Davis v. Zhongding USA Hannibal, Inc.
| Decision Date | 09 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:13 CV 87 DDN,2:13 CV 87 DDN |
| Parties | SHARON D. DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. ZHONGDING USA HANNIBAL, INC., INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This action is before the court on the motion of defendant Zhongding USA Hannibal, Inc., to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. (Doc. 6.) The parties have consented to the exercise of plenary authority by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 9.) The court heard oral argument on November 19, 2013.
On February 21, 2013, plaintiff Sharon D. Davis brought suit against defendant Buckhorn Rubber Products, Inc. in the Circuit Court of Marion County. (Doc. 8.) On April 12, 2013, defendant Buckhorn removed the action to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), invoking diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. On July 18, 2013, this court remanded the action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Davis v. Buckhorn Rubber Products, Inc., 2013 WL 3779116 (E.D. Mo. 2013).
On September 6, 2013, the Circuit Court of Marion County granted plaintiff's motion to substitute Zhongding USA Hannibal, Inc. (Zhongding), for Buckhorn Rubber Products, Inc., as defendant; Zhongding advises that it does business under the name Buckhorn Rubber Products, Inc. (Doc. 1, n. 1.) On October 7, 2013, defendant Zhongding removed the action to this court, invoking diversity of citizenship subject matter jurisdiction. (Id.)
Plaintiff's complaint alleges the following. From October 30, 1978 to May 4, 2012, defendant Zhongding1 employed plaintiff as a trimmer and packer. (Doc. 8 at ¶ 9.) On October 27, 2010, plaintiff filed a worker's compensation claim for an injury that occurred during the course of her employment in June 2010. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.) After plaintiff filed the claim, defendant continuously harassed plaintiff by imposing on her duties that it did not impose on other employees. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Defendant questioned other employees about plaintiff's work. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff's former counsel discussed the harassment with defendant. (Id. at ¶ 14.)
On Saturday, April 28, 2012, plaintiff informed her employer that she would miss work that day due to illness. (Id. at ¶ 15.) On Monday, April 30, 2012, plaintiff returned to work. (Id. at ¶ 16.) On May 4, 2012, defendant terminated her for the stated reason she failed to present medical documentation for the illness that caused her to miss work on April 28. (Id. at ¶ 17.) In her prior 33 years of employment with defendant, defendant had not previously required medical documentation for missing one day of work. (Id. at ¶ 18.)
Prior to her termination, plaintiff nearly qualified for retirement and pension benefits. (Id. at ¶ 23.) After her termination, plaintiff filed for unemployment benefits. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Although she qualified for such benefits, defendant denied them for the stated reason of misconduct. (Id. at ¶ 21.)
In Count I, plaintiff alleges defendant intentionally terminated her employment and denied her unemployment benefits in retaliation for her filing a workers' compensation claim. Plaintiff alleges "as a result of Defendant's retaliatory conduct, [she] has been unlawfully deprived of the opportunity to return to work, and has been subjected to emotional distress and mental anguish." (Id. at ¶ 27.) Plaintiff alleges defendant violated Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.055, the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA).
In Count II plaintiff alleges that by its actions defendant intentionally inflicted significant and severe emotional distress on her, that defendant knew or should have known that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing distress, that defendant terminated plaintiff without cause and for pretextual reasons during the pendency of her workers' compensation claim. (Id. at ¶¶ 29-34.)
Plaintiff seeks equitable relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs.
Defendant moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6)for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Defendant argues that the MHRA provides no relief for plaintiff's retaliation claim as alleged, that plaintiff fails to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress due to failure to allege outrageous conduct or medically diagnosable physical harm, and that the Missouri worker's compensation statute provides the exclusive remedy for plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. (Doc. 7.)
Plaintiff argues in her memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss that she adequately states a claim for workers compensation retaliation under the Workers' Compensation Law, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.780. She also argues that defendant acted outrageously, that she suffered physical injury, and that she could not obtain medical documentation due to lack of insurance. Defendant replies that plaintiff fails to plead an exclusive causal relationship between her injury and the filing of the workers compensation complaint. (Docs. 15, 16.)
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Carton v. General Motor Acceptance Corp., 611 F.3d 451, 454 (8th Cir 2010); Young v. City of St. Charles, 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). To meet the plausibility standard, the complaint must contain "more than labels and conclusions." Id. at 555. Rather, the complaint must contain "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
Defendant moves to dismiss, arguing, as stated, that: (1) the MHRA does not cover plaintiff's retaliation claim as alleged; (2) the Missouri's worker's compensation statute provides the exclusive remedy for plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; and (3) plaintiff failed to state a claim for intentional infliction by failing to allege outrageous conduct and physical harm.
Defendant argues that the MHRA does not cover plaintiff's Count I retaliation claim as alleged. Specifically, plaintiff alleges retaliation against defendant, specifically invoking the MHRA. She contends that her claims for worker's compensation and unemployment benefits motivated her termination. The Missouri Human Rights Act states in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . to retaliate or discriminate in any manner against any other person because such person has opposed any practice prohibited by this chapter or because such person has filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing conducted pursuant to this chapter.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.070(2). The MHRA prohibits discrimination in areas including housing practices, commercial real estate loans, real estate sales and rentals, and public accommodation. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010 et seq.; Keeney v. Hereford Concrete Products, Inc., 911 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Mo. 1995). Additionally, the MHRA prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age or disability of any individual." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.070. Moreover, the MHRA authorizes several proceedings to facilitate the enforcement and administration of the Act. See e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.075 (); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.077 (). Significantly, the MHRA does not govern claims for worker's compensation or unemployment benefits.
Plaintiff argues that the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.780, allows actions for retaliation for filing worker compensation claims. The court agrees. See Buehrle v. City of O'Fallon, Mo., 695 F.3d 807, 813 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo. 1998)). However, plaintiff has not pled her retaliation claim under theMissouri Workers' Compensation Act, but incorrectly under the Missouri Human Rights Act.
Plaintiff does not allege that defendant retaliated against her because she opposed any practice prohibited by the MHRA or because she participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing conducted under the MHRA. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a retaliation claim under the Missouri Human Rights Act upon which relief can be granted.
Because plaintiff has argued that she in entitled to relief under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act, the court dismisses the Count I claim of retaliation without prejudice to plaintiff amending her complaint to seek relief under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act.
Defendant argues that Missouri's worker's compensation statute provides the exclusive remedy for plaintiff's Count II intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. "Workers' compensation laws are the exclusive remedy for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment." Palermo v. Tension Envelope Corp., 959 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.120). Further, the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relationship Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo. 1991). However, if an employee alleges that emotional distress resulted from termination, the injury does not arise during the course of employment, and, therefore, the exclusivity provisions of the worker's compensation statute do not...
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