Davison v. State

• Decision Date: 25 June 2020
• Docket Number: NO. 96766-1,96766-1
• Citation: 466 P.3d 231
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Colleen DAVISON, legal guardian for K.B., a minor, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, and Gary Murrell, Respondents, v. STATE of Washington and Washington State Office of Public Defense, Petitioners.

466 P.3d 231

Colleen DAVISON, legal guardian for K.B., a minor, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, and Gary Murrell, Respondents,

v.STATE of Washington and Washington State Office of Public Defense, Petitioners.

NO. 96766-1

Supreme Court of Washington.

Filed June 25, 2020

Jeffrey Todd Even, Office of the Attorney General, Solicitor General Division Attorney General, Attorney at Law, Po Box 40100, 1125 Washington St. Se, Olympia, WA, 98504-0100, Eric Andrew Mentzer, Office of the Attorney General, 7141 Cleanwater Dr. Sw, Tumwater, WA, 98501-6503, for Petitioners.

Mathew Lane Harrington, Theresa Hsin-Yi Wang, Lance Alan Pelletier, Stokes Lawrence PS, 1420 5th Ave. Ste. 3000, Seattle, WA, 98101-2393, Nancy Lynn Talner, Breanne Schuster, Jaime Michelle Hawk, ACLU-WA, John Ballif Midgley, ACLU of Washington Foundation, Po Box 2728, Seattle, WA, 98111-2728, for Respondents.

Marsha L. Levick, Jessica Feierman, Juvenile Law Center, 1315 Walnut Street Suite 400, 4th Floor, Philadelphia, PA, 19107, Kimberly Noel Gordon, Law Offices of Gordon & Saunders PLLC, 1000 2nd Ave., Suite 3140, Seattle, WA, 98104, for Amici Curiae on behalf of Juvenile Law Center, National Legal Aid and Defender Association.

Neil Martin Fox, Law Office of Neil Fox, PLLC, 2125 Western Ave. Ste. 330, Seattle, WA, 98121-3573, Roy L. Austin, Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis, 1919 M Street Nw, Suite 800, Mary Ann Scali, NJDC, 1350 Connecticut Avenue Nw, Suite 304, Washington, DC, 20036, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of National Juvenile Defender Center.

Paul J. Lawrence, Sarah Stewart Washburn, Pacifica Law Group LLP, 1191 2nd Ave. Ste. 2000, Seattle, WA, 98101-3404, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State Association of Counties.

STEPHENS, C.J.

¶1 This class action cuts to the heart of Washington's system of indigent criminal defense. The plaintiff class sued the State of Washington and the Office of Public Defense (OPD), alleging ongoing violations of the right to counsel in Grays Harbor County Juvenile Court. They premise state liability not only on alleged systemic, structural deficiencies in the state system, which currently offers indigent public defense services at the local level, but also on the State and OPD's alleged knowledge of Grays Harbor County's specific failures to safeguard the constitutional right to counsel.

¶2 Our legislature has delegated the duty to enforce the right to counsel to local governments—counties and cities. See generally ch. 10.101 RCW. While the State bears responsibility to enact a statutory scheme under which local governments can adequately fund and administer a system of indigent public defense, it is not directly answerable for aggregated claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Rather, to prevail on their claims against the State, the plaintiff class must show that the current statutory scheme systemically fails to provide local governments, across Washington, with the authority and means necessary to furnish constitutionally adequate indigent public defense services. Given that standard, we reject the plaintiffs’ claims premised on the State and OPD's alleged knowledge or awareness of Grays Harbor County's failure to provide adequate public defense services. Such an allegation cannot support state liability even if we could fairly impute knowledge or awareness of a particular county's failings to the State. That said, the plaintiffs’ claims alleging systemic, structural deficiencies in the state system of public defense remain viable. We therefore affirm the superior court's denial of the State's motion for summary judgment in part on other grounds and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

¶3 The plaintiff class sued the State and OPD under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, ch. 7.24 RCW, alleging ongoing, systemic violations of the right to counsel taking place in Grays Harbor County Juvenile Court.

¶4 The superior court certified a class composed of:

"All indigent persons who have or will have juvenile offender cases pending in pretrial status in Grays Harbor County Juvenile Court since April 3, 2017, and who have the constitutional right to appointment of counsel."

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 557-58.

