Davis v. Wood, 80-272-M

• Decision Date: 27 March 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-272-M,80-272-M
• Citation: 427 A.2d 332
• Parties: 11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,643 William M. DAVIS, d. b. a. G.S.R. Landfill v. W. Edward WOOD, Director of Department of Environment Management. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 332

427 A.2d 332

11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,643

William M. DAVIS, d. b. a. G.S.R. Landfill v. W. Edward WOOD, Director of Department of Environment Management.

No. 80-272-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 27, 1981.

Leonard A. Kiernan, Jr., Thomas C. Plunkett, Providence, for plaintiff-respondent.

Sean O. Coffey, Chief Legal Counsel, Dept. of Environmental Management, Providence, for defendant-petitioner.

Daniel J. Schatz, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for Atty. Gen., as amicus curiae.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This is a statutory petition for certiorari which we issued pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), to wit, G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) § 42-35-16, at the behest of the Director of the Department of Environmental Management (DEM). He seeks a review of a judgment entered in the Superior Court in which the trial justice ruled (1) that the provision of G.L.1956 (1979 Reenactment) § 23-18.9-8 which authorized the director's licensing of solid-waste-management facilities is unconstitutional because the statute represents an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and (2) that the administrative hearing conducted within the DEM did not measure up to the fairness requirements of due process.

The record certified to us indicates that in the fall of 1977, respondent, William M. Davis (Davis), operated a licensed solid-waste-management facility in the Glocester-Smithfield area of the state. On September 22, 1977, he applied for a renewal of his license. In the meantime, DEM personnel were conducting periodic inspections of Davis's facility to determine his compliance with DEM rules and regulations. These inspections revealed violations of departmental rules.

Davis was first notified of these violations on November 4, 1977. The notice informed Davis that his license, due to expire on December 8, 1977, would not be renewed until the matters amounting to violations were remedied. Later, on January 9, 1978, he was informed of further violations. During this period he took no steps to avail himself of an opportunity to request a hearing so that he could show cause why the violation orders should not remain in effect.

On January 19, 1978, DEM denied Davis's application for a renewal of his license. At that time Davis availed himself of the opportunity to request a hearing on these matters. At the hearing, testimony of DEM personnel indicated that their inspections revealed violations of departmental rules concerning the covering and separation of refuse and equipment required to be present at such a facility. On December 18, 1978, DEM affirmed the denial of Davis's application for renewal, and he was ordered to submit within three weeks complete plans for a systematic termination of the facility's operation. He then turned to the Superior Court, seeking judicial review in that tribunal by way of the APA, to wit, G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) § 42-35-15.

We shall first consider the delegation question and then go on to discuss the due-process issue.

In order to appraise the constitutionality of the DEM licensing statute, G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) § 23-18.9-8, we must first give a brief review of Rhode Island legislative efforts in the regulation of the disposal of solid waste. The General Assembly at its January 1968 session made its original attempt to deal with the problem of refuse disposal with the passage of P.L.1968, ch. 192. This legislation gave the Department of Health (DOH) the authority to regulate "refuse disposal facilities." The act also added chapter 46 to title 23. This chapter, entitled "Refuse Disposal," made it clear that each municipality had the responsibility of disposing of refuse generated within the municipality, but it also recognized that in some instances a regional approach should be made to the issue. The Legislature expressed a concern that the disposal of "specialized waste" might present a threat to the public health which, in turn, would require the assistance of the DOH; and the DOH was authorized in such instances to "request that the (G) overnor recommend appropriate action to the (G)eneral (A)ssembly."

However, as we observed in Town of Glocester v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., R.I., 390 A.2d 348, 349 (1978), many cities and towns, having been assigned by the state responsibility for the safe and sanitary disposal of refuse generated within their respective communities, were hard pressed to provide adequate service at reasonable cost, and others, as a result of inefficient practices and poor management techniques, were confronted with pollution problems, environmental deterioration, and the unnecessary waste of land and other valuable resources. In response to these developments, the Legislature in 1974 with the enactment of P.L.1974, ch. 176, substantially amended the 1968 legislation and simultaneously enacted chapter 46.1 of title 23, the Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corporation Act (the waste-management act).

The waste-management act, with its accompanying legislative findings and policy declaration, recognized that the collection, disposal, and utilization of solid-waste matter were matters of general concern to the citizens of this state and their welfare; that the problems associated therewith were statewide in scope; that appropriate governmental processes and support were required so that an effective and integrated statewide network of solid-waste-management facilities might be planned, financed, developed, and operated in an environmentally sound manner for the benefit of the people in the municipalities of the state; and that private industry should be encouraged to continue to play a key role in the state's solid-waste-management program.

In amending the 1968 legislation, the Legislature specified that no person could operate a solid-waste-management facility unless a license therefor had been obtained from DOH's director, who was given "full power to make all rules and regulations establishing standards" that must be complied with before any license could issue. General Laws 1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 23-46-8.

After a lapse of three years, the Legislature, at its January 1977 session, again manifested concern about environmental affairs when it gave favorable consideration to an act that enlarged and reorganized the Department of Natural Resources and changed its name to the Department of Environmental Management. Public Laws 1977, ch. 182. Among the powers and duties transferred to the new department and its director were those formerly exercised by the DOH and its director pursuant to chapter 46 of title 23. Section 42-17.1-2(e) (1980 Cum.Supp.).

When the trial justice was considering the director's licensing and rule-making power, he focused his attention on G.L.1956 (1979 Reenactment) § 23-18.9-8, which, because of the assignment of statutes necessitated by the reenactment in 1979 ¹ of titles 22 through 28 of the General Laws, replaced § 23-46-8, which had originally authorized the licensure of solid-waste-management facilities by the director of health. The trial justice, after noting that § 23-18.9-8 was identical to the former § 23-46-8, went on to say that the power bestowed on the director by this proviso was "broad and sweeping." He also remarked that the General Assembly "had failed to provide any standard" that would prescribe the director's licensing and rule-making power. Unfortunately for the trial justice, the standards that he found absent were present. They were present when the General Assembly first gave the licensing and rule-making power to the director of health in 1974; and, as will be seen, they were transferred to the DEM's director in 1977.

The nondelegation doctrine in Rhode Island stems from the Rhode Island Constitution, art. IV, §§ 1 and 2, which provide that the Rhode Island Constitution shall be the supreme law of the state and that the legislative power thereunder shall be vested in the two houses of the Legislature. The purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is to protect the citizens against arbitrary and discriminatory action by public officials. As a practical matter, the doctrine has not prohibited the delegation of legislative power. Since we recognize the need of a legislative body to employ an administrative agent to effectuate the beneficial purposes of legislation, the delegation will be upheld if the statute declares a legislative purpose, establishes a primary standard for carrying out the use, or lays out an intelligent principle to which an administrative officer or body must conform. As long as the Legislature that creates the agency demonstrates standards or principles to confine and guide the agency's power, this court will sustain the delegation. See First Republic Corp. of America v. Norberg, 116 R.I. 414, 358 A.2d 38 (1976); J. M. Mills, Inc. v. Murphy, 116 R.I. 54, 352 A.2d 661 (1976).

In determining whether a statute contains sufficient standards, we must read the act as a whole; the provision in question should not be isolated, but must be construed with reference to the entire act. United States v. Gordon, 580 F.2d 827, 839 (5th Cir. 1978); Sheeran v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 80 N.J. 548, 558, 404 A.2d 625, 630 (1979); see Narragansett Electric Co. v. Harsch, 117 R.I. 395, 402, 368 A.2d 1194, 1199 (1977).

The...