Dawkins v. Green

• Decision Date: 25 April 1968
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 413.
• Citation: 285 F. Supp. 772
• Parties: Irvin Lee "Jack" DAWKINS et al., Plaintiffs, v. William GREEN, City Manager of the City of Gainesville, Florida, T. E. (Ted) Williams, Mayor-Commissioner of the City of Gainesville, Florida, Walter Murphree, Commissioner of the City of Gainesville, Florida, William D. Joiner, Chief of Police of the City of Gainesville, Florida, T. E. (Ted) Duncan, State's Attorney; Alachua County, Florida, and J. M. Crevasse, Jr., Sheriff, Alachua County, Florida, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

285 F. Supp. 772

Irvin Lee "Jack" DAWKINS et al., Plaintiffs, v. William GREEN, City Manager of the City of Gainesville, Florida, T. E. (Ted) Williams, Mayor-Commissioner of the City of Gainesville, Florida, Walter Murphree, Commissioner of the City of Gainesville, Florida, William D. Joiner, Chief of Police of the City of Gainesville, Florida, T. E. (Ted) Duncan, State's Attorney; Alachua County, Florida, and J. M. Crevasse, Jr., Sheriff, Alachua County, Florida, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 413.

United States District Court N. D. Florida, Gainesville Division.

April 25, 1968.

John Due, Quincy, Fla., William M. Kunstler and Arthur Kinoy, New York City, Morton Stavis, Newark, N. J., Dennis Roberts, Harriet Van Tassel & George Logan, Newark, N. J., for plaintiffs.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen. State of Florida, T. T. Turnbull, Chief Trial Counsel, State of Florida, Tallahassee, Fla., Wayne M. Carlisle, Osee R. Fagan, Gainesville, Fla., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

CARSWELL, Chief Judge.

One hundred three separate plaintiffs, ninety-two individuals and eleven organizations, filed complaint against six defendants individually and as public officials of the City of Gainesville, Florida, or of Alachua County, Florida, seeking an injunction restraining the defendants, "their agents, employees, attorneys and all others acting in concert therewith from the enforcement, operation or execution of ss. 806.01 and 806.02, 870.01 and 843.01 of the Statutes of the State of Florida;" and further restraining the defendants, their agents, etc., "from impeding, intimidating, hindering and preventing the individual plaintiffs and the friends, supporters and members of the organizational plaintiffs from exercising rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States."

Initially, the complaint sought to invoke the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Sections 2281 and 2284, by seeking a three judge federal District Court to determine this proceeding and to declare the relevant Florida statutes relating to arson, common law rioting and resisting arrest unconstitutional on their face.

Upon hearing, however, counsel for plaintiffs withdrew demand for a three judge court and conceded that it was inappropriate. Thus, the Constitutionality of the subject Florida criminal statutes is not at issue, and on the face of them they are clearly within Constitutional limits.¹

The defendants have answered and have filed sworn proofs in support thereof, together with further proofs in support of their respective motions for summary judgment and motions to strike. Timely notice on the motions was given and acknowledged. A pre-trial conference was held at which the pending motions for summary judgment and motions to strike were fully argued by counsel for the respective parties. Written briefs have been filed and considered following the second hearing.

Expunged of considerable volume of irrevelant matter in each, the complaint and answer and the pending motions for summary judgment present, basically, a simple factual question: Have the defendant public officials acted in bad faith in prosecuting the plaintiffs or some of them under the color of law enforcement to suppress and give a chilling effect to the exercise of the plaintiffs' rights as secured by the Constitution of the United States?

The entire thrust of the complaint is predicated upon the holding in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965), which, under plaintiffs' interpretation thereof, would require federal intervention to the extent of issuing an injunction restraining attempted enforcement of criminal laws by state officials upon a showing of bad faith as posed by the question above.

Since the filing of this complaint the Supreme Court on April 22, 1968 has given further exposition and clarification to Dombrowski, supra, in Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968). On the proofs before it here this Court can only conclude that plaintiffs are far short of the heavy burden as made explicit even in the dissent in Cameron, supra, where Mr. Justice Fortas said:

"And those who seek federal intervention bear a heavy burden to show that the State, in prosecuting them, is not engaged in use of its police power for legitimate ends, but is deliberately invoking it to harass or suppress First Amendment rights. Dombrowski should never be invoked when the State is, in substance and truth, engaged in the enforcement of valid criminal laws. Ordinarily, the presumption that the State's motive was law enforcement and not interference with speech or assembly will carry the day." (Emphasis added.)

Moreover, of even more recent date, i. e., May 20, 1968, the Supreme Court has given per curiam affirmance to Brooks v. Briley, 274 F.Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn.1967); 391 U.S. 361, 88 S.Ct. 1671, 20 L.Ed.2d 647 (1968); and Zwicker v. Boll, 270 F.Supp. 131 (W.D.Wis.1967); 391 U.S. 353, 88 S.Ct. 1666, 20 L.Ed.2d 642 (1968), both affirmances citing Cameron v. Johnson, supra.

From the proofs here it is clear that there was no harassment, intimidation or oppression of these complainants in their efforts to exercise their Constitutional rights, but some were arrested and they are being prosecuted in good faith under Constitutionally valid criminal laws of the State of Florida. As Mr. Justice Brennan said, speaking for the Court in Cameron, "Any chilling effect on the picketing as a form of protest and expression that flows from good-faith enforcement of this valid statute would not, of course, constitute that enforcement an impermissible invasion of protected freedoms."

No proofs whatsoever were filed in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment or its proofs which on the face of them categorically deny any effort or attempt to subvert the Constitutional rights of any of these named plaintiffs or the class they purport to represent. Here the presumption running in favor or the defendants is underpinned by sworn proofs and are not contradicted.

The sole argument advanced by plaintiffs at the hearing in opposition to the motion for summary judgment was to the effect that Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was inappropriate in such case and that they were entitled as a matter of law to have a full scale evidentiary hearing on all of their allegations. The Supreme Court has not taken such casual attitude toward Rule 56 and has indeed upheld the granting of summary judgment with respect to one of the respondents in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967). The urgings of plaintiffs that all of their prospective witnesses, numbering in excess of 130 persons plus some 75 attorneys who are members of the Alachua County, Florida Bar must be brought to the witness stand for examination flaunts the very purpose for Rule 56 and ignores the recent Supreme Court decisions.

Upon these findings there simply is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law in accordance with Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Moreover, it is also now made clear, by the Supreme Court affirmance of ...