Davison v. Industrial Acc. Commission

• Decision Date: 21 March 1966
• Citation: 50 Cal.Rptr. 76,241 Cal.App.2d 15
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Winifred D. DAVISON, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents. Civ. 29703.

Page 76

50 Cal.Rptr. 76

241 Cal.App.2d 15

Winifred D. DAVISON, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents.

Civ. 29703.

District Court of Appeal, Second District Division 2, California.

March 21, 1966.

Byhower, Longley & Vaughan by Richard W. Petherbridge, Santa Ana, for petitioner.

Everett A. Corten, San Francisco, Edward A. Sarkisian, Los Angeles, for respondent Industrial Accident Commission.

Weingand, Kendig & Stockwell, by Rex Thomas, Jr., Los Angeles, for respondent Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.

FLEMING, Justice.

The issue is one of statutory construction of the penalty provision for delay in the payment of workmen's compensation. (Labor Code, § 5814.) Petitioner seeks to annul an order of the commission denying her request for the imposition of a second penalty.

In 1962 petitioner sustained injuries in the course of her employment and was awarded temporary disability benefits, medical treatment, and medical-legal costs.

In June 1964 she was awarded continuing temporary disability benefits of $41.32 per week, further medical treatment, reimbursement for self-procured medical treatment, and additional medical-legal costs.

In October 1964 petitioner secured the imposition of a 10-per-cent penalty for unreasonable delay in the furnishing of medical treatment, an award which increased her weekly disability benefits by $4.13 to $45.45.

In April 1965 petitioner requested a second 10-per-cent penalty for further unreasonably delay in furnishing the medical treatment ordered in June 1964, and sought to have her temporary disability benefits increased by $4.55 to $50 weekly ($45.45 plus $4.55). The commission determined that under the statute only one 10-per-cent penalty for delinquency could be imposed, even if further unreasonable delay followed the imposition of a prior penalty. It suggested that petitioner's remedy for the employer's unreasonable delay in providing medical treatment was to procure it herself and seek reimbursement from her employer. We granted review.

Labor Code, section 5814, reads: 'When payment of compensation has been unreasonably delayed or refused, either prior to or subsequent to the issuance of an award, the full amount of the order, decision or award shall be increased by 10 percent. The question of delay and the reasonableness of the cause therefor shall be determined by the appeals board (formerly 'commission') in accordance with the facts. Such delay or refusal shall constitute good cause under Section 5803 to rescind, alter or amend the order, decision or award for the purpose of making the increase provided for herein.'

The sole question before us is whether the statute authorizes more than one 10-per-cent penalty in a single proceeding. Petitioner argues the statute is remedial and should be liberally construed, that its language does not restrict it to a single penalty, and that the statute requires multiple penalties in order to carry out the purposes of the act. Respondents argue the statute contains no specific language authorizing successive penalties, that it is penal in nature and should be strictly construed, and that a principle of strict construction rejects any imposition of penalties by implication.

First, do the words of the statute require any construction at all? If the words are clear and unambiguous it is our duty to follow the plain language of the statute and there is no necessity for any construction. (Code Civ.Proc. §§ 1858, 1859.) A literal reading of the statute gives an inconclusive answer to the question of successive penalties. The text of the statute simply states that When there has been unreasonable delay or refusal in the payment of compensation the full amount of the award shall be increased by 10 per cent. The word When in the statute refers to a condition which may occur any time after the obligation to make payments has accrued, but there is no indication whether or not the condition may occur more than once and thus give rise to successive penalties.

Respondents argue we should be guided by the principle of interpretation which requires a strict...