Dawkins v. Biondi Educ. Ctr.
| Decision Date | 10 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-CV-2366 (KMK),13-CV-2366 (KMK) |
| Citation | 164 F.Supp.3d 518 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
| Parties | Donald Dawkins, Plaintiff, v. Biondi Education Center, Leake & Watts Services, Allan Mucatel, Alphonso Grimes, Donald Antonecchia, George Cancro, Jill St. John, and Ralph Causwell, Defendants. |
Donald Dawkins, Middletown, NY, Pro Se Plaintiff.
Isaac J. Burker, Esq., Susan M. Corcoran, Esq., Tarek M. Maheran, Esq., Jackson Lewis P.C., White Plains, NY, Counsel for Defendants.
KENNETH M. KARAS
Pro se Plaintiff Donald Dawkins (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant Fifth Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Biondi Education Center (“Biondi” or “the school”), Leake & Watts Services (“Leake & Watts”), and their employees, Allan Mucatel (“Mucatel”), Alphonso Grimes (“Grimes”), Donald Antonecchia (“Antonecchia”), George Cancro (“Cancro”), Jill St. John (“St. John”), and Ralph Causwell (“Causwell”) (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging violations of his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Plaintiff further alleges unlawful discrimination by Defendants, in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“Title VI”). Before the Court is Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 54.) For the reasons explained herein, Defendants' Motion is granted.
The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint and the documents attached to his opposition papers, which the Court takes as true for the purpose of resolving the instant Motion.1
Plaintiff is a former employee of Leake & Watts, having held a non-teaching position at Biondi between 2001 and 2012. (See Compl. at unnumbered 3, 12; Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. D (“Aff. of James Faulkner, Jr.”) at unnumbered 1.) “[C]ontrolled and owned by Leake [&] Watts,” Biondi is “a public high school with private status” that provides educational services to students with special needs. (Compl. at unnumbered 10, 15.) “[T]hese types of private schools” are “heavily regulated and closely supervised by the State,” (id. at unnumbered 3, 7), which “almost entirely” funds the school's budget, (id. at unnumbered 5). For these reasons, Plaintiff contends that Leake & Watts, Biondi, and the named employees are “an arm of the State” that should be “deemed State actors” for purposes of his § 1983
and Title VI claims.
The events giving rise to these claims trace back to December 2011, when Plaintiff launched “a union organizing campaign” for workers employed by Leake & Watts. He took “a leading role” in these efforts, “trying to overcome the chilling effects of [Leake & Watts'] union-busting campaign.” (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.) As a result, Plaintiff “started having problems with the administration” and “was really being single[d] out.” (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. E (“Aff. of Perry Kelly”) at unnumbered 1.) He was forced to relocate his office, , and “was consistently reassigned job duties,” (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. I (“Aff. of Windell Whitett”) at unnumbered 1).
In May 2012, Plaintiff was involved in an “alleged assault incident” with a student and then “suspended immediately” by the school. (Compl. at unnumbered 12; see also Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. J (“Aff. of Kenneth M. Stevens”) at unnumbered 1.) Shortly thereafter on May 14, 2012, Leake & Watts, “without conducting a full investigation,” and in violation of “their own policies and regulations,” (Compl. at unnumbered 8, 14), “informed him that he was being terminated,” (Aff. of Julie Berman ¶ 14).
Plaintiff thus contends that Defendants violated his constitutional rights, (see Compl. at unnumbered 1), and unlawfully discriminated against him, in violation of Title VI, (see Pl.'s Opp'n at unnumbered 4–6). Specifically, the Fifth Amended Complaint alleges that Mucatel, Chief Executive Officer of Leake & Watts, “ordered his subordinates to undermine any and every effort made by [P]laintiff ... to organize a union at [Biondi],” while Biondi Superintendent Antonecchia “conspired with all other [D]efendants to stop [P]laintiff from forming a union.” (Compl. at unnumbered 10.) St. John, an administrative assistant at Biondi, allegedly “issu[ed] confidential information regarding [P]laintiff's background ... for retaliatory purposes” in response to “[P]laintiff's union forming activities.” (Id. at unnumbered 11.) The Fifth Amended Complaint further alleges that Support Supervisor Causwell, Assistant Principle Grimes, and Principal Cancro “fail[ed] to give [P]laintiff his Due Process [r]ights” prior to his termination resulting from “the alleged assault incident.” (Id. at unnumbered 12–13.)
On April 8, 2013, Plaintiff commenced this Action against Mucatel, Antonecchia, St. John, Causwell, Grimes and Cancro, (Dkt. No. 2), filing an Amended Complaint four days later, (Dkt. No. 4). On September 12, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, adding Leake & Watts and Biondi as Defendants. (Dkt. No. 9.) On November 15, 2013, he filed a Third Amended Complaint against all Defendants named in his Second Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 11.) Plaintiff then filed a Fourth Amended Complaint on October 7, 2014. (Dkt. No. 45.)
Ultimately, Plaintiff filed this Fifth Amended Complaint on January 8, 2015, alleging that Defendants “depriv[ed] Plaintiff of those rights secured under the Constitution and laws of the United States” by “taking adverse employment actions against him in retaliation for his protected speech.” (Compl. at unnumbered 1.) Defendants filed their Motion To Dismiss and supporting papers on March 9, 2015. (Dkt. Nos. 54–57.) Plaintiff filed opposition papers on April 15, 2015, now additionally alleging that Defendants “adopted discriminatory and retaliatory tactics” in response to his “attempt[s] to exercise his constitutional rights to form a union,” allegedly in violation of Title VI. (Pl.'s Opp'n at unnumbered 5.) Defendants filed a reply on April 29, 2015, (Dkt. No. 62), and Plaintiff filed a sur-reply on June 22, 2015, (Dkt. No. 67).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his [or her] entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)
(alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, a complaint's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Although “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” id. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and a plaintiff must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, if a plaintiff has not “nudged [his or her] claim[ ] across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed,” id. ; see also
Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ( ; id. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ().
In addition, “when ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)
; see also
Dixon v. United States , No. 13–CV–2193, 2014 WL 23427, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2014) (report and recommendation) (“For the purpose of this motion to dismiss, we assume that the facts alleged in [the plaintiff's] complaint are true.”). Further, “[f]or the purpose of resolving [a] motion to dismiss, the [c]ourt ... draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Daniel v. T&M Prot. Res., Inc. , 992 F.Supp.2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC , 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.2012) ). “In adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y. , 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Hendrix v. City of N.Y. , No. 12–CV–5011, 2013 WL 6835168, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013) (...
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