¶5 The plaintiffs’ complaint details several alleged cases of ineffective assistance of counsel, including severe failings on part of the public defender(s) Grays Harbor County contracted with to provide juvenile public defense services. "For example, a 15-year-old was kept incarcerated while serving a sentence for probation violations that was four times the length allowed by statute, and an 11-year-old child has spent two months in the Grays Harbor Juvenile Detention Center without a capacity hearing, also in violation of state law." CP at 35. The plaintiffs contend that "[a]s a direct result of systemic and structural deficiencies known to [the State and OPD], juvenile public defense services in Grays Harbor County operate well below the constitutionally required minimum." CP at 34. The plaintiffs allege that the State and OPD know Grays Harbor County's system of juvenile public defense flouts recognized standards of constitutionally adequate indigent public defense, yet these state actors have taken no steps to remediate the county's failures.

¶6 The complaint sets forth three causes of action. Count 1 alleges violations of the right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Count 2 alleges violations of the right to counsel under article I, sections 3 and 22 of the Washington Constitution. And count 3 alleges violations of state statutes—chapters 2.70 and 10.101 RCW—claiming these statutes authorize OPD to take action to remedy a county's constitutionally deficient system of public defense. Among the relief requested, the plaintiffs ask for a declaration that the State is ultimately "responsible for ensuring that public defense systems in Washington State provide constitutionally adequate representation to indigent criminal defendants, including in Grays Harbor County's juvenile public defense system." CP at 59.

¶7 The State moved for partial summary judgment on the pleadings. It asked the superior court to dismiss count 3, arguing the provision of indigent juvenile defense is a county-level function and OPD lacks the statutory authority to compel Grays Harbor County to remediate its system of indigent public defense. It also argued Grays Harbor County is a necessary and indispensable party, requiring mandatory joinder.

¶8 Given the plaintiffs’ theory of state liability, the court ruled mandatory joinder of Grays Harbor County was not required. Still, it dismissed count 3 of the complaint, determining, "There is nothing in that statutory scheme that gives the Office of Public Defense the authority to do what the plaintiffs have requested, even assuming, as the complaint has alleged, that the defense services in Grays Harbor County violated the constitution and that OPD was aware of that." Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Nov. 3, 2017) at 19; CP at 389. The order did not address counts 1 or 2, so the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims remained pending.

¶9 Near the close of discovery, the parties cross moved for summary judgment. The plaintiffs again argued the State has the ultimate responsibility to safeguard the right to counsel. They presented evidence, including six examples of ineffective assistance of counsel, the county's admissions of its public defense system deficiencies, expert opinions concluding that the county's juvenile public defense system is unconstitutional, and declarations that OPD knew of the defects in the county's juvenile public defense system and failed to take oversight action. According to the plaintiffs, "[t]he Constitution places on the State the ultimate duty to remedy an unconstitutional public defense system that is known and obvious to State officials. This mandate both requires and empowers the State, through OPD or otherwise, to act and this Court should so hold as a matter of law." CP at 155.

¶10 In response, the State argued the plaintiffs sued the wrong party—the State, rather than Grays Harbor County—and the State committed no constitutional violations. The State emphasized that the legislature has the plenary power to develop policy and determine the governmental functions that counties and cities must perform. And given that the legislature delegated the duty to enforce the right to counsel to local governments, the plaintiffs have no right to relief against the State, which does not provide indigent juvenile defense services. The State also argued the legislature has provided the necessary taxing authority for counties to fulfill their statutory obligations, so the State cannot be held liable for the county's failures. It further claimed the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the State and failed to state a claim against OPD. Finally, the State asserted that without Grays Harbor County as a party in the case, the court cannot reach whether Grays Harbor County provides systemically deficient indigent juvenile defense services.

¶11 The superior court denied the State's motion for summary judgment and reserved ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion. The superior court opined in its oral ruling:

It is clear that the state has delegated operational responsibility for juvenile defense to the counties, but the state cannot delegate its ultimate constitutional obligation. I am moved by the authorities from other jurisdictions that I believe are sufficiently similar to the facts at bar to believe that this kind of suit may proceed even in the absence of a "cannot" situation, which is what the state has articulated as the standard here. I believe that the standard that should apply in this type of case is a knowing systemic violation and that the type of relief that is—has been requested by the plaintiffs in this case would be appropriate if the facts bore it out.

VRP (Dec. 14, 2018) at 28.

¶12 ...