & Caffey, for appellees.

TYSON J.

The bill in this case was filed by complainants, as owners of a certain contract by assignment, against the respondents, as successors in interest and title to the lands agreed to be conveyed, and seeks a specific performance of that contract. The contract was executed by R. T. Davis and Mary C. Davis his wife, in which they agreed to convey by warranty deed a half interest in 40 acres of land, to be selected by the complainants' assignors, in a certain section owned by R T. Davis. The consideration of this contract was that the complainants' assignors were to build the Savannah, Americus & Montgomery Railroad within one-half mile of the residence of the Davises, and to erect a depot within the same distance from their residence, at any point along the line of the road most suitable to themselves. The deed was to be executed as soon as the road was built, the depot established, and a train made a trip to Montgomery. The land agreed to be conveyed upon compliance with the conditions of the contract, and selected, was a part of a tract of land owned by him, comprising about 800 acres. R. T. Davis died shortly after entering into the contract, and after the selection of the land was made by complainants' assignors under it. He left surviving him his wife and two sons. His wife, who is one of the respondents, was at the date of the filing of the bill the owner of a two-thirds undivided interest in the entire tract; and Hubert T. Davis, a son, the other respondent, was the owner of the remainder. The evidence shows without dispute that the road was built, the depot established, a train ran through to Montgomery, and the land selected during the year 1891. In other words, complainants' assignors had performed their obligation under the contract, and were entitled to a deed from the respondents during the year 1891. On April 20, 1896, the complainants by purchase became the owners of this contract, and by virtue of that ownership were entitled to a deed from the respondents.

One of the defenses invoked by the answer of the respondents is that complainant Williams for a period of about two years before the filing of this bill, at the date of its filing, and for one year subsequent thereto, tenanted and dwelt on a part of the lands in controversy. It appears from the evidence that Williams in 1892 built a house for the respondents upon the land in controversy, which he occupied while "looking after the business" for them, until December, 1896, from which last-named date he paid rent for this house at the rate of five dollars per month for one year, and four dollars per month for eight months, ceasing to pay rent in August, 1898. The bill was filed on the 11th of February, 1897. It will be noted that when this bill was filed, and after the complainant Williams had become the owner of the contract, and after he became entitled to a deed to the lands from the respondents, he rented a part of the lands, and became the tenant of one of the respondents. His occupancy of the house which is situated upon the lands in controversy, for looking after the business of the respondents, prior to December 2, 1896, when he commenced to pay rent therefor, did not create the relation of landlord and tenant. That relation was simply that of employer and employé or master and servant, and the occupancy of the house was a part merely of the contract for service, and operated as a portion of the consideration of that agreement. People v. Annis, 45 Barb. 304; Wilber v. Sisson, 53 Barb. 258; Haywood v. Miller, 3 Hill, 90; Kerrains v. People, 60 N.Y. 221, 19 Am. Rep. 158; Doyle v. Gibbs, 6 Lans. 180; Bowman v. Bradley, 151 Pa. 351, 24 A. 1062, 17 L. R. A. 213; McQuade v. Emmons, 38 N. J. Law, 397; School Dist. v. Batsche, 106 Mich. 330, 64 N.W. 196, 29 L. R. A. 576; East Norway Lake Church v. Froislie, 37 Minn. 447, 35 N.W. 260; White v. Bayley, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 227.

The relation of landlord and tenant arose in December, 1896 which, as we have shown, was after Williams became entitled to a deed from the respondents to the land. We have the question presented as to whether Williams, being the tenant of one of the respondents at the time of the filing of the bill, and being the owner of the contract at the time he entered into that relation, can maintain the bill to require a specific performance of that contract. There is not an intimation that there was any understanding or agreement that his rental contract was subject to his right to have the contract of purchase of which he was part owner enforced, or that his landlord ever at any time in any way recognized his rights under that contract, or obligation under it to make a deed to him. It is a principle universally recognized and enforced by courts of law that a tenant is estopped to dispute the title of his landlord, unless his landlord's title has expired or been extinguished, either by operation of law or his own act, after the creation of the tenancy. It is only when there is a change in the condition of the landlord's title for the worse after the tenant enters into his contract, in the absence of fraud or mistake of fact, that he is permitted to show the change in the condition of the title. Under no circumstances, when there is no fraud or mistake of fact, will it be permitted to deny the title of the landlord at the beginning of his term. This doctrine has been enforced by this court from its earliest history. Randolph v. Carlton, 8 Ala. 606; Pope v. Harkins, 16 Ala. 321; Rogers v. Boynton, 57 Ala. 501; Farris v. Houston, 74 Ala. 162; Robinson v. Holt, 90 Ala. 115, 7 So. 441; Barlow v. Dahm, 97 Ala. 415, 12 So. 293, 38 Am. St. Rep. 192; Pugh v. Davis, 103 Ala. 316, 18 So. 8, 49 Am. St. Rep. 30. In 2 McAdam, Landl. & T. p. 1341 et seq., this doctrine is stated in this language: "For reasons of public policy a tenant is never allowed to dispute his landlord's title after having accepted possession under him. This rule is elementary. The estoppel extends equally to landlord and tenant, so that, while the tenant is estopped from denying the landlord's title, the landlord cannot allege that he had no title at the time of the demise. Where a tenant enters into possession under a lease, he is estopped from denying the title of his landlord. The tenant must surrender the possession to the landlord before he can assail or question the title under which he entered. *** 'He can no more show that the premises belonged to the state than he can that they belonged to himself. He must first restore the possession which he obtained from his landlord, and then, as plaintiff, he may avail himself of any title which he has been or may be able to acquire.' 'The foundation of the estoppel is the fact of the one obtaining possession and enjoying possession by the permission of the other. And so long as one has this enjoyment he is prevented by this rule of law from turning round and saying his landlord has no right or title to keep him in possession.' *** No dispute as to the title will be tolerated until the parties are placed in their original position. *** Nor can he be heard to deny the title of his landlord, nor can he rid himself of...